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Cambridge : 
PRINTED BY Cc. J» CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRKSS, 


THE THEAETETUS 


OF 


PLATO, 


WITH TRAN AND NOTES. 

σος THE δν δν 
UNIVERSITY 
Kr Foas 
BENJAMIN HA KENNEDY, D.D. 


Ὑ REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK, 
AND HONORARY FELLOW OF ST JOHN’S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ; 
CANON OF ΕΙΥ. 










EDITED FOR ΤΗΕ SYNODICS CF ΤΗΕ UNIVERSITY PRESS. 


¥ 
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ο -- eee 
+ --ᾱ ω--π- 
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Cambridge : 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 





HLonvon: CAMBRIDGE WAREHOUSE, 17, PATERNOSTER Row, 
Cambritge: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 
Heipsig: Ε. A. BROCKHAUS. 


1881 
[All Rights reserved.] 


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INTRODUCTION. 


I. THE dialogues of Plato, which I ‘chose, from 
time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, 
were chiefly the Protagoras, the. Euthydemus, and the 
Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very 
amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any 
of my foremost boys to leave school without reading 
with them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus 
also, as the best preparative for their deeper study 
of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general: often 
adding to it the earlier books (1—4) of Aristotle’s 
Ethics. In the past year, 1880, I took it for the sub- 
ject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation 
to my class, and commenting as occasion required. 
This was executed in the first instance quite indepen- 
dently, without reference to Professor Jowett’s ver- 
sion; but in revising my translation for the press I 
have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as 
might be expected, to the correction of my own work. 


‘Still the result is, that I have generally departed less 


widely from the literal Greek than my confrére in the 
Sister University: and the reason of this is evident: 


Vill INTRODUCTION. 


the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruc- 
tion of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether 
Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience 
of Greek students in Universities. 

II. The order of Plato’s writings, and the genu- 
ineness of many, are questions respecting which the 
varieties of opinion and the controversies resulting, 
chiefly within the present century, have been so many 
and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can _ 
be reached on either point. Schleiermacher’s trans- 
lation with its prefaces (first published 1804—1810) 

_ was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone 
on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the 
dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever 
growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accept- 
ed by any of the scholars who have since published 
their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, 
Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweyg, 
Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and 
Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfa- 
vourable to the principle of Schleiermacher, though not 
admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or 36 dialogues 
usually set down as Plato’s, Ast will only accept 14 
as genuine; viz. (1) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias, 
Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmeni- 
des, Cratylus: (3) Philebus, Symposium, Respublica, 
Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects 
the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be 
considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, 
as Grote in his work on ‘Plato and the other com- 

| panions of Socrates’ represents the extreme credulous 


INTRODUCTION. 1X 


view, supporting the Alexandrjne canon of Thrasyllus, 
a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes 
of Laerta. This canon rejected.ten dialogues, which 
Diogenes enumerates; ‘and these have since then 
been universally treated as spurious. Some of them 
did not survive: seven are printed at the close of 
the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along with 
the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most 
scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (ὅροι). 
Thrasyllus, distributed the dialogues of Plato into two 
classes; (1) d. of Investigation (ζητητικοῦ); (2) d. of 
Exposition (ὑφηγητικοί. These he also subdivided 
variously: but his subdivisions have little interest. 
The chronological order of the dialogues, like the 
genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on 
some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the 
Phaedrus, which Schleiermacher, as an essential fea- 
ture in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as 
Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest. 

Generally it may be said that the shorter and 
slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are 
ascribed to Plato’s youth; the Republic, Timaeus and 
Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while 
the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too | 
the Parmenides and Cratylus) are supposed to have 
been written by Plato during his travels or on his 
return—at all events before his 40th year. 

The following arrangement is that of a critic who 
had evidently given much time and thought, with 
great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I 
mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most 


x INTRODUCTION. 


writers on this subject, distributes the works which he 
accepts into three groups: (1) the earlier, composed 
partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly 
after it, before Plato quitted Megara: (2) those written 
under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during 
or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, 
commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during 
the second half of Plato’s career, while he was scho- 


larch of the Academy, from 386 era till his 
death in 347. 


(1) ος) (3) 


Hippias II. | Cratylus e Phaedrus ¢ 
Ion Theaetetus Menexenus* 
Alcibiades I. Sophistes ¢ Symposium 6 
Charmides Politicus ¢ Phaedo 6 
Lysis Parmenides. Philebus ε 
Laches Respublica é 
Protagoras Timaeus ¢ 
Euthydemus Critias 6 
Apologia Socr.* | Leges e. 
Crito e 

Gorgias 

Euthyphro 

Meno 

Hippias I. 


Those to which e is appended are classed by Grote 
as dialogues of exposition; the rest are of investiga- 
tion (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are 
of neither kind. Grote accepts seven others which 
Hermann disallows. 


INTRODUCTION. xi 


It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that 
the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a 
genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally as- 
cribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when 
(having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and 
didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle dis- 
cussions of Megara had full opportunity of prac- 
tising the dialectic method) he had enlarged his 
learning and experience by intercourse with the ma- 
thematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean school- 
men of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and 
Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their 
genuineness is generally admitted, though the So- 
phistes is disallowed by Ueberweg. 

III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be in- 
complete without some account of antecedent Hellenic 
philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato’s works, 
much more to a single dialogue, such an account 
must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be 
placed in stronger light, and more fully considered 
than others. What are these? 

(1) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor 
in all Plato’s dialogues, excepting ‘the Laws’: and 
in most of them (though not in the Sophistes) we 
find him discussing, more or less, some principle or 
practice of those who are called Sophists. With 
Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with 
the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will 
do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon 
any of Plato’s writings. 

(2) Inseveral of Plato’s works (as in the Theaete- 





ΧΙ]. INTRODUCTION. 


_ tus) appears the contrast between (1) the physical 
teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides, 
Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the 
# universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of 
| Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the 
{place of Being, Many rather than One, Motion and 
1 Change instead of Rest, ascribing such motion to 
{ the flow of a prevailing fiery element (πάντα fei). 
Distinct again from these were (1) the teaching of 
Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord 
of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) as the base 
of existence; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus 
and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to 
the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisi- 
ble particles (ἄτομα); (3) that of Anaxagoras, who 
assigned the arrangement of his ὁμοιομέρειαι to 
supreme Intelligence (νοῦς). ΑΙ these philosophers 
had been preceded by two other famous schools in 
the 6th century B.c.: (1) the Ionian (Thales, Anaxi- 
mander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary sub- 
stance of things to be—the first, Water, the second, 
Indeterminate Matter (τὸ ἄπειρον), the third, Air: 
(2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and 
formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvel- | 
lous organic properties to Number, and believed in 
the "transmigration of souls. All the philosophers - 
above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished 
during the century and a half anterior to the age of 
Socrates (600—440 B.C.), though their exact dates are 
uncertain. 

Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor 


INTRODUCTION. ΧΙΙ] 


Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were 
engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for 
that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal 
by the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras 
(Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by 
them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller’s Preso- 
cratic Philosophy (translated by Alleyne); also Preller’s 
Historia Philosophiae (for citation of passages), Schweg- 
ler’s History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), 
and the fuller work of Ueberweg (published by 
Messrs Hodder and Stoughton). 

IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called 
down philosophy from heaven; by which is meant 
that Socrates was the first to change the direction 
of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them 
from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony 
to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather 
to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was 


— 


most at war, to those who are called Sophists: espe- ; 


cially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential/ 


of their number—the author of the famous dogm 
‘man is the measure of all things, in other words 
‘what seems to each is to each. Protagoras was born 
- at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.c. 450—430. 
Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to 
a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 
435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, 
Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects 
of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, 
logical eristic, &c.: and they travelled from city to 


xiv INTRODUCTION. 


city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the in- 
struction given. This instruction was calculated, as 
they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the pro- 

ress of human civilization, to free them from preju- 
dices, to give breadth and strength to their mental 
faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speak- 
ers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public 
affairs, how to manage their own property, and to 
deal with mankind in general. 

In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far 
as it deserves to be called a school, we may note the 
fate which has attended the name itself and its derived 
words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, so- 
phistication, are all of them terms used to designate 
what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in 
modern times attaches to the words jesuit, jesuitical, 
jesuitry, jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, 
heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a 
vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable 
name originally: it is given by Herodotus to the 
Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means 
a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being 
allowed by the Pope (who calls himself ‘ Vicar of Jesus 
Christ on earth’) to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for 
the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy 
(αἱρεσις, choice) merely meant the Latin ‘secta,’ a sect: 
and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church 
itself ‘the best of all heresies’ (sects). Each of these 
terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no 
doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, 
partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene- 


INTRODUCTION. XV 


mies. Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found 
their most powerful enemy in Plato: and upon his 
dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hip- 
pias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against 
them as a class originally rest. In the great historian 
of Greece, Mr Grote, they have found their most 
powerful champion and rehabilitater; their cause 
being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes 
in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students 
have in their hands Grote’s History; and they may 
be referred to that work for a general statement 
of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the 
facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to 
say) for the defendants in Part 11. Ch. xvii." On the 
other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote’s strong 
championship, may be consulted Thirlwall’s History 
of Greece, Ferrier’s Lectures, and Professor Jowett’s 
prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his 
preface to the Sophistes. 

V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his 
successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were 
founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These 
were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antis- 
thenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called 
Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of 
the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for 
happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. 
Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander 
the Great is so famous, was the best known member of 


1 Grote’s views are supported by Mr H. Sidgwick in two able 
papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of Philology (Nos. VIII. IX.). 


Xvi INTRODUCTION. 


this school. Aristippus of Cyrene founded the Cyre- 
naic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is 
the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later 
teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded 
the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have 
taught a fusion of Eleatic and Socratic doctrines. 
Dialectic was among its special studies, and was 
occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. 
Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its 
disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account 
in Schwegler’s History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), 
and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. I. 
§§ 34—38). It was to Megara that Plato retired after 
the death of Socrates, and resided there before his 
travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic dis- 
cussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this 
kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in 
the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly 
dedicating the dialogue to them. 

VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in 
the headings of the several sections, noted in the 
Greek text I—xXLIV., in the translation 1—44. In 
the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the mar- 
ginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition 
of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are 
chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato’s reasoning 
in places where it is not easily discerned: but occa-. 
sionally they refer to the commentaries of Professor 
Campbell and H. Schmidt. 


TAATQNOS 


OEAITHTOS. 


1 


TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΛ. 


ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, 
ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, 
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ, 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΟΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 


[Numeri marginales Arabici qui vocantur, editionis primae Stepha- 
nianae paginas indicant, Romani ejusdem editionis capitula. Stellula 
paginae, signum | sectionis initium notat.] 


I, * ρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; TEP. 
Ἐπιεικώς πάλαι. καὶ oé ye ἐζήτουν κατ ἀγορὰν καὶ 
ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός 7 ᾖ εὑρεῖν. ΕΥ. Ov γὰρ 4 
κατὰ πόλιν. TEP. Ποῦ µήν; ET. Eis λιμένα κατα- 
Batvov Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ 
τοῦ στρατοπέδου ᾿Αθήναζε TEP. Ζώντι ἢ τετελευ- 


τηκότι; ΕΥ. | Ζῶντι καὶ para poy’ χαλεπώς μὲν B 


\ ” e λ / a A \ » 3 
γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν 
e an \ \ / 3 “a / 
αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονος νὀσηµα ἐν τῷ στρατεύὐματι. TEP. 
“ e 3/ / 
Mov ἡ δυσεντερία; ET. Nai. TEP. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέ- 
γεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι. ET. ἸΚαλόν τε καὶ αγαθὀν, ὦ 
οι Ee Yon oy , / > 
Τερψίων' ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν ἠκουόν τινων para ἐγκω- 
µιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν µάχην. TEP. Kai ουδέν 
y ἄτοπον, αλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἶ μὴ τοιοῦτος 
9 * Vy an > | 9 a M a / . ET 
ἦν. atap mos οὐκ ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν; : 
. , ” oe Se Αν o¥ 2 3 / \ ι / 
Ἡπείγετο οἴκαδε ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, 
ἀλλ) οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέµψας αὐτόν, ἀπιων 
πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς pav- 
A Ld Ν 9 : \ ΔΝ / A / 
τικώς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε Καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ yap µοι 
1. 9 


oad 





ιν 


4 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


9 / \ A“ , 3 - 3, A / 9” 
ολίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανατου ἐντυχεῖν αυτῷ µειρακίῳ ὄντι, 
‘ [ ’ rN 9 , 4 a 
καὶ συγηγενόµενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ayacOnvat 

i] A“ ’ 9 ’ 
αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. Kai por ἐλθόντι ᾿Αθήναζε τοὺς τε 


Ὦ λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, cai! µάλα ἀξίους 


143 


3 a 9 / ο “A 3 / 2 a) 3 / 

akons, εἶπέ τε UTL πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον 

γενέσθαι, εἴπερ eis ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. TEP. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, 

\ 
ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις av 
3 Ν 

διηγήσασθαι; ΕΥ. Ov pa τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε 

9 9 / - . 9 9 , \ 4 9 ηλ *% ” 5 

ὠπὸ oTOomaTos αλλ, ἐγραψαμην μὲν τὀτ ευθυς * οἴκαδ'' 

9 Δ e / ef \ ‘ ‘ b] 

ἐλθων ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνη- 
/ 2 8 ς , 3 ’ 9 

σκόµενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσακις ᾿Αθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, 

ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτην ὃ wn ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο 


ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην. ὥστε por σχεδὀν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος 


γέγραπται. TEP. ᾿Αληθῆ' ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, 
καὶ µέντοι ἀεὶ µέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα 
δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως 
ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέοµαι, ὡς ἐξ aypod ἤκων. 


BET. ! ᾽Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς µέχρι ΕΒρινοῦ Θεαίτητον 


9 ef 9 A > A ’ , 9 3 
προὔπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν andas ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ 
ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται. 
TEP. ᾿Ορθώς λέγεις.-- ΕΥ. To μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ 
Τερψίων, route ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ 
9 \ / ’ « A 9 \ , 
ἐμοὶ Σωκράτην διηγούµενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγό- 

4 A ” ‘ a“ 4 
µενον ols ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωµέτρῃ 
, 4 α ’ ο Φ > a el) 
Θεοδωρω καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳω. Wa οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ 


c μὴ | παρέχοιε πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διη- 


/ ) . le) ς / / ς 5 ’ 

γήσεις περὶ αυτοῦ τε, ὁπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷον 

Kai ἐγὼ ἔφην ἢ Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, 7 av περὶ τοῦ ἀπο- 
/ id / a ° ς : / ο 

κρινοµένου, ὅτι Συνέφη 7) Ovy ὡμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα 

ς 3 A . ο) / # 2 \ ‘\ 

ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόµενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελων τὰ τοι- 

atta. TEP. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη. 


ω 


@EAITHTOS. 8 


ET. Αλλα, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε. --- IT. TO. 
’ ο = , 

Ke μὲν trav ἐν Κυρήνῃ | μᾶλλον ἐκηδόµην, © Θεόδωρε, 
a ” 3 , 

τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αυτόθι 
\ / wv wv / > \ a / 

περὶ γεωµετρίαν n τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων 

/ , a , A 

ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι νῦν δέ--ἧττον yap ἐκείνους 7 
a A a / / 6 α 

τούσδε φιλώ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι, τίνες ἡμῖν 

τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς ταῦτα δὴ αυτος 
a [ \ vf. a 

τε σκοπὠ καθ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, 

a ς a \ / 20é / θ \ δὴ 

ols ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. cot δὴ 
’ ο / / po \ 

οὐκ OAlytoToL πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως ἄξιος yap 

/ | W \ / ο 2 87 9 \ 

τά ' τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ένεκα. εἰ ON οὐν τινὶ 

ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡἠδέως ἂν πυθοἰµην. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ 
[ο 9 la) , 

µήν, © Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ col ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ 

ἄξιον, olw ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτών µειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ 


D 


E 


εἰ μὲν nv καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ 


τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ εἶναι νῦν δέ, καὶ wn µοι 
@ ad 2 3 ead | ad 
b ] ” / \ \ / 
ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιµό- 
\ ν 3 a 5) , . 2 δὲ a ὺ a? 
TnTa καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ 
a , \ / 
ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. ev * γὰρ ἴσθι ὕτι ὧν δὴ πώ- 
ποτε ἐνέτυχον-- καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα-- οὐδένα 
a κά 
πω Πσθύμην οὕτω θαυμαστώς ev πεφυκότα. . τὸ γὰρ 


- ο A α 
εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν, πρᾶον av εἶναι δια-' 


, A * ¢ a 
φερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ ὀντινοῦν, ἐγὼ 
' / } ἀ 9 / ν 6 oa / 9 ’ 
μὲν οὔτ᾽ ἂν Φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ φγυγνοµένους ἀλλ 
ot τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ µνήµονες ὡς 
\ \ \ \ δν. ogee ce a ν oo» 
τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύῤῥοποί εἶσι, καὶ ἅτ- 
/ 3 a 
τοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ | µα- 
3 ‘ , 
νικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἵ τε av ἐμβρι- 
θέστεροι νωθροί πως ἁπαντώσι πρὸς τὰς µαθήσεις καὶ 
/ / 6 of fs. \ 3 / \ 
λήθης γέµοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἁπταίστως καὶ 
3 4 
ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ tas µαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις 


144 


B 


0 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ 
ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυµάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω ταῦτα 
διαπράττεσθαι. ΣΩ. Ev ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καί ἐστι 
Aa A > / ‘ wv / 
τών πολιτών; ΘΕΟ. ᾿Ακήκοα μὲν τούνομα, μµνηµονεύω 


3 fe) A a 
C δὲ ov. ἀλλὰ yap ἐστι | τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ 


/ v \ 1 - / 9 / ο - / lA 
µέσῳ. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω Spdum ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί TE 
fe) 9 le) A 
τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ µοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλει- 
ψάμενοι δεῦρο ὑέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αυ- 
ς A 
tov. Σω. Tuyveckw’ 6 τοῦ Σουνιέως Evdpoviov ἐστί, 
3 ο) 
καὶ πάνυ ye, ὦ pire, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διη- 
α \ v = / A ’ 8 3 ’ , 
γεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ µέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν pada 
\ / ν ο “4 9 a / 
πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ ὃ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ µειρακίου. 


Ρ ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, | τὸ γε ὄνομα τὴν 


, 9 / A / ? / ‘ / 

μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί µοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέ- 
9 » ο \ \ \ a / 

ναι GAN ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθε- 
ριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.. ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις 
Δ ” / / 2A bl / / 
τὺν ἄνδρα. καί µοι Κκέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθί- 
ζεσθαι. ΘΕΟ. "Ὥσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο mapa 
Σωκράτη. LO. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ 
ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρὀσωπον. 


Γ φησὶ γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν µε col | ὅμοιον. ἁτὸρ εἰ 


νών ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη avtas ἡρμόσθα, 
ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ 
ἂν εἰ μουσικὺς, wv λέγε; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Επεσκεψάμεθ' 
ἄν. Σω. Ovxodv τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ ἄν, 
ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;, @EAI. ᾿Αληθηῆ. Σω. Nov 
δέ γ΄ οἶμαι, εἴ τι µέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιο- 
τητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὧν λέγει 7 OV. ΘΕΑΙ. 
Δοκεῖ pot. 20, 7H οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; ΘΕΑΙ. 
Οὐχ, ὅσον y ἐμὲ εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Αρ οὐδὲ γεωµετρικός; 
ΘΕΑ]. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατε. ΣΏ. Ἡ καὶ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. - 7 


᾿ἀστρονομικὺς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα 
παιδείας ἔχεται; @EAI. ὌἜμοιγε δοκε. YO. Ei μὲν 
dpa ἡμᾶς τοῦ σωµατός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινών 
πη ἢ ψέγων, ov πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν. 


@EAI. Ἴσως ov. ΣΏ. Te δ εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυ- 


\ | 2 a \ ) / \ po 2 . 
χην ' ἐπαινοὶ προς upetny τε καὶ σοφίἰαν; ap οὐκ B 


ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι 
'πὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύµως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατε. IIT. ΣΏ. Ὥρα 
τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, col μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ 
σκοπεῖσθαι' ὡς εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρός 
µε ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν 
ὡς σὲ νῦν δή. ΘΕΑΙ. Ed ἂν éyou, ὦ Σώκρατες ἀλλ᾽ 
dpa μὴ παίζων | ἔλεγεν. ΣΏ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος 
Θεοδωρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτό- 
µενος παιζοντα λέγειν τονδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ 
μαρτυρεῖν πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ 
θαῤῥών ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. ΘΕΔΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα 
ποιεῖν, eb σοι δοκε' XO. Λέγε δή µου µανθάνεις που 
παρὰ Θεοδωρου «γεωμετρίας ἄττα; ΘΕΑΙ. “Eqwye. 
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ |! ἁρμονίας καὶ 
λογισμούς; OEAT. Προθυμοῦμαί γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ 
ἐγώ, ὦ Tal, Tapa ye τούτου καὶ παρ ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν 
οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαῖειν. GAN ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω 
περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὲν δέ τι ἀπορώ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ 
τε καὶ τὠῶνδε σκεπτέον. Kai µοι λέγε Ap οὐ τὸ µαν- 
θάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ µανθανει 
τι; @EAI. Πώς γὰρ od; ΣΏ. Σοφία δέ γ᾿ οἶμαι 
σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί. ΘΒΑΙ. Ναί 0. | Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν 
διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;, ΘΕΑΙ. To ποῖον, Σω. Ἡ 
σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί; 


ο 


Ῥ 


ed 
an 


8 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ti µήν; ΣΏ. Ταὐτὸν dpa ἐπιστήμη καὶ σο- 
n 9 , ε 
dia; @EAI. Nai. YQ. Τοῦτ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ 
9 A . [ A e A 9 9 ο 
ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ ἐμαυτῷ, 
146 ἐπιστήμη 6 Th ποτε τυγχάνει dv. dp οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν * 
λέγειν αὐτό; Ti φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρώτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ 
ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖταε, ὥσπερ 
\ e a e / Ld ο ia + OA 
φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος ὃς ὃ ἂν περι- 
γένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὃ 
a , 9 / / a bod / 
τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί που, 
e 
ὦ 'Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προ- 
θυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε 
B καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. ' Ἡκιστα 
/ 9 / \ “A A 4/ 4 9 ‘ 
µέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, TO τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ 
τών µειρακίων τι κἐλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν 
‘ 9/ a / / \ 909 9 
yap anOns τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ ovd av συν- 
εθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω' τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο 
\ a 2 na, a \ ow e , 9 
καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπιδιδοῖεν τῷ yap ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς 
ο 3 / ” 3 9 ef wv \ 3 / ~ 
wav ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. GAN, ὥσπερ ἠρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ 
-ᾶΘεαιτήτου, ἀλλ ἐρώτα. IV. ΣΏ. ᾿Ακούεις δή, ὦ 
¢ / ο) ae 9 
Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, 
6 οὔτε σὺ | ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέµις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ 
a 3 iz , 9 aA 9 ? \ 
σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. GAN εὖ Kal γεν- 
ναίως εἰπέ' τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ 
’ "A / / 
χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑἡμεῖς κελεύετε πάντως 
’ ’ 
γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε ΣΩ. Πάνυ 
μὲν οὖν, ἄν πὲρ ye οἷοί τε ὦὠμεν. ΘΒΑΙ. Δοκεξ τοί- 
« : / bd Α 
νυν µοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου dv τις µάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι 
9 / Δ A a 5 \ ‘\ ὃ ηλ 6 \ 
εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ as νῦν δὴ σὺ dundOes, καὶ 
Dav σκυτοτοµική τε καὶ | αἱ τών ἄλλων δημιουργών 
/ [0 / N e / / 9 w “a 
τέχναι, πᾶσαί TE καὶ ἑκάστη τούτων, ουκ ἄλλο TL N 
\ / 3 
ἐπιστήμη εἶναι YO. Γενναίως ye καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 9 


φίλε, ἓν αὐἰτηθεὶ πολλὰ δίδως, καὶ ποικίλα av? 
ἁπλοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς τί τοῦτο λέγει, & Σώκρατες; 
ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν' ὃ µέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν 
λέγῃς σκυτικήν, µή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑπο- 


δηµάτων ἐργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΏ. Τί 8 | ὅταν Β 


τεκτονικήν; µή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων 
σκευών ἐργασίας; @EAI. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. LO. Οὐκοῦν 
9 9 a A 

εν αμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο opites; ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
Να ΣΏ. Τὸ δέ ye ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ θΘεαίτητε, οὐ 
τοῦτο Hv, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινέ. οὐ 
yap ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώ- 

> / > \ ad 4 > 9 / A 294 , 

ναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ 6 Ti ποτ ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω; 


@EAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθώς. ΣΏ. * Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ 147 


τοδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροι- 
το, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμε- 
θα αὐτῷ πηλὰ 6 τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς 6 τῶν ἴπνο- 
πλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς 6 τῶν πλινθουργών, οὐκ ἂν ηελοῖοι 
εἶμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Πρώτον μέν γέ που οἰόμενοι 
συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτώντα, 
ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθώὠν προσθέντες 


ui 


εἴτε | ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν δημιουργών. % ole, Tis TEB 


ouvingt τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ olde τί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ovéa- 
pas. ΣΩ. Οὐδ dpa ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν 
ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ov γάρ. ΣΏ. Σκυτικὴν 
apa ov συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῃ, οὐδέ τινα 
ἄλλην τέχνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Γελοία dpa 
ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν 
αποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστή- 


µην | ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ) ἐρωτηθεί.. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ο 


ΣΏ. "Ἔπειτά yé που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀπο- 
κρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ddov. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ 


10. TAATONOS 


A ὃν 9 , A , λ ο ο 3 . 6 
τοῦ πηλοῦ έρωτησει φαῦλον που καὶ ATOPY εἰπεῖν, UTL 
ma 6 α a ‘ a v 4 >of τρ / 
yn ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν ein, τὸ δ ὅτου ἐἂν χαίρειν. 
V. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται" 
oe A a a 
adtap κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος 
D εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε Kal τῷ σῷ | ὁμωνύ 
7 αλεγομένοις, ἐμοὶ ὶ τῷ σῷ | ὁμωνύμῳ 
, - 
τούτῳ 3ΣῬωκράτε. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε; 
: / α , 
@EAI. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, 
τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀποφαίνων ὅτι 
µήκει ov ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαία, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν 
ἑκάστην προαιρούµενος µέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος' ἐν 
δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, 
9 \ ‘ \ α ε / b) 4 
ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάµεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειρα- 
An a b σ 4 , : | 
E θῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν eis Ev, OTH πάσας ταύτας | προσαγο- 
) ls Suva ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ evperé DTOv ; 
pevoopev τὰς δυνάμεις. . Ἡ καὶ εὑρετέ τι τοιοῦτον ; 
A , 9 , 
@EAI. ἼὭμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκὀπει δὲ καὶ ov. LO. Λέγε. 
, \ 
ΘΕΑΙ. Tov ἀριθμὸν πάντα diya διελάβοµεν. τὸν μὲν 
A Ν 
δυνάµενον ἴσον ἰσάκις φίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ 
σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον 
προσείποµεν. DO. Καὶ eb ye. ΘΕΔΑΙ. Tov τοίνυν 
D 4 φ Δ Ν / Ν \ / x A 
148 μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε * καὶ 
aoa 207 ” >? , ~~ V9 A / 
mas ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, GAN ἢ πλείων 
9 / a 3 / / / / \ 
ἐλαττονᾶκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, µείζων δὲ 
καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προ- 
/ 9 / 9 , 9 \ 9 
| µήκει ad σχήµατι ἀπεικάσαντες προµήκη ἀριθμὸν éxa- 
~ / 9 \ / \ a 
| Nécapev. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ peta τοῦτο; 
ΘΕΑΙ. "Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπί- 
3 A ’ 
πεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, µῆκος ὠρισάμεθα, boat 
A 9 
Β δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάµεις, ὡς µήκει μὲν ov! Evppétpovs 
ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ 
στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΣΩ. ᾿Αριστά γ ἀνθρώπων, ὦ 
a ef ae , bd ” a 
παϊΐδες, ὥστε µοι δοκεῖ 6 Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδο- 


@EAITHTOS. ᾿ 11 


2 
µαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ µήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ γε 
3 a“ 4 3 ’ . A 4, 9 
ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίµην αποκρἰνασθαι 
fe! a ’ 
ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάµεως. KalToL σύ γέ 
pot δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν. ὥστε Tadw av φαίνεται 
ψευδὴς.ὁ Θεόδωρος. LO. Ti δαί; εἴ σε | πρὸς δρόµον 
9 α \ ef na ὃν α / 2 
ἐπαινών μηδενὶ οὕτω δροµικώ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυ- 
fo) 3 / 
χηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου 
ε / Φ ‘ “a ” ? A / ὃν bd / μ 
ἠττήθης, ἧττόν τι ἂν oles ἀληθῆ τὀνὃ ἐπαινέσαι; 
@EAI. Ove ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ 
a \ 3 \ / »/ 9 3 a 3 
νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σµικρὀν τι oles εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ 


C 


τών πάντῃ ἄκρων; ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Al’ ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα | 


γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων. ΣΩ. Θάῤῥει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ και 
τι οἴου Θεόδωρον λέγειν, ' προθυµήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ 
τών τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί 
ποτε τυγχάνει dv. ΘΕΒΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκεν, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, φανεῖται. VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή καλώς γὰρ ἄρτι 
ὑφηγήσω' πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάµεων 
ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὖσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περι- 
έλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας Evi λόγῳ προσ- 
ειπεῖν. ΘΕΒΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ’ ev ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, | πολλακις 
δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ 
ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις' ἀλλὰ yap οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναµαι 
πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανώς τι λέγω, OUT’ ἄλλου ακοῦσαι 
λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει, οὐ μὲν δὴ av οὐδ 
απαλλαγῆναι τοῦ µέλλειν. LO. ᾿Ωδίνεις γάρ, ὦ pire 
Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὺς αλλ. ἐγκύμων εἶναι. @EAI. Οὐκ 
οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες' ὃ µέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. ΣΏ. Εἶτα, 
ὦ * καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὡς ἐγω εἶμι υἱὸς µαίας 
para yevvaias τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; ΘΕΑΙ. 


1480. Num legendum sit του pro τοῦ quaeri potest, non decerni. 


/ 


D 


0) 


149 


12 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ὪἨδη τοῦτό ye ἤκουσα. 2). ρα καὶ ore ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν 
αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας; @EAI. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. AAD’ 
Φ ο. \ / ῃ \ \ oo» 

ev ἴσθ ore’ μὴ µέντοι µου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. 

λέληθα γαρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην οἱ δέ, 
of 9 στο a \ > / \ 5ο A ο 

ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὗ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ 
ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπους ἀπορεῖν. 7 

Ὦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας; @EAT. | Ἔγωγε  ΣΏ. Εἴπω οὖν 
σοι τὸ αἴτιον; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ᾿Εννόησον 
δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς µαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾷον µαθήσει 
“A [ 9 / ef 9 / . «a / 
ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα yap που ὅτι οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι 

"αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας µαιεύεται, 
ἀλλ, αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ᾿Αρτεμιν, 
/ 4/. 9 \ / ό / Ν 
ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν 

9 Φ Ww 9 | ἔδ ’ θ ef e¢ 9 @ 4 , 

6 οὖν apa οὐκ | ἔδωκε µαιεύεσθαι, ort ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις 
’ / a a / ΑΔ 9 ν . a 
ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν av ᾖ ἄπειρος ταῖς 
δὲ δι ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτῆς 
ὁμοιότητα. ΘΗΕΑΙ. Eixos. YO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ rode εἰκός 
τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι 
μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τών μαιών ἢ τῶν ἄλλων; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Παάνυ 
γε. 20. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί ye αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια 

Ῥ καὶ ἐπᾷδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδίνας | καὶ 
µαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δ)) 

\ , Ν oN / A , 2 / 
τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον dv δὀξη ἀμβλίσκειν, 
ἀμβλίσκουσιν; ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἠστι ταῦτα. ΣΏ. Αρ οὖν 
ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἶσι 
δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνώναι, ποίαν 


χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παϊδας τίκτειν: 
@EAI. Ov πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλ ic ὅτι ἐπὶ 


149 Ρ. véoy ὃν corruptum videtur. 


ΘΕΑΔΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 13 


3 / / 
τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. | ἐννόει Ἡ 
yap’ τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἴευ τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε 
καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπών καὶ av τὸ γωνω- 
σκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φΦυτόν τε καὶ σπέρµα κατα- 
"Βλητέον; @EAI. Ove, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς. YO. Eis 
γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ pire, ἄλλην μὲν oles τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην 
δὲ ξυγκοµιδῆς; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. * Οὐ 150 
/ b] \ \ ‘\ ” / v 4 : 
γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὼ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν 
bd A / Φ \ / ov , 
ἀνδρὸς καὶ αγυιναικός, ᾗ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι 
καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ µαῖαι, φο- 
βούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν aitiay dia ταύτην ἐμπέ- 
σωσιν ἐπεὶ ταῖς ye ὄντως palais µόναις που προσήηκει 
καὶ προµνήσασθαι ὀρθώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΏ. Το 
μὲν τοίνυν TOY μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ 
δράµατος. ov γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα 
/ ” Ss v4 | x θ / a δὲ \ cfr 5 3 
τίκτειν, ἔστι ὃ ὅτε ' ἀληθιωά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι B 
διαγνώναι. εἶ γὰρ προσῆν, µέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον 
ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς µαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ - 
µή. ἢ οὐκ οἵἴει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε VII. 20. TH δέ ¥ 
> A lA “a , \ Ν W e , ed 
ἐμῇ τέχνη τῆς pavevocws τὼ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει, bod 
bY / ὃ / δὲ A ¥ ὃ Ar \ \ aA 
ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ TE ἄνδρας adda µη yvVaixas 
A ‘ A 
µαιεύεσθαι, καὶ τῷ Tas ψυχᾶς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπι- 
σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. µέγιστον δὲ TOUT ἔνι τῇ 
ἡμετέρα τέχνη, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ | τρόπῳ, ϱ 
[ ” a 3 , A / e / 
πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια 
“A / / 1 / 3 / 3 ς , 
ἢ αγόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.. ἐπεὶ τόδε ye καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρ- 
χει, ὅπερ ταῖς µαίαις ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ δη 
/ > ο \ ν 3 9 A 9 4 
πολλοί µοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτώ, αὐτὸς 
δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν 
aopov, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε 
, / ς Δ 3 / “A 9 / 
µαιεύεσθαί µε ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκωλισεν. 


14 ΠΛλΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


9 \ es oA \ ’ / , νο , 
εὐμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ TL µοι 


Déotw εὕρημα ! τοιοῦτον, γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκ- 


‘ 9 / \ : A 
yovov’ οἱ ὃ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόµενοι τὸ μὲν πρώτον φαίνονται 
ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἁμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς 
a \ 
ξυνουσίας, οἶσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον 
b / e 6 a \ a of “A ο 
ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὗτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι καὶ 
a / 4 A 

τοῦτο ἐναργές, OTL παρ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε µαθόντες, 
9 9 9 4 9 e A \ N 4 ς / 

αλλ, αυτοὶ παρ αυτώων πολλα Kal Καλα εὑροντες τε 

/ A / 
καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι µαιείας 6 θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ 


Ε αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο | ἀγνοήσαντες 


το 


καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ 
3 Ν  )» ν / >. A .. 7 
αὐτοὶ ἢ UT ἄλλων TetoOEerTeEs, ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον 
τοῦ δέοντος, ἄπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν 
: : : 
διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ ἐμοῦ μµαιευθέντα 
κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ 
fe) > A A 
πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες ὃ av- 
τοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ὠμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν els 


* ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ 


γέγονεν ᾿Αριστείδης 
πολλοί ols, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσιν δεόµενοι τῆς ἐμῆς 
ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρώντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνό- 
µενόν pot δαιµόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ᾽ 
\ / 3 N } , / \ \ 3 Ν 
καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ 
A \ a 
ξυγγιγνόµενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις ὠδί- 
νουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ 
. ’ 4 a A 3 aA ’ ΔΝ \ INA 
ημέρας πολυ μαλλον ἢ εκειναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδίνα 
ἐγείρειν τε Kal ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ 
Φ \ | \ 4 > / δέ 9 Θ AY ” 
οὗτοι μὲν | δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοτε δέ, ὦ Θεαιτητε, of av. 
Ν / / 3 ’ te J 8 of 9 Ν 
µοι un δὀξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν 
> n / / 9 a A ο \ a 
ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενώς προμνώμαι, καὶ Ew θεῷ 
1508. ἡἢ αὐτοὶ 7 ὑπ ἄλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii, 


pro vulgato 7 αὐτοὶ um’ ἆλλων. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. | 15 


3 a / e α΄ , A / ¥ 
εἰπεῖν, Tavu ἱκανώς τοπάζω ols ἂν ξυγγενόµενοι ὄναιντο. 
ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις 

Δ / 3 ’ A , 9 
σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ 
ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ 
αὐτὸς ole, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου. οὖν 
πρός µε ὡς πρὸς µαίας υἱὸν καὶ | αὐτὸν µαιευτικὀν, καὶ 
ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷος Tt el, οὕτως ἀποκρί- 
νασθαι. καὶ ἐὰν dpa σκοπούμενύς τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃης, ἡγή- 

\ 3 φ a 
σωµαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα vireEaipauat καὶ 

9 ’ 4 9 i ϱ/ ο / - Ν \ 
ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ayplaive ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ 

/ \ \ Ld ο / / cf 
παιδία. πολλοὶ yap ἤδη, © θαυµμάσιε, πρὀς µε οὕτω 
διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνώς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει- 
Sav τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρώμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί µε 
εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πὀῤῥω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς 

A | 7 9 , 1. 9 \ 5 / A 
θεὺς | δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳα τοιοῦτον 
aA Ag? a \ 
οὐδὲν Spa, ἀλλά pou ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς 
: a \ ’ 
ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέµι.. VIII. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 
3 , A ’ 
© Θεαίτητε, ὃ τί ToT ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν ὡς 

3 2 7 9 ed / 3 ¥” rN \ \ fh’ 

ὃ οὐχ οἷός 7° ef, μηδέποτ᾽ εἴπῃς. ἐὰν yap θεὸς ἀθέλῃ 

9 , ? 
καὶ avopitn, olos 7 ἔσε. Q@EAI. ᾽Αλλὰ pévro, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, cod γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ 
οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι Ὁ τί τις ἔχει | λεγειν. 
δοκεῖ οὖν µοι 6 ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθανεσθαι τοῦτο, ὃ 

1 / Δ 6 \ / > ¥ { 93 
ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς ye vuve φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο.τί ἐστιν 
ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις. 20. Ed ye καὶ γενναίως, ὦ trai’ 

by > / 
χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ 
“a 3 a 
αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιµον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει Ov. 
αἴσθησις, dys, ἐπιστήμη;, ΘΒΕΑΙ. Ναί Σω. Κωδυ- 
; a / 
νεύεις µέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, 
ἀλλ, ὃν ἔλεγε * καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον 


σ 


D 


I 


A / 
εἰρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Φφησὶ yap που πάντων χρημάτων 


~ 


2 


2 


16 | ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


, 9 θ 9 a \ 6 ε # “a 4 
µέτρον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, TOV δὲ 
“A ν e 9 ” > / / 
μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας yap Tov; ΘΕΑΙ. 
3 a 
Ανέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, 
ὡς ola μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ Φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν 


ἐμοί, ola δὲ coi, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε 


κἀγω; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Λέγει yap οὖν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ειἰκὸς µέντοι 


ΔΝ wv Ν A. | 9 , 9 9 A 
πο αν ἄνδρα µη ληρεῖιν ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν AUTO. 
Pd A na e \ e Aa 
dp οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ 6 μὲν ἡμών 
ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ᾽ οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
Kal para. ΣΏ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ 
A ΔΝ a 9 A , A , A 
πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ ov ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόµεθα τῷ 
, oe “~ ΔΝ e ‘el , A 4 
Πρωταγόρα, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥυγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ 
4 b A 
ov; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε. 20. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως 
ἑκατέρῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Nat. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ ye φαίνεται αἶσθά- 
νεσθαί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι γάρ. ΣΏ. | Φαντασία 
apa καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὺν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς 
τοιούτοις. ola γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ 
καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. "Βοικεν YO. Αἴσθησις 
bd a }ὸ > / 9 \ ? / e 2 / > 
dpa τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι καὶ arpevdés, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. 
@EAI. Φαίνεται. ΣΏ. Αρ’ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάἀσ- 
, » ο , lal 6 a \ > ? 
σοφός τις ἦν 6 Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο 
ry A wn A \ aA ? ? }γς 
τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀποῤῥητῳ 
[ nA ’ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;, ΘΒΑΙ. Ids δή, ὦ Σὠκρατες, 
τοῦτο | λέγυις; ΣΏ. Ἐηὼ ἐρῶ καὶ par ov φαῦλον 
λόγον, ὡς dpa ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ovd 
ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς ovd ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ ἐὰν ὡς 
’ a ; Ν 
µέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, Καὶ édv βαρύ, 
κοῦὔφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς µήτε 
τινὸς µήτε ὁποιουοῦν' ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως 


| 152 5. 颰 ἑαυτοῦ. De hac lectione cf. Vers. 


ΘΕΔΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 17 


καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή papev 
εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαηορεύοντες ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέ- 


9 9a? 3 | ’ \ / , 
ποτ ovdév, ἀεὶ δὲ | γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες F 


ἑξῆς of σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυµφερέσθων, Π]ρωτα- 

/ ye / ν ta) a 
γόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ “EprredoxvAns, καὶ τῶν 
ποιητὠν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωµφδίας μὲν 
> / / 4 ο δν \ 
Ἐπίχαρμος, tpay@dias δὲ "Όμηρος εἰπὼν yap 

Ὠκεανόν τε θεών γένεσιν καὶ µητέρα Τηθύν 
γ μητέρ 

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα pons τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὗ δοκεῖ 
τοῦτο λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιχε IX. Σω. Τίς οὖν ἂν 
ἔτι πρὀς ye τοσοῦτον * στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν 
“ο δύ 2 , \ > / 

µηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὗ καταγέλαστος 
γενέσθαι; @EAT. Ov ῥάδιον ὦ Σώκρατε. ΣΩ. OV 

/ 3 / > 4 / a / A e , 
γαρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, 
ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρ- 
έχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἠσυχία' τὸ yap 
θερµόν τε καὶ πρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτρο- 
πεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως' τούτω δὲ 


153 


κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός; BEAT. Λὗται Ἡ 


' μὲν οὖν, ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ro ye τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τών 
αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται. ΘΕΔΙ. Πώς δ οὗ; ΣΩ. Τί dai; 
ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἠσυχίας μὲν καὶ apyias 
διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυµνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολὺ σώζεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 20. Ἡ & ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ µαθήσεως μὲν Kal μελέτης, κινήσεων 
ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε µαθήµατα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται 
βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας 


/ 
οὔσης, οὔτε τι µανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν µάθῃ | ἐπιλανθάνεται; ϱ 


ΘΕΔΙ. Kal para. ' ΣΏ. Τὸ μὲν dpa ἀγαθὸν κίνησις 


162Ππ. Κξυμφερέσθων recte se habet pro vulg. ξυμφέρεσθο». 
K, Ρ. ? 2 


18 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ | 


9 
κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. SO. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεµίας τε 
a 4 e , 
καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι on- 
4 9 , 4 2 ο ". / ἣ 3 / 
πουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ ὃ ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ Tov- 
A ος 3 ’ ’ A m 
τοις τὸν κολοφώὠνα αναγκάζω προσβιβαζων, THY χρυσην 
\ 
σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον "Όμηρος λέγει, καὶ 
5 a ef | σ λΝ a e Δ 9 / } e 
D δηλοῖ ὅτι | ἕως μεν ἂν n περιφορα 7 κινουµένη Kal ὁ 
fod s ” N ’ a 9 6 a } 9 
NALOS, παντα ἐστι καὶ σώζεται τα ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ αν- 
θρώποι»' εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' 
ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ Ὑένοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ λκηόµενον ἄνω κάτω 
πάντα; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα 
δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγες. Χ. YO. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ 
” e / \ @ a) rs) \ nA 
ἄριστε, οὑτωσί. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρώτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς 
αρώμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὑτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τών σών 
3 a 
ὀμμάτων pnd ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ tw’ αὐτῷ χωώραν | 
9 9 / 
E αποτάξῃης. ἤδη yap ἂν ein τε dv που ἐν τάξει καὶ µένοι 
. A ry ἄν 
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν αγενέσει γίγνοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰὸ πῶς; 
α , 9 
Σω. ἙἜπωμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ αὑτὸ ἓν 
aA 4. : \ 6 α ϱ/ I \ 
ὃν τιθέντες καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω µέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ 
ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τών ὀμµάτων 
πρὸς THY προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενηµένον, καὶ 
λ λ ο 9 | a a w . / 
ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί Φαμεν χρώμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον 
154 οὔτε * τὸ προσβαλλόὀµενον ἔδται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκά- 
στῳ ἴδιον γεγονος. ἢ ad διϊσχυρίσαιο ἄν, ὡς οἷον cot 
φΊλίνεται ἕκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτῳοῦν 
Cop; OEAI. Md A? οὖκ ἔγωγε YO. Τί δ; ἄλλῳ 
’ / 9» of ολα \ / :ς ας, 3 
ἀνθρωπω dp ὅμοιον καὶ ool “φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις 
a 3 a “a \ A ef ION \ 2 A 
τούτο ισχυρώς, 1) πολὺ μαλλον, OTL ‘OL δὲ col αυτῶ 
ταύτὸν διὰ τὸ µηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν; 
ν A / A a ο 
B@EAI. Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν µοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 
εὖ μὲν -ὃ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ ἡ οὗ | ἐφαπτόμεθα, µέγα Ἱ 
λευκὸν 9 Θερμὸν ἦν, οἱκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ τῳ προσπεσὺν 


@EAITHTOS. 19 


ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, avTo ye μηδὲν μεταβάλλον' εὖ δὲ av 
τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἡ ἐφαπτύμενον ἕκαστον HY τούτων, 
οὖκ ἂν av ἄλλου προσελθόντος 4 τι παθόντος αὐτὸ 
μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ dire, 
A 3 a 9 
θαυμαστά τε Kal γελοῖα εὐχερὼς πως αναγκαζόµεθα 
lA ο / a / Ν “A 6 A 3 
λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ 
ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγει. OEAI. Πώς δὴ καὶ ποῖα 
λέγεις; ΣΏ. ' Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγµα, καὶ πάντα Ο 
” “A U ’ / / σ “A \ 
εἶσει ἃ βούλομαι. aotpayadous yap που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν 
᾿τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν 
/ \ e / 3 Ν , 3 , \ 
τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους Kal 
9 
ἡμίσεις' καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε ΣΏ. Τέ οὖν; ἄν σε Πρωταγόρας 
2 ef a 
ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος, "O Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ᾽ ὕπως τι μεῖζον 
a , / Μ a 9 Poi , 9 a 
ἢ πλέον yiyverat ἄλλως 7 αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώὠκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν 
ao 2 12 / η] >  ν .”.”. \ \ 
νῦν ἐρώτησιν | ἀποκρίνωμαι, OTL οὐκ ἔστιν' ἐὰν δὲ πρὺς D 
τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν. 
ΣΩ. Ed γε vn τὴν Πραν, ὦ Φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἁἀτάρ, ὡς 
4 3. > / 6 ” > / i / 
έοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Βὐριπίδειον τι ξυµβή- 
σεται ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλὠττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, n δὲ 
φρὴν ove ἀνέλεγκτος. ΘΗΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθήῆ. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 
? 4 \ \ ΔΝ 1} / \ \ 4% : / \ 
εὖ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγω τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ 
A A 3 , Ww a \ Ν 9 / 
τῶν φρενάν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας 
ἀλλήλων ἁποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελθόὀντες σοφιστικώς | eis E 
, / ὃν / \ / n / 
µαχην τοιαύτην, αλλήλων τους λογους τοῖς λογοις 
} / ο Φ δὲ e ὃ A a , 6 
ἐκρούομεν νῦν δὲ ate ἰδιώται πρῶτον [βουλησόμεθα 
θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς avta, τί ποτ ἐστὶν ἃ διανοου- 
µεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ ὁπω- 
στιοῦν. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοί- 
µην. ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Kal μὴν ἔγωγε ὅτε 8 οὕτως ἔχει, 
2—2 


20 MAATOQNOS © 


ἄλλο τι ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, 
155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, ov * δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα wor ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ 
φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν. ὧν πρὠτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, 

¢€ 2 A 9 / δὲ A a δὲ ” 
ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, µηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον 
γενέσθαι µήτε ὄγκῳ µήτε ἀριθμῶ, ἕως ἴσον ein αὐτὸ 
ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΏ. Δεύτερον δέ 
ye, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο µήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε 
αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε pnte Φθίνειν ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναυ. 
ΒΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Αρ ! οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, 
ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ 
γενέσθαι καὶ φίγνεσθαι advvatov; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε 
δή. ΣΏ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται 
αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν 
ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φώμεν ἐμὲ τηλικὀνδο 
ὄντα, µήτε αὐξηθέντα µήτε τοὐναντίον παθὀντα, ἐν 
ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν µείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ 
ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ 
6 αὐξηθέντος. | εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ἵστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν, 
οὗ γενόμενος ἄνευ yap τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνα- 

\ 3 \ aw 9 Ww 9 / 
τον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγιγνόμην 
’ \ \ , > 4 / / ” 

ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ µυρία ἐπὶ µνρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, 
9/ A A ’ ο / 9 ‘ 
εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόµεθα. ἔπει yap που, ® Θεαί- 
τητε δοκεῖς γοῦν µοι οὐκ ἄὄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυώς 
5 / / % 9 aA 3 € > A 
ὡς θαυμάζω, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, Kal ἐνίοτε ws ἀληθώς 
D βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιώ. XO. ὶ Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ 
Φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακὠς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. 
para γὰρ Φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν΄ 
οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη apy? φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν 
Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας ov κακώς γενεαλογεῖν. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 21 


ἀλλὰ πότερον µανθάνεις ἤδη, διὸ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὕπω; ΘΕΑ]. 
Οὔὕπω µοι Sond. ΣΏ. Xapw οὖν µοι εἴσει, ἐάν σοι 


ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστών τῆς διανοίας | τὴν EB 


ἀλήθειαν ἁποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωµαι ' αὐτῶν ; 
@EAI. Πώς γὰρ οὖκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ ye πολλήν; 
ΧΙ]. Σω. Αθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν,.µή τις τῶν ἁμυήτων 
ἑπακούῃ. εἶσὶ δὲ «οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἴόμενοι εἶναι 
n οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις 
δὲ καὶ γενέσεὶς καὶ wav τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι 
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας µέρε. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
σκληρούς ye λέγεις καὶ * ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. ΣΩ. 
Eict γάρ, ὦ mai, pad ed ἄμουσοι ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ 
κοµψότεροι, ὧν µέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ 
δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηταυ nde 
αὐτών, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἆλλο παρὰ τοῦτο 
οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον 
ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχει». 
ἐ« δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα 


156 


ηίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, | δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν B 


3 / Ν A a > A / 
αἰσθητον, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεν- 
Ζωµένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ 
τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοα) καὶ 
να / ’ \ , \ ς / ν 
ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ 
καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκληµέναι καὶ 
ἄλλαι, ἁπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ 
ὠνομασμέναι τὸ ὃ ad αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσταις 


ὁμόγονον, ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς | παντο- 0 


Samra, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἷ- 
/ 4 of 3 \ A , / 
σθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόµενα. Τί δὴ 
9 cia , Φ ς a / 8 X 
οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ 


22 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


πρότερα; apa ἐννοες; @EAI. Ov adv, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλ ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῃ. βούλεται yap 
δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα µέν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, 
τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν 
οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν 


/ ” ) a δὴ | a ‘ δὲ , 
Ὦ κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω On ' Ύεννα, τα OE γεννωµενα 


οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερά ἐστιν ὅσον δὲ αὖ ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ 
πὀῤῥωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω yevva, τὰ δὲ 
/ a Q , 9 /, , ‘ 9. 
γεννώµενα οὕτω δὴ] θάττω ἐστέ Φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν 
dopa αὐτῶν 7 κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ 
3). ’ ’ a 4 
ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμµέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν 
, 4 ” } A / “A . 
λευκότητά τε Kal αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἄν 
> / e / 1 / 4 ν ά 
ποτε ἐγένετο ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἆλλο ἐλθοντος, 
ό δὴ ‘ / a \ a \ a 
τότε On μεταξὺ φερομµένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν 


E ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος | πρὺς τοῦ συναποτί- 


157 


\ a ; 
KTOVTOS τὸ χρώμα, ὁ μὲν οφθαλμὸς apa ὄψεως ἔμπλεως 
> / YV ς 3 ὃ \ / \ 2 2 4 Μ 3 \ 
ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο ov τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ 
3 4 ς a A Δ A \ A / ς 
ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος 
/ λ > / 3 / 9 3 λ , 
περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλα λευκόν, 
εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρω- 
σθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. «καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω, 
σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπο- 
ληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ 
/ *% 252 9 N A \ ψ. ς / / 
τότε * ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τη προς αλληλα οµιλἰᾳ παντα 
“ 3 a) / 2 ΔΝ 4 
γύγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ Kal τὸ 
ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, 


156 p. βραδύτερα et quae in uncinis sequuntur, omissa in codd., 
supplevit Stephanus e Cornarii eclogis: et sine uncinis edidit Bekker, 
sensu, ut videtur, exposcente; respuunt tamen Campb., Jowett. 

E. ὁτιοῦν-- χρῆμα ex correctione Cornarii receperunt Heind. 
et Bekker. pro vulg. ὁτουούγ--- χρώμα. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. | 93 


” > 9 , y) \ aA 9 + 
ὥς φαᾶσιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί Tt, 
' \ “ / 
πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάᾶσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὖτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν 
τῷ ποιοῦντι to τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ ad 
προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τού- 

” 9 b] a / IAN = 4 4 > 
των, Όπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ 
ς / » , ΣΑ / \ > 9 
αὐτὸ, ἀλλά τινι ael ηίγνεσθαι, τὸ ὃδ εἶναι παντα- 
: 6 | 3 / 3 6“ e a \ bd 3 
χοθεν | ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ Kal ἄρτι ἠναγ- DB 
κασµεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι 
> A ‘ 9 3 aA e e a Aa ή bd 
αὐτῷ. το 8 οὐ δεῖ ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφών. λόγος, οὔτε τι 
ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ᾽ ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε OUT ἐκεῖνο οὔτε 
ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα, 6 τι ἂν ἰἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν 
Φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόµενα καὶ ποιούµενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα 
: , ee 27 , , a / ./ 
καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα' ὡς ἐάν Ti τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέ- 
λεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰὼ µέρος οὕτω 
λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλών ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι 
ἄνθρωπόν te τίθενται ' καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζώόν τες 
A eqs ~ 

καὶ eldos. Ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, dp’ ἠδέα δοκεῖ σοι 
εἶναι, Kal γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων; ΘΕΒΕΑΙ. Ov‘ 

9 ” φ , ϱ yA ’ \ a ar 
οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ cov δύναµαι 

a a \ le) 
κατανοῆσαι, πὀτερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὸ ἢ ἐμοῦ 

9 a 9 4 9 ο“ 3 \ . 
ἀποπειρᾷ. ΣΏ. Ov pynpovevers, ὦ Φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν 

/ 3 9 wv A α , ION 9 / . 9 
ovT οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ 
3 9 A 
εἰμὶ αὐτῶν dryovos, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα 
‘ A a 3 
ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθηµι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφών ἀπο- 
ηεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν eis | das τὸ σὸν δὀγµα ξὐνεξαγαγω' D 

3 ’ ’ , Ὁ wv / vy Ὁ ? aA ” 

ἐξαχθέντος δέ, ToT ἤδη σκέψοµαι εἴτ ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε 
/ b , 3 A xen le ° 

γονιµον ἀναφανήσεται. ἄλλα θαῤῥών καὶ καρτερών εὺ 
) 3 ὃ / , / WA A / ϱ ) ὦ A 

καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ Oy ἂν 

/ / 
ἐρωτώ. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾿Ερώτα δή. XIII. ΣΏ. Λέγε τοίνυν 
: ry 9 4 

πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει TO µή TL εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι 

9 . Ac \ / . A v } a 
ael ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα, ἃ ἄρτι ὁιῃμεν. 


24 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Αλλ) ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ cod ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, 
θαυµασίως Φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον 
Β ἧπερ διελήλυθας. ΣΩ. ! Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον 
ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ 
νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ µανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν 
ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα 
γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι 
δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι δι]μεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν 
158 φευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν  αὐτοῖς γιγνοµένας, Kad πολλοῦ 
δεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν 
τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι @EAT. ᾽Αληθέ- 
στατα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, 
λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεµένῳ 
καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα Kal εἶναι τούτῳ, ᾧ 
φαίνεται; ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾿Εγὼ µέν, © Σώκρατες, ὀκνώ εἰπεῖν, 
ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότε poe νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εὐπόντι 
Bavro. ered ὡς ἀληθώς ye οὐκ ἂν δυναίµην | ἀμφισβη- 
τῆσαι, WS οἱ µαινόµενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ 
δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ 
δὲ πτηνοί τε, καὶ ὡς πετόµενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοώνται. 
ΣΏ. "Ap’ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς 
περὶ αὐτῶν, µάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ; 
@EAI. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΏ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι axn- 
κοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκµήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, 
el τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντε, πότερον Ka- 
θεύδοµεν καὶ πάντα, ἃ διανοούµεθα, ὀνειρώττομεν, 7 
6 ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλῆλοις | διαλεγόμεθα. 
@EAI. Καὶ µή», ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν ye, ὅτῳ χρὴ 
ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκµηρίφ. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ 
αὐτὸ παρακολουθεῖὶ ἅ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα, οὐδὲν 
κωλύει Kal ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ δοκεῖν αλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι" 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 2ὅ 


Νο ὃ 4 3 4 ὃ a 8 a @ 4 
καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκώμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος 
e ς / / 3 / ε ο 9 ο , 
ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοι. ΣΩ. Ορᾷς οὖν, ὅτι TO γε 
9 a > / ϱ / / ’ 
ἀμφισβητῆσαι ov χαλεπὀν, ὅτε Kal moTEpov ἐστιν ὕπαρ 
A Ἡ 9 a | \ bY \¥ ¥ a / 
ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, | καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου 
ὃν καθεύδοµεν ᾧ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαµάχεται 
ς ο e \ 4 / 4 \ a 
ἡμών ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα Soypata παντὸς μᾶλλον 
94 3 α e/ ” \ / / \ ¥ 
εἶναι ἀληθὴῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον trade φαμὲν ὄντα 
9 ” 1 α ‘ e / a9? ο / ου 
εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ  ἑκατέροις διΐσχυ- 
ριζόµεθα. ΘΕΑ]. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 
καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιών ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ 
χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ isos; ΘΕΛΙ. Ὀρθώς Σω. Τί οὖν; 

, , , 9 , ‘ ο] \ ε ’ 

πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι TO ἀληθὲς ὁρισθήσεται; 
ΘΕΑΙ. ! Γελοῖον μέντ ἂν ein πολλαχῇῃ. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλά 
τι ἆλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὁποῖα τούτων τών 
δοξασµάτων ἀληθῆ; ΘΗΕΑΙ. OF pos Sond. XIV. Σω. 
9 A / wv Ν . a a / e \ 2 NA 
Eyod τοίνυν ἄκουε, ola περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὺ 
δοκοῦντα ὁριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθή. λέγουσι 
δέ e > \N 9 ο . “a 70, Θ / A A 

é, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτώντες, εαίτητε, ὃ ἂν 
ἕτερον ᾖ παντάπασι, un πῄ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν 
44 aes 7 ) \ ϱ , ao, 7 \ 4 
ἕξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ; Kal μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι 
ὃ ἑρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ, ὅλως Erepov. ΘΕΛΙ. 
9 ὃ , / > 7 ” a 3 / ΑΦ A 2 

Αδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν Suvaper * 4 ἐν 
ἄλλῳ ὀτφοῦν, ὅταν ᾖ κομιδῇ ἕτερο. OQ. *Ap’ οὖν 
οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν; 
ΘΕΔΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΏ. Ei dpa τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοιόν 
τῷ φίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ cite ἄλλῳ, ὁμοι- 
ούμενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν «γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον 
δὲ ἕτερο; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Ανάγκη. 20. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν 

/ e \ N ¥ λ ον bd 
ἐλέγομεν, WS πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα Kal ἄπειρα, 
ὠὡσαύτως δέ ye τὰ πάσχοντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ΣΏ. Καὶ 


D 


159 


26 JIAATONOS 


μὴν ὅτι ye ἄλλο ἄλλω συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ Ov 
Β ταὐτὰ ἀλλ) ἕτερα γεννήσει; ΘΕΒΕΑΙ. ! Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΣΏ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλ ἤδη κατὰ 
τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη 
av ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνό- 
µοιον Φήσομεν; ΘΒΑΙ. "Αρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σω- 
κράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι 
Ῥωκράτει; ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες' αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω. 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Ανόμοιον δήπου. XO. Kal ἕτερον dpa οὕτως, 
ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον;» ΘΒΑΙ. ᾽Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Καὶ καθεύ- 
C δοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα, ἃ νῦν | διήλθοµεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι 
ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν AGB ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, 
ὡς ἑτέρῳ µοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ ; 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ti & ov µέλλε; ΣΏ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ep’ 
ἑκατέρου γεννήσοµεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ 
ποιοῦν; ΘΗΑΙ. Τί µήν; ΣΏ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω 
ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς pot φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς; ΘΕΔΙ. Nai. 
ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε yop δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογηµένων TO 
D τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ | πάσχον γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, 
ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφοτερα, καὶ 4 μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ 
πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειρ- 
γάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν 
Φερομένη αγλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ 
ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ΘΕΑΙ. Πάανυ μὲν 
οὖν Ta πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο. ΣΏ. "Όταν 
δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ yap δὴ προσῆλθεν. ΘΒΑΙ. 
Β Ναί, ΣΏ. Έτερα δὴ ad | ἐγενησάτην 6 τε τοιοῦτος 


(1594. καὶ ἄλλφ ov. Fortasse legendum καὶ ἄλλρ αὖ οὐ. 


®EAITHTOS. 27. 


2 - / ‘ a 
Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλώτ- 
ταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον ηιγνοµένην 
καὶ φεροµένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα 
αλλιὰ πικρὀν, ἐμὲ δὲ ove αἴσθησιν ἀλλ αἰσθανόμενον ; 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν 
ἄλλο ποτὲ ηγενήσοµαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος τοῦ γὰρ 
ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον * καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ 
τὸν αἰσθανόμενον' ovr ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ µή ποτ 
9 Ν 3 A A / Pe 3 \ 
ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταύὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον yevnTaL’ ἀπὺ 
γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν αλλοῖον γενήσεται. ΘΒΑΙ. 
"Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΏ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, 
2 af e a a“ a ? \ 
ἐκεῖνὸ τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. OEAT. Ov yap 
οὖν. ΣΩ. ᾽Ανάγκη δέ ye ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν 
αἰσθανόμενος ηίγνωµαι αἰσθανόμενον yap, μηδενὸς δὲ 
αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖνό τέ τινι γίγνε- 
σθαι, ὅταν αγλυκὺ | ἢ πικρὸν HY τι τοιοῦτον αίγνηται 
ηλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΒΑΙ. 
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 3ΣΏ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν 
3 / v7 > 9 / 9 ¥ / / 
ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γυγνόµεθα, γίγνεσθαε, 
ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ µέν, συνδεῖ 
δὲ οὐδενὶ τών ἄλλων, OVS’ ad ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. αλλήλοις δὴ 

/ / ϱ/ M” 9 / bd / 
λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ἐνομαζει, 
Tit εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὀς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνε- 

. 24 ν 99? ea A A A / ” 
σθαι αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ OV ἢ φιγνόµενον οὔτε 
αὐτῷ | λεκτέον oT ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ 
λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σηµαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι 
μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατε. BO. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ 

a 3 3 \ 9 9/ 9 9 / 
ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι 
αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος ὃ of; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ids γὰρ οὔ»: ΣΏ. ᾽Αλη- 

‘\ bd 2 ς κ) ¥ e a \ > A > 97 9 » 
Ons apa ἐμοὶ 4 ἐμὴ αἴσθησις' τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσιας αεί 
ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν IIpwrayopav τῶν τε 


160 


28 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


” 9 a a ν ν ε ν ν 
ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. 
D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε. XV. 20. Πώς ἂν | οὖν ἀψευδὴς dv 
καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ ta ὄντα ἢ γιγνόµενα 
οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὦνπερ αἰσθητής;: ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὐ- 
δαμώς ὅπως ov. ΣΩ. Παγκάλως dpa σοι εἴρηται, ὅτι 
9 / 9 v , 9 A ν 9 2 4 
ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν 7 αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν 
συµπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν "Όμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ 
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, 
kata δὲ Ἡρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων 
ἂνθρωπον µέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων 
Ἑ οὕτως | ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην «γίγνεσθαι. ἡ 
γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φώμεν τοῦτο cov μὲν εἶναι οἷον 
νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ µαίευµα; ἢ Tas λέγεις; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. XO. Τοῦτο μὲν 
δή, ὡς ἔοικε, µύγις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅ τι δή ποτε 
\ / 
καὶ τυγχάνει dv. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια 
αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθώς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ Royo, 
? 4 / ea > κ A a 
σκοπουµένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς ουκ ἄξιον bv τροφῆς τὸ 
/ 9 \ * b) at \ 30) A A 
16I γιγνοµενον, ἄλλα * ανεμιαῖον τε καὶ ψεῦδο. ἢ σὺ 
oles πάντως δεῖν TO ye σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι ; 
ὴ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρών, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπα- 
α 3/ α [4 / > Vv e A 
vets, dav τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῆ; ΘΕΟ. 
᾿Ανέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσ- 
a 9 4 4 
Κολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεών eitré, 4 ad οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; 
ΣΩ, Φιλολόγος vy’ ef ἀτεχνώς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, 
ὅτι µε oles λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἑξε- 
a A A \ . 
B λόντα ἐρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ad ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτᾶ. τὸ dé! Φιγνό- 
a α / 
µενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ᾽ 
ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγοµένου, ἐγὼ 
/ / 
δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον 
a a“ > / 
map ἑτέρυ σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 





καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσοµαι, ov τι 
εὐπεῖν. ΘΒΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις καὶ 
mole. οὕτως. XVI. ΣΩ. Οἱσθ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ 
ϐθαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου cov IIpwraydpov; ΘΕΟ. ἰ Τὸ ο 
ποῖον» ΣΏ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα poe πάνυ ἠδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς 
τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι τὴν ὃ ἀρχὴν τοῦ 
λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ᾽Αλη- 
θείας, ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων µέτρον ἐστὶν bs ἢ κυνο- 
κέφαλος ἢἤ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, 
ἵνα µεγαλοπρεπώς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικὠς ἤρξατο 
ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ 
θεὺν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὁ ὃ dpa ἐτύγχανεν ὧν 
els φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων | βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι Ὦ 
ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πὠῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε; εὖ 
γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι αἰσθήσεως δοξάζη, 
καὶ µήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, µήτε 
τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν 
ἑτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς 
Ta αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος povos δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ 
καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν 
σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος αξιοῦσθαι | δικαίως E 
μετὰ μεγάλων μισθών, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἁμαθέστεροί τε καὶ 
φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ ἐκεῖνον, µέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ 
τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα Tas μὴ φώμεν δημούμενον 
λέγειν τὸν Ἡρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς 
ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς συγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλι- 
σκάνοµμεν οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ζύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν Kal ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν 
τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου 
οὖσας, ov μακρὰ * μὲν καὶ διωλύηγιος Φλυαρία, εἰ ἆλη- 162 
Ans ἡ ἀλήθεια Ἡρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ 


30 | ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἁδύτου τῆς (Βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο; ΘΕΟ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, 
φίλος ἁνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ eles. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαί- 
. 2 fe) e le) / / 
µην δι ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Ἱ]ρωταγοραν, 
το. Φ \ \ / > / “A Φ / 
οὐδ av col παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον 
πάλιν λαβέ. πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ par ἐμμελώῶς σοι 
ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. XO. "Apa κἂν eis Λακεδαίμονα 
Β ἐλθών, ὦ Θεόδωρε, | πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας αἀξιοῖς ἂν 
” , , > / / 9 A 
ἄλλους Oeapevos γυμνούς, ἐνίους Φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ 
ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόµενος; ΘΕΟ. ᾽Αλλὰ 
/ Δ “A ” / , 3 , / 
τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ µέλλοιέν µοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ ππεί- 
σεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν 
᾿θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυµνάσιον σκληρὸν 
ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳρ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι 
προσπαλαίειν. XVII. ΣΩ. AA εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, 
6 σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν | of παροιμιάζόμενοι. 
πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. Λέγε 
δή, © Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νῦν διήλθοµεν, apa ov 
, > 9 / ¢/ 9 / \ 
συνθαυµάξζεις, εὖ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν 


/ » / ς a . θ , A \ 6 a.  Α 
χειρων εις σοφίαν οτουουν αν ρωπων 1/ και εων, 7) 


4 , 93/ λ / / > \ A 9 
ἧττόν τι οἵει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον µέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς 
, 
ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι; EAI. Ma Ad’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ 
e/ > Led / / ε / \ A 
ὕπερ ye ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡἠνίκα γὰρ διῇμεν, 
ελ A A a 
D ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ |! εἶναι 
τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ µοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι νῦν δὲ 
9 / ή ’ Σω Νέ \ > 
τούὐναντίον Taya µεταπέπτωκεν. ΣΩ. Néos yap εἶ, ὦ 
φίλε παῖ τῆς οὖν δηµηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ 
/ 4 \ ο 3 a / bd a 
πείθει. πρὸς yap ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας 7 τις ἄλλος 
“ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὢ «γενναῖοι παϊδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δηµη- 
yopetre ξυγκαθεζόµενοι, θεούς τε ες τὸ µέσον ἄγοντες, 
Ἀ a fe) A 
E οὓς «ἐγὼ ἔκ τε «τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ | αὐτών, 
ς - “a e 9 -> / iS og A. VAN e \ oA 
WS εἰσὶν 7) ὡς οὐκ «εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν 


®EAITHTOS. 31 


ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν et μηδὲν 
διοίσει eis σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήµατος 
ὁτουοῦν' ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην ovd ἠντινοῦν λέγετε, 
ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος 
τις τῶν γεωμετρών χρὠµενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδενὸς 
µόνου ἂν ein. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε Kal Θεόδωρος, et 
ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίαᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ * τηλικού- 
των λεγομένους λόγους, ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν. YO. "Αλλῃ 
δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς 0 τε ads καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου 
λόγος. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. ΣΏ. Τῇδε δὴ 
σκοπώμεν, εἰ apa ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις 
ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἷς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν 
ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα 
ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ ηάρ;. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


163 


ΣΩ. | Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, & τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα B 


ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον 
τών βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον ov 
Φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν Φφθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ 
ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ av γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστά- 
µενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπί- 
στασθαι, εἴπερ ὁρώμεν, διισχυριούµεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Αυτό 
ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρώμέν τε καὶ 
ακούοµεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σγῆμα 
Kal τὸ χρώμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν | ὀξύ- 


’ ε 9 
τητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε dua καὶ εἰδέναι' ἃ δὲ of 


τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν͵, 
9/ > / (al e a A > , W > / 
οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὖτε ἐπίστασθαι. 
20. ᾿Αριστά 7, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς 
ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξανῃ. XVIII. ἸΑλλ 
, ο 
ὅρα δὴ καὶ tode ἄλλο προσιὀν, Kal σκόπει, TH αὐτὸ 


C 


82 _ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


διωσόµεθα. ΘΕΒΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε, εἴ 
τις ἔροιτο, apa δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γἐνοιτόὀ 
D ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα | μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον 
τότε ὅτε µέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ µέμνη- 
ται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, et 
µαθων τίς τι µεμνηµένος μὴ olde, ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, 
ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγει. LO. Μὴ οὖν 
ἐγὼ ληρώ; σκόπει δέ. dpa τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν; ΘΒΑΙ. Ἔγωγε ΣΏ. 
Οὐκοῦν 6 ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδε κατὰ 
Etcy ἄρτι λόγον»; @EAI. Nai, ΣΩ. | Τέ dal; μνήμην 
οὗ λέγεις µέντοι τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΏ. ΠἩότερον ov- 
δενὸς ἢ twos; ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δήπου. LO. Οὐκοῦν ὧν 
ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾖσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Té 
µην; 20. Ὁ δὴ εἶδέ τι µέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε; 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Μέμνηται 20. Ἡ καὶ µύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δρά- 
σας ἐπελάθετο; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
164 τοῦτό ye hava, YO. * Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν 
πρὀσθεν λόγον εἰ δὲ py, οἴχετα.. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ 
vn τὸν Ai’ ὑποπτεύω, ov μὴν ixavas ye συννοῶ ἀλλ) 
εἰπὲ 17H. ΣΏ. Τῃδε ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, paper, 
τούτου «γέγονεν, οὗπερ ὁρῶν' ὄψις yap καὶ αἴσθησις 
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν ὠμολόγηται. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πάνυ ye. 
ΣΩ. ‘O δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων «γεγονὼς οὗ éwpa, 
ἐὰν µύσῃ, µέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό. ἡᾖ yap; 
ΒΘΕΑΙ. Ναί 20. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρῷ οὐκ | ἐπίσταταί 
ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ Opa ἐπίσταται ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 
Σω. Συμβαίνει dpa, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι 
µεμνηµένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ. ὃ 
τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αληθέσ- 
Tata λέγει. ΣΏ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι ξυμβαίνειν 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 33 


φαίνεται, ἐαν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν φῆ 
εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε. 20. "Αλλο dpa ἑκάτερον φα- 
τέον. ΘΒΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει. 20. Τί οὖν Sir ἂν εἴη 
ἐπιστήμη; | πᾶλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Ἱαΐτοι 
ti ποτε µέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, Spav; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Tivos 
πέρι; 20. Φαινόμεθά por ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην, 
πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν. 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πώς δή; 20. ᾽Αντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς 
τών ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ 
Tw περυγενόµενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὗ φάσκοντες 
ἁγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκεί- 
νοις | τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντε. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕπω 
µανθάνω ὅπως λέγει. ΣΏ. "AAN ἐγὼ πειράσοµαι δη- 
λώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν 6 ye δὴ vow. ἠρόμεθα yap δή, εὖ 
μαθὼν καὶ µεμνηµένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν 
ἰδόντα καὶ µύσαντα µεμνηµένον, ὁρῶντα δὲ ov, atro- 
δείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ dua μεμνημένον' 
τοῦτα ὃ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δ) μῦθος ἁπωλιετο 
6 Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ 6 σὸς ἅμα 6 τῆς ἐπιστήμης Kal 


σ 


D 


αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. | Φαίνεται. YO. E 


Οὔ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ ye ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου 
μύθου ἔξη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν 
ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζοµεν. καὶ γὰρ ovd οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς 
Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος 
els G5e. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου Ever’ 
αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Ov yap ἐγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ 
μᾶλλον Καλλίας 6 Ἱππονίκου τῶν * ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος" 
ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τών ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν 
γεωμετρίαν απενεύσαμεν. χάριν ye µέντοι ἔξομεν, ἐὰν 
αὐτῷ βοηθῇς. ΣΏ. Καλώς λέγει, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι 
οὖν τήν y ἐμὴν βοήθειαν, τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἄν 
K. P, : 3 


165 


34 - TIAATONOS 


φ , , a e / \ a 
τις ὁμολογήσειο μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι Tov νοῦν, 
ᾗ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. col 
λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ; ΘΕΟ. Eis τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, 

B ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος σφαλεὶς | γὰρ ἧττον ἄσχη- 
µονήσει. XIX. ΣΏ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. 
‘» / / . 9 , \ 2 \ γα, 
ἔστι δέ, οἶμαι, τοιόνδε τι apa οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἶδότα 
τι τοῦτο ὃ olde μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρι- 
νούµεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατόν που, οἶμαι 
ἔγωγε, ΣΏ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶῶν ye ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. 
TL yap χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν 
φρέατι συνεχόµενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ, 

\ a aA Αν οὁ ’ ’ 9 ¢ a 
καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ cod τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμον, eb ὁρᾷς 

Οτὸ ὑμάτιον τῷ | κατειληµµέῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ov φήσω, 
οἶμαι, τούτω γε, τῷ μέντοι ἑτέρῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν spas 
τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα tavrov; @EAI. Otto γέ πως. 
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ᾽ ἠρόμην 
τὸ ὅπως, GAN εἰ ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστα- 
σαι. νῦν δὲ ὃ οὐχ spas, ὁρών Φαίνει ὡὠμολογηκῶς 
δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ 
> / 9 9 U / / 
ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαινει. 

D ΘΕΙΑΙ. ! ᾽Αλλὰ λογίζομαι, ὅτι τἀαναντία ols ὑπεθέμην. 
ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ y’, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔπαθες, 

Ww / > 9 ” Δ 9 , ow 
el τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι 
δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πὀῤῥωθεν δὲ 
, / > / \ > ?- 9/ / 
pn, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα µυρία, 
ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόηοις 
ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν ἔθου, 
3 ‘ A 9 \ > / \ 3 / λ 
ἐμβαλὼν ἂν eis τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς 
τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, 

E' πρὶν Oavpacas τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ξυνεποδίσθης 

Un’ αὐτοῦ, οὗ δή σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ ξυνδήσας ἤδη 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 35 


7 ρ / ρ a a » / 20/7 
ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων, ὅσων σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ἐδόκει. 
Ti’ οὖν δὴ 6 Πρωταγόρας, pains ἂν tows, λόγον ἐπιί- 
κουρον τυῖς αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώµεθα λέγειν; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. XX. 20. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα, 
ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, 
* χωρήσεται, καταφρονών ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ 
ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν 
ἔδεισεν, εἶ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ µεμνῆσθαι ἅμα 
καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι 
A \ 4 > Av 03 a / 9 / 
προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. 
τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥαθυμό Σω nd ἔχει ὅ D 
, α ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες, THO ἔχει ὅταν τι τών 
ἐμῶν δι ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῇς, ἐὰν μὲν 6 ἐρωτηθεὶς οἶάπερ 
ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ 


166 


ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα, ' αὐτὸς 6 epwrnbeis. αὐτίκα B 


\ a a 
γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι µνήµην παρεῖναί τῳ 
4 “A 
ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι ovcav πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, 
µηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ ye δε, ἢ avd ἀποκνήσειν 
e A / 3 Φ 99 ‘ PINE x 9 A 
ὁμολοηεῖν οἷόν T εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν 
9 we, ο. 
τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ :τοῦτο Selon, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν 
εἶναι τὺν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; 
μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα, ἀλλ οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους 


γυγνοµένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, | ei 6 


δὴ ὀνομάτων ye δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλή- 
λων; ἀλλ, ὦ µακάριε, Hoel, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ 
ἐλθών, ὃ λέγω, ef δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον, ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι 
αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γέγνονται, ἢ ws ἰδίων γιγνο- 
µένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον pove ἐκείνῳ 
γέγνοιτο, ἤ, εὖ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάξειν, εἴη, ὦπερ Φαίνεται. 
ds δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ µόνον αὐτὸς ὑὐηνεῖς, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο Spav εἰς τὰ συγγράµ- 


: / A 
pata µου ἀναπείθει, οὐ καλῶς |! ποιών. éyd yap D 


3—2 


36 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


λ ‘ ὃν ” e , 7 / \ 
φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα pétpov γὰρ 
ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή μµυρίον µέντοι 


ὃ / σ ς / b) a , ϱ ed Δ ιά 
: διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αυτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα 


ἔστι τε καὶ Φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ 

σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ, αὐτὸν 
a / / A wv ς a 9 / 

τοῦτον Kal λέγω σοφὀν, ὃς av τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται 

, , , / 

καὶ ἔστι Kaka, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃη ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί 
9 \ \ { Φ \ a ef / 

τε καὶ εἶναι τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί µου 


E δίωκε, | ἀλλ ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε, TE λέγω. οἷον 


167 


B 


Δ 3 a / / ? / ο Aa ΔΝ 
yup ἐν τοῖς πρὀσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, OTL τῷ µεν 
3 θ a \ / a 9 θ/ \ sm” a δὲ 
ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ 
e 
ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν 
οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατον' 
ουδὲ * κατηγορητέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἁμαθής, ὅτι 
a of bd “ 
τοιαῦτα So€aver, 6 δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι αλλοῖα᾽ 
‘ e / 
µεταβλητέον & ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀμείνων yap ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. 
¢ Ν 9 a ’ 9 \ ο 7 σι. 9 ΔΝ \ 
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν 
ς 9 / 

ἀμείνω µεταβλητέον. arr ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς Φαρμέκοις 


'µεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοι. ἐπεὶ ov Ti γε 


ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε 
δοξάζειν' οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε 
ἄλλα παρ ἃ ἂν πάσχη, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. arr 
οἶμαι, πονηρᾷᾶ ψυχῆς ἕξει ' δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ αὐτῆς 
χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθὴ καλοῦσιν ἐγὼ δὲ 
βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. 
καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατρά- 
χους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, 


4 Ν 8 , \ A , ο) 
κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ yewpyous. Φφημὶ yap καὶ τούτους τοῖς 


: A 3 A 9 / e/ ? Αα 9 A 
φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρών αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτών ασθενῇ, 


6 χρηστὰς kab! ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐμ- 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 37 


ποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ ye σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς 


) ὰ ἀντὶ τῶ ὧν δι Sone’: 
πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρὠν δίκαια δοκεῖν 
εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ ola y ἂν ἑκάστῃη πόλει δίκαια καὶ 
καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νοµίζη. 
93 3 ς \ 3 \ a) b a e ’ 
ἀλλ 6 σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρὠν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων 
χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν 
λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευοµένους οὕτω δυνά- 
µενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὀς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλών χρη- 


µάτων τοῖς | παιδευθεῖσι. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἶσιν D 


ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, κα σοι, ἐάν 
τε βούλῃ ἐάν τε µή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι µέτρῳ' σώζεται γὰρ 
> , e / Φ 9 \ 9 4 ” 3 9 A 
ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ᾧ ad εὖ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ 
δι ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι ἐρωτήσεων' οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο 
c 3 4 δ / / n A 
φευκτέον, αλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν 
2 a 
ἔχοντι. ποίει µέντοι οὑτωσί μὴ αδίκει ἐν τῷ | ἐρωτᾶν. 
καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἁλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
μηδὲν αλλ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν 
& ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς 
3 / A \ ο) ‘ 
αγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλε- 
/ 9 λ « / \ / 
youevos, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζη τε καὶ σφαλλῃ καθ 
ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε 
καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόµενον, ἐκεῖνα µόνα αὐτῷ 
9 / \ / a > Αλ € 3 e A Ν 
ἐνδεικνύμενος TA σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς bp ἑαυτοῦ καὶ 
τών * προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ 
οὕτω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρἰβοντές 
led α ? / 
σοι τῆς αὑτών ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ οὐ σέ, Kal 
N / 
σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὑτοὺς δὲ µισήσουσι, 
/ 49 
καὶ φεύξονται ad’ ἑαυτών eis Φιλοσοφίαν, iv’ ἄλλοι 
A . oN 
γενόµενοι ἁπαλλαγώσι τῶν of πρότερον ἦσαν ἐὰν δὲ 
α 3 
τάναντία τούτων Spas, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τἀναντία 


168 


38 TIAATONOS 


EuuBnoetal σοι καὶ τοὺς Evvovtas ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων 
B μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ | πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν πρεσ- 
βΒύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθη, ὃ καὶ πρότερον 
sxe / 3 A IEA α 9 9 ϱ “a 
ἐῤῥήθδη, ov δυσμενώς οὐδὲ paynrinds, ἀλλ tre . τῇ 
«διανοίᾳ ξυγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθώς σκέψει, τί ποτε λέγομεν, 
κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα td τε δοκοῦν 
ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο Kab εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει, καὶ ἐκ 
/ > 4 ¥ > A 3 ? 4 
τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἴτε ταὐτὸν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη © 
καὶ αἴσθησις, adr’ οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημά- 

ο των τε καὶ ὀνομάτων ἃ οἱ |. πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν 

3 , 9 4 \ , 
ἕλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπᾶς παρέχουσι. 
Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου eis βοήθειαν προσ- 
πρξάµην κατ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὸ ἀπὸ σμικρών' et 
ὃ αὐτὸς ἔζη, µεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν. 

XXII. ΘΕΟ. Παίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες πάνυ yap νεανικώς 
τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκα.. ΣΩ. Ed λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε καί 
pot εἶπέ ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου 

\ > δί 6 a ὔ } ὸ δέ \ / 

D καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν, ὅτι ' πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους 
4 0 α A \ ’ 9 / 3} λ 
ποιούµενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ὠγωνιζοίμεθα eis τὰ 
ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισµόν τινα ἁποκαλών, ἀποσεμνύνων 
δὲ τὸ πάντων pétpov, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο 
περὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; ΘΕΟ. Πώς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, 
© Σώκρατες; ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; 
ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε ΣΏ. “Ορᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα 

A ον / 3 / 3 9 , vn 3 / 4 
πλὴν cov παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόµεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, Ewe 

E καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ' ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις 
σπουδάσαι περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἵνα µή τοι τοῦτό } 
»” 9 α e \ / / ? 
ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς µειράκια διεσκεψ ἀμεθ 
av τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΘΕΟ. Ti δ'; οὐ πολλών τοι 
Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον av ἐπα- 
κολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωµένω; BO. ᾽Αλλ ov τοι 


ΘΒΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 39 


God γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἵου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ 
σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, 
σὲ * δὲ µηδενί, ἀλλ ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, 
µέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδώμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ 
διαγραμμάτων πέρι µέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως 
col ixavol ἑαυτοῖς els τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἆλλα, ὧν 
: δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρει. ΘΕΟ. Ov ῥᾷδιον, 
᾿ ὦ Σώκρατες, col παρακαθήµενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, GAN 
ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρέλήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν por μὴ 
ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαι- 
µόνιο, σὺ δέ poe δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίῤῥωνα μᾶλλον 


169 


τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν | γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι Β 


κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ ᾽Ανταϊόν τί pot μᾶλλον δοκεῖς 
\ a a, \ , ’ 27 

τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν τὸν γὰρ προσελθὀντα οὐκ avins πρὶν 

ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαϊῖσαι. 


Σω. ᾿"Αριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον µου ἀπείκα- , 


σας ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. µυρίοι yap ἤδη 
µοι Ἡρακλέες τε. καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχάνοντες καρτεροὶ 


πρὸς τὸ λέγειν par ev ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ ἐγὼ οὐδέν . 


τι μᾶλλον ἀφισταμαι οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε 


τῆς | περὶ ταῦτα yupvacias. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς 6 


προσανατριψάµενος σαντόὀν τε Gua καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι. 
ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ, aye ὅπῃ ἐθέλει; πάν- 
τως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην, ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, 
δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω rye 
ὧν προτίθεσαι olos + ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. 
ΣΏ..᾽Αλλ ἀρκεῖ καὶ µέχρι τούτων. καί µοι πάνυ 
é 5) / 
τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, µή που παιδικὀν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος 


τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, Kat τις πάλιν | ἡμῖν αὐτὸ D 


ὀνειδίση. ΘΕΟ. ᾽Αλλὰ δὴ πειράσοµαί ye καθ ὅσον 
ἂν δύνωµαι. XXIT, ΣΏ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν 


40 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ὅ ἀντιλαβώμεθα, οὗπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς 
ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι 
αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον eis φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώ- 
ρησεν 6 Ἡρωταγόρας, περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χεί- 
povos διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί; 
ΘΕΟ. Nai. ΣΩ. Βὲ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὠμολόγει, 

E ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς | βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαµεν, 
οὐδὲν ἂν πᾶλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι νῦν 
δὲ tay’ dv τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου 
ὁμολοηίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου 
αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι ov γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει 
οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως. ΘΕΟ. Λέγει ἀληθη. ΣΏ. Μὴ 
τοίνυν δι ἄλλων, GAN ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνυ λόγου ὡς διὰ 

17ο βραχυτάτων * λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς; 
ΣΏ. Οὐτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί 
που ᾧ δοκεῖ; ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ 
Ἱρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων 
ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὄντινα ov 
τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἠγεῖσθαι τών ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ 
ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς µεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν 
ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειµάζωνται, 
ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, 

Bowrnpas σφών | προσδοκώντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ ty διαφέ- 
ροντας ἢ τῷ εἶδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἆάνθρώ- 
πινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν 
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τών τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε 
ad ἱκανὼν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ 
ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώ- 
mous ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἁμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; 
@EO. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν 
᾽ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν; 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 41 


ΘΕΟ. ! Τί µήν; Σω. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησό- 
pela τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φώμεν del τοὺς ἀνθρω- 
mous δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ 
ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που ξυµβαίνει pn det ἀληθῆ αλλ. ap- 
φότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν, σκόπει yap, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εὖ 
ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τών ἀμφὶ ΠἩρωταγόραν ἢ σι αὐτὸς δια- 
µάχεσθαι, ws οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε 
εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΒΟ. ’AAN ἄπιστον, ὦ 
Σώκρατες.. ΣΏ. Καὶ μὴν eis τοῦτό ye ανάγκης | 6 
λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων µέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων. 
ΘΕΟ. Πώς δή; 30. “Οταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ 
πρὀς µε ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, cot μὲν δὴ τοῦτο 
κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πὀτερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς 
γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεί σε κρίνοµεν αληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ µυρίοι 
ἑκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευ- 
59 κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώ- 


σ 


κρατες, para | µυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν "Όμηρος, of γέ pou Β 


τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν. XO. Τί οὖν; 
/ / . e 4 / a a ᾗ 
βούλει λέγωμεν, ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, 
τοῖς δὲ µυρίοις ψευδῆ; ΘΕΟ. "Ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου 
ἀνώγκη εἶναι. ΣΏ. Ti δὲ αὐτῷ ἩΠρωταγόρᾳ; ap’ οὐχὶ 
ἀνάγκη, eb μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾧετο µέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον 
μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι 
ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν ; εἰ δὲ * αὐτὸς 
Δ /.. \ \ a κ » ¢ a. 
μὲν Beto, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ' ὅτι πρὠτον 
A 6 / N na ἃ A , 
μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ 
μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν; ΘΕΟ. ᾿᾽Ανάγκη, εἴπερ γε 
καθ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. YO. Ἐπειτά 
ye τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον' ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ 
οἴήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαξζόντων οἴησιν, ᾗ ἐκεῖνον ἡ- 


171 


4ο ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


«ηοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολο- 
γῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας. ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, 
BY. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ ' ξυγχωροῖ, et τὴν 
τῶν ἠγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι; 
ΘΕΟ. ᾽Ανάγκη. ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ Υ ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσιν 
ἑαυτοὺς Ψψεύδεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Ov γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. Ὁ δέ 
Υ ad ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν 
γέγραφε. ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται. 20. ᾿Βξ ἁπάντων dpa 
ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον 
δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντία 
λέγοντι ξυγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ 
6 Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ' ξυγχωρήσεται µήτε Kiva μήτε 
τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον µέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς 
οὗ ἂν μὴ µάθῃ. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. 0. Οὐ- 
κοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδεν) ἂν εἴη 
ἡ Ἡρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλφ οὔτ 
αὐτῷ ἐκείφ. ΘΕΟ. "Αγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταῖρόν 
µου καταθέοµεν. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλά τοι, ὦ Φίλε, ἆδηλον, εὖ 
καὶ παραθέοµεν τὸ ὁρθόὀν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύ- 
D τερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα | ἐν- 
τεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε µέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε 
ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, 
καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, 
οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν avrois, ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ 
τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὺ νῦν ἄλλο 
τι φώμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό ye ὀντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι 
σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἁμαθέστερον; 
ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοί αγ) οὖν δοκε. XXIII. ΣΏ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτῃ 
ay μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν 
E βοηθοῦντες | Ἡρωταγόρα, ws τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ᾗ δοκεῖ, 
ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερµά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα 


@EAITHTOS. 48 


ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου εἶ δέ που ἔν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται 
διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη 
ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ 
θηρίον δὲ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ 
τὸ ὑπιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, 
εἴπερ που; ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. ΣΩ. * Οὐκ- 172 
οὖν καὶ περὶ πολιτικών, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ 
δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ bora καὶ py, ola ἂν ἑκάστη 
πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 
” 3 ’ ε / 8 / 9 IOV wt 
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώ- 
Ν 6 OF 7 ” ὃ 
τερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ιδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι 
ἐν δὲ τῷ ξυμµφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἡ un ξυμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, 
ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, av ὁμολογήσει ξύμβουλόν τε ξυμ- 
Θούλου διαφἑρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς 
ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολµήσειε | φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν Ἡ 
θῆται πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἶηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον 
ταῦτα καὶ ξυνοίσειν. ἀλλ ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις 
907 e sv 9 / 9 /] /. ϕ , 
καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρί- 
€ 9 wv , 9 A > \ 9 ο 
ζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αυτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ 
” 3 4 A , A / 9 
ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε 
ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. Kal ὅσοι γε δὴ 
μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Ἱρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὡὼδέ 
πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄὤγουσι. Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, 
ἐκ λόγου, µείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος, ' καταλαμβάνει. ΘΒΟ. ο 
Ουκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. 
Kal πολλάκις µέν γε δή, ὦ δαιµόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατε- 
, » 4 A € 9 / e 93 α / 
νόησα, ατὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις 
πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες eis τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες 
γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορε. ΘΕΟ. Πώς δὴ οὖν λέγεις » 
Σω. Κινδυνεύουσιν of ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιού- 
τοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφία καὶ 


44 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ὦ τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ | τεθραµµένους ὥς οἰκέται πρὸς 
ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. ΘΕΟ. Πῃ δή; ΣΏ. *He τοῖς 
µέν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, ael πάρεστι αχολὴ καὶ τοὺς 
λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς 
νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου µεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω 
κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς 6 ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειµένου μᾶλ- 
λον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, apéon, καὶ διὰ μακρών ἢ βραχέων 
µέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν µόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ 
ἐν ἀσχολία τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον, 

Ε καὶ οὐκ ' ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους 
ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ 
ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκοµένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς ov ῥητέον' 
(ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν') οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμο- 
δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήµενον, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην 
ἔχοντα, καὶ of ἀγώνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ) ἀεὶ 
τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις δὲ Kal περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος. 

173 ὥστ' ἐξ * ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι Kat δριμεῖς γίγνον- 
ται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ 
ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. 
τὴν γὰρ avEnv καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ 
νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, 
μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς 
ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάµενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ 
ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ 
ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόµενοι πολλὰ κάµπτονται καὶ 

B συγκλώνται, | ὥσθ᾽ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς 
ἄνδρας ἐκ µειρακίων τελευτώσι, Sewol τε καὶ σοφοὶ 
γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Kat οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ 
Θεόδωρε' τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βουύλει 
διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πἀλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπώµεθα, 
ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερία 


@EAITHTOX. 45 


καὶ µεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρὠµεθα; ΘΕΟ. Μη- 
A 9 / 9 \ / ; ’ 4 Φ 
δαμώῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντε. πάνυ γὰρ ev 
nw A 3 A “A 
τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ott! οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῴδε χορεύ- 
| a , e 3 9 e / ε ¢ 2 
οντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. GAN οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι 
4 a 
ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτών περιμένει ἀποτελε- 
σθῆναι, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατής, 
ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε Kal ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ 
παρ ἡμῖν. XXIV. ΣΏ. Λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ 
col ye δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν. κορυφαίων τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς 
ye φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι 
δέ που ἐκ Νέων πρώτον μὲν eis ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν 


ὁδόν, οὐδὲ | ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν D 


ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα 
λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραµµένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. 
σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειών ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα 
καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κὠώμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσ- 
ίσταται avtois. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακώς τις γέγονεν ἐν πὀλει, 
ἢ τί τῳ κακὀν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς 
ἀνδρών ἢ γυναικών, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς 


θαλάττης λεγόμενοι yoes. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' | οὐδ ὅτι Ε 


οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν' οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκι- 
μεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σώμα µύνον ἐν τῇ πόλει 
κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα 
ἠγησαμένη σμικρὸ καὶ οὐδέν ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ 
φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ra τε yas ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ 
ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, 
καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν * ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκά- 
στου ὅλου, eis τών ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. 
ΘΕΟ. Πώς τοῦτο λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες; LO. Ὅσπερ 
καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ dvw βλέ- 
ποντα, πεσόντα eis Φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ 


174 


46 TIAATONOS 


χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκώψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν 
9 3 a ο) 3Q 7 , 3 9 ον 
ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, Ta ὃ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ 
\ id / of: > A 3 a 
καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ 
lad 9 A , ὄ 3 ὃ ’ Ι A 
Ώ σκώμμα ἐπὶ πάντας, ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφία διάγουσι. | τῷ 
γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον 6 μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων 
λέληθεν, οὗ µόνον & τι πράττει, ἀλλ ὀλίγου καὶ εὖ 
ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο θρέµµα' τί δέ ποτ ἐστὶν 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον 
τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πἀσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' 
” ---. , / / A 
ἔχει διερευνῶµενος. pavOavers γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ 
οὗ» ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγει. ΣΏ. Τουγάρτοι, 
ὦ Φίλε, idia τε συγγιγνόµενος ὃ τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ 
δη las ο σα Ι ἕλ ο 2», ὃ / 
6 δηµοσία, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος | ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίφ 
/ wv 9 a “A , A 
tov ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας Kab 
τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει ov 
µόνον Θράτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἷς φρέατά 
τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ 
> , / / 9 ’ , ” 
ἀσχημοσύνη Sewn, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχοµένη. ev 
τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοι- 
ὃ Ca) ἅ 9 > δ \ A δὲ 10 A 3 A“ A 
ορεῖν, ἅτ οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ 
D µεμµελετηκέναι ἀπορών οὖν ηελοῖος Φαίνεται év | τε 
τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τών ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ 
A 9 Δ a A 54 , 
MPOTTOLNTWS, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελών ἔνδηλος γιυγνόµενος 
Anpwons δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἔγκω- 
᾽μιαζὀμενον ἕνα τῶν νοµέων, οἷον συβωτην, ἢ ποιμένα, 
bd f e a b] / ? , 4 
ἦ τινα βουκόλον ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ 
βδάλλοντα δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπι- 
βουλότερον ποιµαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς' 
A | \ 9 / e A 3 20 Φ 
ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἧττον 
Ἡ τῶν νοµέων τὸν | τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν 
> # \ na / ae ya , 
ἐν ὄρει TO τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δε όταν µυρία 


@EAITHTOS. 47 


πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις apa κεκτηµένος 
θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσµικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς 
ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούν- 
των, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὼ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων 
ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ αμικρὸν ὁρώντων 
ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ * ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναµένων eis 
τὸ πᾶν ae βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι πάππων καὶ 
προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ yeyovacw ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν 
als πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρ- 
Bapol τε καὶ Έλληνες πολλακις pupios «γεγόνασιν 
ὀτφοῦν, GAN ἐπὺ πέντε Kal εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων 
σεμνυνοµένων καὺ ἀναφερόντων εἰς 'Ἡρακλέα τὸν ᾽Αμ- 
φιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σµικρολοηίας, 


175 


ὅτι δὲ ὁ am’ ᾽Αμϕιτρύωνος eis τὸ | ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς B 


τοιοῦτος ἦν, Ola συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, Kal ὁ πεντηκο- 
στὸς am αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ ov δυναµένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ 
χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἁπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ 
τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πόλλών καταγελᾶται, τὰ 
μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ ὃ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοών 
τε καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορών. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι Τὰ 
γιγνόµενα λέγεις, ὦ Σωκρατε. XXV. Σω. Ὅταν δέ 
yé τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις 


a α 9 “a 
αὐτῷ | ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Ti ἐγὼ σὲ adixd ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἷς 6 


/ . a ὃ / \ 2) / rf e / 
σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον 
Αα πρ a / A / / A >. 
αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τών πάντων ἢ αλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ 
A 4 2 / / 2 ? 
τοῦ Βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτηµένος T αὖ πολι) χρυσίον, 
’ cf 
βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης Όλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ 
A 
ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα 
τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι 
α a , 
αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν, --- περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὅταν 


ad δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν | σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν D 


48 ΗΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικὀόν, πάλιν avd -τὰ ἀντίστροφα 
ἀποδίδωσιν' ἱλιγγιῶν τε ad’ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ 
Βλέπων µετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀἁδημονών τε καὶ 
ἀπορών καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρ- 
/ νοϱ ο 9 Lf 9 9 \ 9 , 
έχει οὐδ ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδευτω οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, 
τοῖς ὃ ἐναντιως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖοιν ἅπασιν. 
Οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν 
/ A , | “A , 
E ἐλευθερία τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμµένου, | ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον 
ray ? 9 / », a \ 3 ? 
kaneis, @ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, 
ὅταν eis δουλικὰ ἐμπέση διακονήµατα, οἷον στρωµατό- 
δεσµον μὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον 
ἡδῦναι ἢ θώπας λόγους ὁ δ av τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα 
δυναµένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι 
δὲ οὖκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ Υ ἁρμονίαν 
176 λόγων λαβόντος * ὀρθώς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρών 
εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. ΘΕΟ. Ei πάντας, ὦ Σώκρα- 
/ A , ef > + 4 A 3 / 4 
τες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις, ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ 
κακὰ ἑλάττω Kat’ ἄνθρώπους ein. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλ' οὔτ 
’ / ‘ Ν΄ , 3 / . / \ 
ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατὀν, ὦ Θεόδωρε' ὑπεναντίον γὰρ 
nA 3 A 9 ? 9 / ο 4/ 9 b] Α > \ 
τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ael εἶναι ανάγκη οὔτ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ 
ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον 
περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε 
> A / ef / \ | δὲ ς / @ a 
Β ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν 0 τι τάχιστα. φυγή | δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ 
κατὰ To δυνατὀν ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ 
φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι 
ο Cal e ov b ] @ ο e / nw 
ῥαᾳδιον πεῖσαι, ὡς dpa οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί dace δεῖν 
πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν 
Q \ 3 5 ο / \ 8 vw ο 5 κ \ ΔΝ νο 
τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ᾽ ov, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα 
ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι, ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν 
ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεταύ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. | 
ε / 
6 θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμώς ἄδικος, ἀλλ) ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότα- 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 49 


oe a Sg 2 Ane / Se A vA ¢ oa 
Tos, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδεν ἢ Ὁς ἂν ἡμῶν 
e e 
avd γένηται 6 τι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου καὶ 7 ws 
: . 9 / 
ἀληθώς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. 
ς \ \ , A / ) . ὶ ? ο) . δὲ 
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ αρετή αληθινη, 7 
b / / 
ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής' αἱ & ἄλλαι δεινότητές 
α α / 
τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις 
, / A 9 
γυγνόµεναι Φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις Bavavoot. τῷ οὖν 
9 A a a 
αδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ | πράττοντι µακρῷ 
ἄριστ᾽ ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας 
9 9 ’ ‘ A b] / \ ¥ 9 ’ 
εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν, 
of 9 ry +) f 
ὅτι οὐ λῆροι εἰσί, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ. ἄνδρες, oious 
a 3 / \ , / 9 9 / 
δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησοµένους. λεκτέον οὖν ταληθές, 
"a ’ a ’ 9 Ὠ 9 ” er > 9 
OTL τοσούτῳ pdAXov εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι ουχὶ 
οἴονται ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, 0 δεῖ ἥκιστα 
9 a 4 Oh A 
ἀγνοεῖν. ov yap ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ 
/ 2 > / / YEON 9 a 9 \ 
θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ 
\ 9 ‘ a 
ἣν ἀδύνατον | ἐκφυγεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; Σω. 
/ a? f 3 Αα Ἡ ς / a \ 
Παραδειγµάτων, ὦ Φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν 
/ . / A \ wa Ba 9 , vox αν 
θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ 
ὁρώντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς 
ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ 
‘ *% OU / a δὲ 9 / κά δὴ 
τας * αδίκους πραξεις, τῷ δὲ avopotovpevot. οὗ δὴ 
A : 4 πα 
τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται. 
dA > w+ v4 a \ 3 a A / 
ἐὰν © εἴπωμεν, ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἁπαλλαγώσι τῆς δεινότητος, 
4 A A -. α 
καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ TOV κακών 
\ / λ / 3 / \ ‘\ e aA e 
καθαρὸς τόπος ov δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιο- 
. a Αν ὃν aA / 
τητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, 
fe) \ a) 
ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάαπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι 
ἀνοήτων τινών ἀκούσονται. ΘΕΟ. Kal pada δή, ὦ 


177 


Σώκρατες. YO. Oida τοι, ' ὦ Eratpe. év μέντοι τι Ὦ 


3 a aA : 
αυτοῖς συµβέβηκεν, ὅτι av idia λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε Kai 
K. P, 4 


50 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


2 
δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικώς 
A A 
πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, τότε 
ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιµόνιε, τελευτώντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ 
αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἆπο- 
µαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ 
μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, 
0 ἀποστώμεν εὖ δὲ µή, πλείω αεὶ ἐπιῤῥέοντα | καταχώσει 
ς oa ν 3 ώ a / oo oe, . ν Y] 
ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν iwper, 
εὖ καὶ cot δοκε. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Εμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ 
Ῥώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν' paw γὰρ τηλικῴδε 
ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν' εἰ μέντοι Soxel, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν. 
ΧΧΥΙ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν 
ὡ w” 4 8 / 9 / λέ 4 AY 
ὦ ἔφαμεν τοὺς THY Φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ 
αεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτω ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν 
μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διισχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα 
D περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς | μᾶλλον, & ἂν θῆται πόλις 
δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεµένῃ, ἕωσπερ 
A / . ΔΝ \ 9 A . 4 3 A 1) ϱ 
ἂν κέηται' περὶ δὲ τἀγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ οὕτως 
A 
εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα 
οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον 
e a D we \ ” ν » Pe ye 
ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι 
A a A 
τοῦτο δέ που σκὠμμ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί; 
E ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ ye. ΣΏ. M7! λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται. ΘΒΟ. Μὴ yap. 
ΣΩ. "AA ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζη, τούτου δήπου στοχά- 
ζεται νομοθετουµένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ ὅσον 
” , ε 9 / ο aA _s 
οἵεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθεται. 
178 ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται; ΘΕΟ. * Οὐ- 
δαμώς. ΣΩ. 7H οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει αεί ἢ πολλὰ καὶ 
διαµαρτάνει ἑκάστη; ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαµαρ- 
rave. ΣΏ. “Ere τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον mas τις 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 51 


ὁμολογήσειε ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, et περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους 
ἐρωτφῴη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει dv. ἔστι δέ 
που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νοµο- 
θετώµεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέ- 
µεθα eis τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ µέλλον ὀρθῶς 
ἂν λέγοιμεν. ΘΕΟ. | Πάνυ ye. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, οὑτωσὶ B 
ἐρωτώμεν Ἱρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον Twa τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ 
αὐτὰ λεγόντων' Πάντων µέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς 
φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκών, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς 
ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον 
ἐν αὑτῷ, ola πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθή τε οἵεται 
αὑτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Obras. 20. Ἡ 
καὶ τών μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱ]ρωταγόρα, 
ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ ola | ἂν οἴηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ο 
ταῦτα καὶ 'γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οὐηθέντι; οἷον θερµά᾿ 
dp’ ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι 
καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερµότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς 
δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φώμεν τὸ µέλλον 
ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑατρῷ 
οὗ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; 
ΘΕΟ. Τελοῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν ein. XO. ᾽Αλλ), οἶμαι, περὶ 
olvov γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης | ἔσε- Ὁ 
σθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, ἀλλ οὐχὺ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, 
κυρία. ΘΒΟ. Τί µήν; Σω. Ovs ἂν ad περὶ. ἆναρ- 
µόστου Te Kal εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίθης ἂν 
βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουαικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ 
παιδοτρίβη δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμώς. 
ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ µαγει- 
ρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζοµένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις 
τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν 
γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη | ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν E 
4—2 


oa 


52 ΤΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


a , , 9 4 . A A . 
πω τῷ λόγω διαµαχώμµεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος 
e / / ” / > A e ο 
ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ 
i |» ἢ σύ, ὁ II , ) ὶ λό 
ἄριστος κριτής; ἢ σύ, ρωταγόρα, TO γε περὶ λό- 
A , 
yous πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον 
βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν ; 
ο 
ΘΕΟ. Καὶ para, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό ye σφόδρα ὑπι- 
a / 
σχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτό. ΣΏ. Ni Δία, ὦ 
179 µέλε' ἢ οὐδείς γ ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο  διδοὺς πολὺ 
2 / 4 Δ , ” ο Ν / 
ἀργύριον, el wn τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλ- 
λον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε µάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος 
ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νοµοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ 
4 /. 9 / A a « A , 
τὸ µέλλον ἐστί, καὶ Tas ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουµένην 
/ / 3 , 9 “A 9 U bd 
πόλιν πολλάκις ἄναγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτατου ἅπο- 
τυγχάνειν; ΘΕΟ. Mada γε ΣΩ. Μετρίως dpa ἡμῖν 
Ν A ὃ , , > 7 ὄ ».) | 9 A 
Ἡ πρὸς τὸν diacKadov σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη | αὐτῷ 
a ’ ? 
ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόὀν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν 
τοιοῦτον µέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ανεπιστήµονι μηδὲ 
6 fe) 3 , 9 / / e ” 
ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι µέτρῳω γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι µε 
9 , ee \ 9 ’ , 4 9 3 / wv , 
ἠνάγκαζεν 6 ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ᾽ ἐβουλόμην εἴτε pn, 
τοιοῦτον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνῃ µοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος Kal ταύτῃ, 
ᾗ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφά- 
νησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι. 
ΣΩ. | Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον 
ἁλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόὀξαν εἶναι περὶ δὲ 
\ \ e / / > e e 3 , \ e 
τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθῆσεις καὶ αἱ 
κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι «ίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἑλεῖν, ὡς 
οὐκ ἀληθεῖ. tows δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω ἀνάλωτοι yap, εὖ 
ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι 
/ 
καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος 


Ω 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. | 53 


60€ οὐκ. ἄπο σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην 
ταὑὐτὸν θέµενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, | ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ 
Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν Φερο- 
µένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἶτε σαθρὸν 
Φθέγγεται. μάχη δ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' 
ὀλίγοις yéyove. XXVII. @EO. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ 
φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν ᾿]ωγίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι 
πάµπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι 
τούτου τοῦ λόγου para ἐῤῥωμένως. YO. Τῷ τοι, ὦ 
/ / a / Δ ? “3 a or 
Φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ 
αὐτοὶ |! ὑποτείνονται. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ 
, > , / a ε / nv 
yap, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ 
κά \ { e / \ ww / 9 
ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις 'Ὁμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, av- 
τοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται 
ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ 
a a a \ 
τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνώς ydp κατὰ τὰ συγγράµµατα 
φέρονται, τὸ S ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ 
ἡσυχίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἧττον * 
αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ μηδέν μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ 
οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν nav- 
/ . 3 3 bd / 3” ef 2 / ε 
vias’ GAN ἄν τινα τι €py, ὥσπερ ἐκ Φφαρέτρας ῥη- 
µατίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, Kav 
τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει 
καινώς μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς 
Ins x ay, το / 3 - b \ ‘\ . / 3 > 
οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδέ ye ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ, 
εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐἂν εἶναι | pnt’ 
ἐν λόγῳ μήτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ 
δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιµον εἶναι τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι, 
καὶ καθ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν. Σ9. 
/ e / 
Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας µαχοµένους ἑώρακας, 
; 3 
ερηνεύουσι δὲ ov cuyyéyovas’ ov γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἶσιν. 


D 


E 


180 


54 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


GAN’, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς 

φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι. 

ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιµόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν 
η ’ ’ 


, ο 4 / ή ] 9 3 . / 9 
C TolovTwY ETEPOS ετέρου µαθητής, | adr’ αὐτόματοι ava- 


/ e / a 4 σ 3 a 2 / 
φύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, 
e ς Αα / Ν 
καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδένι. παρὰ 
A φ / a ea 2 OA 9 9 / 
μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ Ya ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις 
λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὖτε ἀκόντων αὐτυὺς δὲ δεῖ παρα- 
/ n ‘ 
λαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. YO. Καὶ 
\ / 
µετρίως γε λέγει». τόὀ ye δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι πα- 
α ‘ Ν , 
ρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως 


D ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς | πολλούς, ὡς 7 γένεσις τῶν ἄλ- 


λων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύματα τυγχάνει 
N Oe ο a \ A ε / ο / 
καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ate σοφωτέ- 
e / 

pov, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόµοι 
αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν µάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται 
ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν 
, α a ? 

ὄντων, µαθόντες & ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμώσιν av- 
τούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπέλαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι ad 


’ - 
E τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, οἷον | ἀκίνητον τελέθειν 


181 


τῷ πἀντ᾽ ὄνομ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ 
Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι mace τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, 
/ α 
ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, ουκ ἔχον 
4 e “A al al 
yopav, ἐν 7 κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, @ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί 
/ \ \ wf 

χρησόὀµεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν yap mpoiovtes λελήθαμεν 
. / 3 \ 

αμφοτέρων ets τὸ µέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν µή πη 
9 / ὃ , * / , ϱ e 9 
αμυνοµενοι διαφύγωμεν, * δίκην δώσοµεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν 
ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντε, ὅταν ὑπ 
3 Ua / ο 3 3 / α 
ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται eis τἀναντία. δοκεῖ 
9 \ 

οὖν µοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ οὕσπερ 

\ / 
ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μέν τι φαίνωνταιν 


ΘΕΔΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 55 


, / 9 4 «a 6 a ? , \ ς / 
λέγοντες, συνέλξοµεν ET αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέ- 
pous ἐκφυγεῖν πειρωμενοι' ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιώῶται 
ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκώσι, φευξόμεθα παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ 

“a > 

τούτων τών καὶ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. αμφότεροι | 8 
a a \ / / a > 

ἂν φανώσι μηδὲν µέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα 
ἠγούμενοι ἡμᾶς µέν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παµπα- 
λαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. 
ο Φ > / 3 aA 3 a of 
ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εὖὐ λυσιτελεῖ εις τοσοῦτον προϊέναι 
κίνδυνο ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 

\ . / / / ς a 9 a 
μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι, τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρών. 
XXVIII. ΣΏ. Σκεπτέον ἂν ein cov ye οὕτω προθυ- 

η 
µουµένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν pos ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινή- 
σεως πέρι, | ποῖύν τί ποτε apa λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα 
A y ι \ / \ / : / Y 
κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε' πότερον ἕν 
4 x A , λ οϱ > \ / / \ 
τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ 

, , } Ν / 9 , \ 4 ὁ 
µέντοι µόνον ἐμοὶ δοκείτω, ἀλλὰ συµµέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα 
κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἄν τι καὶ δἐέῃ. Kal por λέγε dpa 

a a e/ / 3 4 / 
κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χωραν ἐκ χώρας µεταβάλλῃ 
ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε ΣΏ. 
Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ᾖ μὲν ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ ἢ | µέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ 
μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινά ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιώται, 

/ 
dpa οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φΦάναι κινήσεως; ΘΕΟ. 
Ὄμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. ᾿Αναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω 
τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. 
ΘΕΟ. ᾿ΟὈρθῶς ye λέγων. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διε- 
λόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι 
κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν, Πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως 


σ 


D 


al / 
κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ | ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ µέν TLE 


181 Dp. τὴν δὲ περιφορά». Latere videtur corruptio. Cf. Vers. 
Απρ. | 


56 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


.. 


ἀμφοτέρως, TOS ἑτέρως; ΘΕΟ. ᾽Αλλὰ pa At’ ἔγωγε 


᾿οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν οἶμαι ὃ ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρω.. ΣΏ. Ki 


192 


δέ ye pn, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα 
φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθώς ἕξει εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κινεῖ- 
ται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἕστηκε. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Δληθέστατα 
λέγει». ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὲ 
κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι pndevi, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν * Kivnow 
del κινεῖται. ΘΕΟ. ᾽Ανάγκη. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή poe τόδε 
αὐτῶν' τῆς θερµότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὁτουοῦν γένεσιν 
οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον 


, / ¢ A fe) 
τούτων aya αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε Kal 


/ 
πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὺν ἀλλ. οὐκ 
” ” / Δ \ “A / 9 3 9 
αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ οὗ 
/ 
ποιοτητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνε- 
3 
ται ὄνομα, καὶ ov µανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον κατὰ 


. / 2 3 ] A \ a W / ” 
B µέρη οὖν axove. ' τὸ yap ποιοῦν οὔτε θερµότης ovTE 


/ 
λευκοτης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν αίγνεται, καὶ τἆλλα 
/ a , 
οὕτω. péuvnoat yap που, ἐν τοῖς πρόὀσθεν ὅτι οὕτως 


/ >] 
ἐλέγομεν, Ev μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ αὑτὸ εἶναι, pnd av τὸ 


ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα 
συγγιγνοµένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκ- 
τοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα «γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. 
ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι' πῶς δ ot}; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα 


/ / 
6 χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως | εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν' οὗ 


ὃ) ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο µόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώντες' 
Κινεῖται καὶ pei, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; 4 yap; ΘΕΟ. 
Nal, ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας, ds διειλόμεθα, κινήσεις, 
φερόµενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμεα; ΘΕΟ. Πώς 8 οὔ; 


182 8. ἀποτίκτοντα suspectum facit sequens τά. Conici potest 
ἀποτικτόμενα, Quod si nihil mutetur, statuenda est accusativi ab- 
soluti constructio. 


®EAITHTOS. 57 


εἶπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται ΣΏ. Ei μὲν τοίνυν 

ας. , / b α 8 ’ 9/ bd 9 ο 

ἐφέρετο µὀνον, ἠλλοιοῦτο δὲ µή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εὐπεῖν, 
wv wn ‘ a 

ola ἄττα pet τὰ dhepopeva, ἢ Tas λέγωμεν; ΘΕΟ. 


/ a 
Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ | τοῦτο pévet, τὸ λευκὸν D 


ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου 
/ a“ 
εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην 
χρὀαν, ἵνα μὴ ἁλῷ ταύτῃ µένον, apa ποτε οἷόν τέ τι 
προσειπεῖν χρώμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶώς προσαγορεύειν; 
ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο ye τι τῶν 
, ” 3 N / ς , ϱ/ \ ο 
τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ῥέον. 
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς 


A 6 A ΔΑ 3 I _ / 4 9 9 A A | ς αν 
του Opav η ακουεἰν», µένειν ποτε ἐν αὐτω TM ' ὁραν Ε 


ἢ ἀκούειν; ΘΕΟ. Οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. 
20. Οὔτε dpa ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, 
οὐδέ τιν ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ µή, πάντων γε πάν- 
τως κινουμένων. ΘΕΟ. Ov γὰρ οὖν. Σω. Καὶ μὴν 
” / 9 / co , / , 
αἴσθησίς ye ἐπιστήμη, ws ἔφαμεν ἐγω τε καὶ Θεαίτητος. 
ΘΕΟ. Ἡν ταῦτα. ΣΏ. Οὐδὲν dpa ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον 
ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι, ὃ τί ἐστιν 
ἐπιστήμη. ΘΕΟ. * Εοίκατε YO. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν 
συµβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυµη- 
θεῖσιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ 
μμ... 3 \ a \ 9? ς vw >, ! 9 / 
ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῃῇ. τὸ ὃ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφανη, εἰ πάντα 
κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, 
ς / > \ 9? ια > / \ ὀὁ 2 
ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω T ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτως, εὖ 
Λ / / ο λ / > \ A / 
δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωµεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόηῳ, 
ΘΕΟ. Ὀρθῶς λέγει. ΣΏ. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι 
cf 9 9 id A \ 9O\ A ϱ 
οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὕτω 
, ee ee re A ore 3° 9 vo, 
λέγειν οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι | κινοῖτο οὕτω" οὐδ av μὴ οὕτω 
οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις ἀλλά τιν ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον 
nw 4 , A A 4 
τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν ye πρὸς τὴν 


183 


58 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


6 a ε 9 4 es ο.  Ννψ \ >Q9 
avray ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ apa τὸ οὐδ 
ὕπως. μάλιστα ὃ οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἁρμόττοι, ἄπειρον 
λεγόμενο. ΘΕΟ. Οὐἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη 
αὐτοῖ.. YO. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε cov ἑταίρου 
ἀπηλλώγμεθα, καὶ οὕπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ 

6 ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων µέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ | φρόνιμός 
τις ᾖ' ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν ov συγχὠρησόμεθα κατά 
ye τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι µέθοδον. ei pn τί πως 
ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγε. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αριστ' εἴρηκας, 

+ / π / \ / να δν 3 
ὦ Σώκρατες' τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἄπηλ- 
λάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ 
τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη. XXIX. 
@EAI. Μὴ πρίν Υ ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ 

D τοὺς φάσκοντας ad τὸ | πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ὥσπερ 
ἄρτι προὔθεσθε. ΘΕΟ. Νέος dv, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς 

/ 2 a / e / 

πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνου- 

9 Ν / 6 Cad 9 / / 
τας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τών ἐπιλοίπων Σωκρά- 
τει δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε βούληται. 
ἤδιστα µέντ ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἱππέας 
els πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούµενος' 
ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλά µοι δοκῶ, ὦ (Θεό- 

E δωρε, περί ye ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος ov πείσεσθαι | αὐτῷ. 
ΘΕΟ. Ti δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι; ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν 

‘ νά aA A e \ / \ A 3 / 

καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνοµε- 
vos μὴ PopTiKas σκοπώμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα 
ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ poe φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ 

‘O , ὃ al / ef ὃ 4 / 
µήρον, αἰδοῖός τέ µοι ἅμα δεινός τε. ξυμµπροσέµιξα 
yap δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καί µοι 
184 ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι yevvaiov. * φοβοῦμαι 
οὖν, μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, Ti τε διανοούμενος 

4 / / ν _\ , ee 
εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώµμεθα, καὶ τὸ µέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα 


= 





a , / 
τον «γένηται ὑπὸ. τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, el τις 
9 nn / ‘ y. V iw rat 9 , 
αὐτοῖς πείσεται ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει 
ἀμήχανον εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳω σκέψεται, ἀνάξι ἂν 
πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανώς, µηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἆφα- 
viet. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν | κυεῖ περὶ 
α A A , 9 
ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ µαιευτικῇ τέχνη ἀπο- 
λῦσαι. ΘΕΟ. ᾽Αλλὰ χρή, ef δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. YO. 
3 / 9 Θ / , 5 } a bd / 
Ἐτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων 
ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν yap δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. 
ἡ γάρ; OEAI. Nai. Σω. Ed οὖν τίς σε ὧὦδ ἐρωτώη' 
A Ν 4 4 / e ~ \ Αα A 9 , 
τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ µέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα 
καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἄν, οἶμαι, ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὡσίν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. "Eyoye. ΣΏ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τών | ὀνομάτων re C 
λε / Δ ’ 3 / ? , \ \ 
καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ µὴ δι ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν 
πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον 
9 A fe) 
ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ viv ἀνάγκη 
3 / @ a kd / αλ 3 ί Φ . 9 @ ο. 
ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή 
9 a 
σκόπει yap, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρ, @ ὁρώμεν, 
ο. 9 9 6 ro, § > @ tia \@ 2 , 
τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι οὗ ὁρώμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν, 
ora, ἢ δι οὗ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Δι ὧν Exacta αἶσθα- 
νόµεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ ols. ΣΏ. | 
Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ mai, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ 
9 
ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς 
’ \ 997 ¥ ‘ ¥ ο A A ’ 
µίαν Tiva ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε 6 τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα 
ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανό- 
µεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Αλλά µοι δοκεῖ οὕτω 
a A a 
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως. LO. Tod δέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι 
A wv A A “A ο. 
διακριβοῦμαι; εἴ τιν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν 
α / A , 
ὀφθαλμών ἐφικνούμεθα λευκών τε καὶ µέλάνων, διὰ δὲ 
A ¥ Xx e 4 ” ee 4 ? / 
τών ἄλλων ἑτέρων av τινών, καὶ ' ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος E 


60 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


/ 4 a 9 A a 9 / ν \ 
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἷς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βελ- 
\ / > V\ 3 ’ a A > Vv, ¢ A 
TLOV σὲ λέγειν αὐτα αποκρινὀµενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ υπερ 
cov πολυπραημονεῖν. Kal mos λέγε θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ 
λ Le) 4 / τν @ > μ 94 2 a , 
καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σω- 
patos ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινό; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς 
ἄλλου. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολοηγεῖν, ἃ δι ἑτέρας 
185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι * δὺ ἄλλης ταῦτ 
αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι axons, 8’ ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι ὄψεως, δι 
axons; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω; ΣΏ. EZ τι 
dpa περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διά ye τοῦ ἑτέρου 
9 / 909 Ὀ 4 ο” ο \ 2? ) > , 9 
ὀργάνου, οὐδ av διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι 
ἄν. @EAI. Ov γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ 
χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, 
ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν; ΘΕΒΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε  ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 
καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν ; 
BOEAI. !Tipnv; ΣΩ. Kal ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτε- 
pov δὲ ἕν; @EAT. Καὶ τοῦτο ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε 
ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς eb ἐπισκέψασθαι; 
@EAI. Ἴσως. ΣΏ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τινος περὸ 
3 a a 9/ \ 2 3 A 9/ > » , 
αὐτοῖν διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι axons οὔτε δι ὄψεως οἷόν 
4 A / \ 3 Ca 4 \ \ / 
τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβανειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ rode 
τεκµήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν εὖ yap δυνατὸν ein ἆμφο- 
/ / Φ > 3? A ς \ A 4 9 > ef σ : 
τέρω σκέψασθαι, dp’ ἐστὸν ἁλμυρω 7 ov, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἕξεις 
9 a e 9 ϱ N a 9/ | ” wv 9 LY 
6 εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε | ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ 
φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο. OEAI. Τίδ ov μέλλει, ἤ γε 
Sud τῆς γλώττης δύναµις; LO. Καλώς λέγει. ἡ δὲ 
δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό Tt ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ 


wn e Ν , 
"τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὖκ 


é 
ἔστι καὶ & νῦν δὴ ἠρωτώμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις Tact 
ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα, δι ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμών τὸ 


αἰσθανόμενον Exacta; ΘΕΔΛΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ 


{ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ, 61 


J e , ζ 
μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν 
) Νλ ο 3 δὲ ο | \ \ Ww 3 θ Δ 
τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ Ev! τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν 
9 A A , 6d \ / | \ \ 
περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δέ, ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε Kal περιττὸν 
ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἆλλα, ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὼ τίνος more 
τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα. ZO. Ὑπέρευ, 
© Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. 
| @EAT, ᾽Αλλὰ pa Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι 
9 fa) / 9 4 9 \ 900) 9 nA 
εἰπεῖν, πλήν OTL µοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ εἶναι τοιοῦ- 
OA / 93/ ”Ν cf 9 / 9 9 
τον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ. 
9 9 9 cone | , / \ 
αὐτὴ δι αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ | κοινά poe Φαίνεται περὶ 
a } 
πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. 20. Καλὸς yap el, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
” a 
καὶ οὐχ, ws ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός ὁ γὰρ καλώς 
λέγων καλός τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δέ τῷ καλῷ ed ἐποίησάς 
, A 3 
µε “ara συχνοῦ λόγου ἁπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ 
A 9 AN 9 ἑ α « \ 3 α 4 Ν aA 
μὲν αὐτὴ δι αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὼ τῶν 


lo) A \ Aa 
τοῦ σώματος δυνάµεων. τοῦτο yap nv, ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ µοι 


ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ cot δόξαι. ΘΕΔΙ.  ᾽Αλλὰ 
μὴν ddiveral ye. XXX. YO. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης 
τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο yap μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέ- 
πεται. ΘΒΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ avy καθ αὑτὴν 
ἐπορέγεται. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιου, 
καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερν; @EAI. Ναι Σω. Te 
δὲ καλὸν Kal αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὀν; ΘΒΑΙ. 
Καὶ τούτων pot δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα 
σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ 
γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα | apts τὰ μέλλοντα. >. 
“Eye 57° ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα 
διὼ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν 
µαλακότητα ὡσαύτως; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε 
οὐσίαν καὶ 6 τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιέτητα πρὸς ἆλ- 
λήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ad τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ uy? 


D 


10 


186 


62 TIAATQONOS 


ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συµβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πει- 
ρᾶται ἡμῖν. ΘΗΒΕΑΙ. Ἱάνυ μὲν οὖν. YO. Οὐκοῦν τὰ 
6 μὲν εὐθὺς «ενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει ὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος πα- 
θήµατα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ava- 
λογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν µόγις καὶ ἐν 
χρόνῳ διὰ πολλών πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγί- 
γνεται ols ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Παντάπασι 
μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Olov τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ 
οὐσίας; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατον. ΣΏ. O8 δὲ ἀληθείας τις 
ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; ΘΗΕΛΙ. Καὶ 
Daas ἄν, | ὦ Σώκρατε; ΣΏ. Ἐν μὲν dpa τοῖς πα- 
θήµασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλ- 
λογισμῷ' οὐσίας yap καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα µέν, ὡς 
ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Φαί- 
νεται. ΣΏ. Η οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, 
τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε; @EAI. Οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιον 
ye. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ὠποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ par, 
ἀκούειν, ὀσφρωινεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερµαίνεσθαι;, ΘΕΙΛΙ. 

Β Αἰσθάνεσθαι | ἔγωγε τί yap ado; SO. Ἐύμπαν dp’ 
αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν; ΘΕΛΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Ὃι χε, 
Φαµέν, οὐ µέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι' οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. 
@EAI. Ov γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. Oud’ dp’ ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑ]. 
Ov yap. ΣΏ. Οὐκ dp’ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦὐτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ov φαίνε- 
ται, ὦ Ywxpates, καὶ μάλιστά ye νῦν καταφανέστατον 
γέγονεν ἄλλο bv αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. ΣΩ. "AN od 
187 τι * μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόµενοι, ἵνα 
εὕρωμεν Ti ποτ οὐκ ἔστ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ Ti ἔστιν. 
ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν ye προβεβήκαµεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν 
αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, αλλ ἐν ἔκείνῳ τῷ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 63 


ὀνόματι, & τί ποτ ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ αὐτὴν 
πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό 
γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ws ἐγώμαι, δοξάζειν. 0. 
Ὀρθώς yap ole, ὦ φίλε. καὶ Spa δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 
πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν | ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, B 
ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις, τί ποτ 
ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. ΧΧΧΙ. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν ei- 
πεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἐστι 
Sofa’ κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί 
pot τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. édv γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊοῦσιν, 
ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόµεθα λέγει. ΣΩ. Οἵ- 
τω μέντοι χρῆή, © Θεαίτητε, λέγειν, προθύµως μᾶλλον, | 
ἢ ὡς τὸ πρὠτον ὠκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω 
ὁρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, !ο 
ἢ ἧττον οἱησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν καίτοι οὐκ 
ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δὴ Kal νῦν. τί 
ys; δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἰδέοιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευ- 
Sods δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν αληθῆ δοξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζει ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε τοῦτο γὰρ av viv µοι φαίνεται. YO. 
"Ap οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν; ΘΕΛΙ. 
Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγει; ΣΏ. Θράττει µέ πως viv τε καὶ 
ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, WaT ἐν ἀπορίαᾳα πολλῇ πρὸς !Ὁ 
ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί 
mot ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον 
ἐγαιγνόμενον. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξαάζειν 
Tia ψευδῆ. σκοπώ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον 
ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψωμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον 
πρότερον. @EAI. Τί µήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ- γε καὶ 
ὁπῃοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακώς ye σὺ καὶ 
Θεύδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε 
κατεπείχε. ΣΩ. | Ὀρθώς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ Ε 


04 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ 
που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι. ΘΕΙΔΙ. Τί 
μήν; ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμὲν 
ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμών δοξαάζειν ψευδῆ, 
τὸν ὃ av ἀληθῆ, ws φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων; ΘΕΒΑΙ. 
Φαμὲν yap δή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν rode y ἔσθ ἡμῖν περὶ 
* καὶ καθ ἕκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι, 
µανθάνειν yap καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων as 


188 παντα 


ὄντα yalpew λέγω ἐν τῷ παρὀντι νῦν ηὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς 
λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ µήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
3/. 9 IAN / \ @ A 3 / “a Δ 
ἄλλο γ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ 
᾿εἰδέναι. LO. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀναγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δο- 
ξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδε; ΘΕΔΑΙ. ᾽Ανάγκη. 
20. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα ye μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα 
B εἰδέναι | ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς 8 οὔ: Σω. ᾽Αρ οὖν 
ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξαζων, ἃ olde, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι, 
3 λ ο ./ 9 9 \ 9 . Σο > nA 9 
ἀλλὰ ἕτερα atta ὧν olde, καὶ ἀμφοτερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ av 
ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ) ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. 

3 > 3 A \ ? e a ΣΣ. \ 9 ο 4) 
AN dpa, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἅττα 
ὧν μὴ olde, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ µήτε Θεαίτητον µήτε 
Σωκράτη εἰδότι eis τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης 
6 Θεαίτητος ἢ 6 Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης; ΘΕΑΙ. ! Καὶ 
πώς ἄν; ΣΩ. "AXN οὐ μήν, ἅ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεταί που 

A \ 9 > 34 9 ay Φ A Δ ἷδ "“ 4 
-@ pn οἶδεν αυτὰ εἶναι, ovd av ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ olde. 
@EAI. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται. XO. Πώς οὖν ἄν τις ἔτι 
ο / 3 \ \ , 9 / J , 
φευδῆ δοξάσειεν ; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων αδὐνατόν που δοξα- 
ζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις 
οὐδᾳμοῦ Φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. 
᾿Αληθέστατα. ΣΏ. Αρ οὖν od ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ 
A A 4 δέ \ ‘ δέ »/ 3 \ 
ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ 
Ὦ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ὶ καὶ pn; ΘΒΑΙ. Πώς λέγχες; BO. 


®EAITHTOX. 65 


Μὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, ὅτι 6 τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων 
οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ 
τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ. ΘΒΑΙ. Ἑϊκός y av, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
ΣΩ. Πώς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, dav τις ἡμᾶς 
ἀνακρίνη Δυνατὸν δὲ ὀτφοῦν ὃ λέγεται, Kal τις ἀνθρω- 
mov τὸ μὴ dv δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ 
καθ᾽ αὑτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν 
Ι"Ὅταν ye ἀληθῆ μὴ οἴηται οἰόμενος. ἢ Tas ἐροῦμεν ; E 
ΘΗΔΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. 7H οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦ- 
τόν ἐστι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. El τις dpa µέν τι, 
épa δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; Σω. ᾽Αλλὰ μὴν εὖ 
Ev γέ τι Opa, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἓν ἐν 
τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι; @EAI. Οὖκ ἔγωγε. ΣΏ. Ὁ dpa 
ἕν yé τι ὁρῶν dv τι Opa. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΏ. * Καὶ 189 
6 dpa τι ἀκούων ev yé τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν ἀκούει.  ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
Nai, ΣΏ. Καὶ 6 ἁπτόμενος δή του ἑνός yé Tov ἄπτεται 
καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἑνός; @EAI. Καὶ τοῦτο 30. “Ὁ δὲ 
δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν τι δοξάζει; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Ανάγκη. Σω. 
‘O & ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ov τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐνυγχωρόά. 
ΣΩ. Ὁ dpa μὴ dv δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξαζε. ΘΒΑΙ. Ov 
φαίνεται. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλὰ μὴν 6 γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ 
παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει. OEAT. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν. BO. 
| Οὐκ dpa οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ dv δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν Ὦ 
ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ αὑτό. BEAT. Ov φαίνεται. FO. 
”Αλλο τι Gp ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα 
δοξάζειν. ΘΒΑΙ. Αλλο ἔοικεν. YO, Οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ οὕτως 
οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα 
ἐν ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ov yap οὖν δή. XXXII. ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλ) 
dpa ὧδε φιγνόµενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύοµεν; MEAT. 
Ids; 20. ᾽Αλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι 
δοξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο ad | τῶν ὄντων, C 
K, P. ὃ 


66 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοία, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν 
A / σ 3 > e fF e / ? 
det δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ) ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὗ 
ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων. ΘΕΛΔΙ. 
Ὀρθότατά pot νῦν δοκεῖς ερηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ 
“ 9 A “A 9 4 3 A \ / / 6 
καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζη, τότε ὡς 
ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ. YO. Δήλος el, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
καταφρονών µου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ti μάλιστα; 
ΣΩ. Οὖκ ἄν, οἶμαι, col δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθώς ψεύδους 
9 λ / θ | ... 2 φ/ ‘ δέ A 
D ἀντιλαβέσθαι, | ἐρόμενος, εἰ olov τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ 
A / aA 9 \ \ \ ς 
κοῦφον βαρέως 7) ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ 
° > 4 \ 2 / / ς le 
φύσιν ἀλλὰ Kata τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ 
ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ µάτην θαῤῥήσης, 
ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ws dys, τὸ τὰ ψευδῇῆ δοξάζειν 
᾿ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ἔμοιγχε YO. "Βστιν dpa 
κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο 
τῇ διανοία τίθεσθαι. ΘΒΑΙ. στι µέντι. Σω. 
Ὅ 9 S03 Sia / δα ο, a 2A 
E’ Όταν οὖν τοῦθ’ 7 διάνοιά του dpa, ov καὶ | ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν 
ἦτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. 
Ανάγκη μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. "Ἠτοι ἅμα ye ἢ ἐν μέρει; 
ΘΒΑΙ. Κάλλιστα. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι dp ὅπερ 
ἐγὼ καλεῖς» ΘΕΙΑΙ. Τίκαλών; 20. Λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ 
ΔΝ e 4 e A / \ φ A A (v4 
πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῃ. ὥς 
γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο yap pou ἐνδάλλεται 
διαναουµένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν 
190 ἐρωτώσα * καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα Kat ov 
φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ opicaca, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ 
ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη hn καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, 
δόξαν ταύτην τίθεµεν αὐτῆς. dat ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάξζειν 
λέγειν καλώ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, ov μέντοι 
πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν. σὺ δὲ 
τί;  ΘΒΑΙ. Kayo. ΣΏ. Ὅταν dpa tis τὸ ἕτερον 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 67 


ἕτερον δοξάζη, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον 
εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. ' Ti pnv; Σω. ᾿Αναμιμνή- Β 
σκου δή, εἰ πωποτ᾽ εἶπες πρὸς . σεαυτὀν, ὅτι παντὸς 
a , A bd , 9 “A \ w dé, 
μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρὸόν ἐστιν ἡ TO ἄδικον δίκαιον, 
ἢ καὶ τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον σκὀπει, el ποτ᾽ ἐπεχείρησας 
σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν 
9 ry a 9 / »ο) 2 ο / » 
ἐατιν, ἢ Wav τοὐναντίον οὐδ ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας 
εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὀν, ὡς παντάπασιν apa τὰ περιττὰ 
ἄρτια ἐστιν ἦ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αληθῆ λέγεις, 
ΣΏ. "Άλλον δέ τινα oles | ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ µαινόμενον τολ- 6 
µῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα αὑτόν, 
ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἕν; ΘΕΛΙ. 
Ma Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε 3»ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ef τὸ λέγειν πρὸς 
e ‘ / 3 / ON 9 / , ’ 4 
ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά ye λέγων καὶ 
δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ 
δοξάσειεν, ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἑατέον δὲ καὶ cot 
τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρο. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, µηδένα 
δοξάζειν, ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν 7 ἄλλο TL τῶν τοιούτων. D 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ), ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε Kai por δοκεῖ ὡς 
λέγεις. ΣΩ. "Αμϕω μὲν apa δοξαάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ 
ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν. ΘΒΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. 20. ᾽Αλλὰ 
‘ Νο / , ὃ / \ δὲ ο 5 a 
μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν ye µόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῆ, 
οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι. ΘΒΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ 
λέγει: ἀναγκάζοιτο yap ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ 
δοξάζε. 20. Οὔτ' dp’ ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δο- 
ξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. wor et τις | ὁριεῖται δό- Ἐ 
ξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι οὔτε 
Δ / wv \ N 4 / A 
γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν 
a 4 
ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα. ΘΕΒΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικε. ΧΧΧΙΠ. Σω. 
᾽Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ Φανήσεται ov, 
πολλα ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα. ΘΕΑΙ. 
5—2 


19! 


D 


68 | ΠΛΑΊΩΝΟΣ 


Τὰ ποῖα δή; 20. Οὐκ ἐρώ σοι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ 
πειραθώ σκοπών. αἰσχυνοίμην yap ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν 
A“ 9 ς a; 
@ αποροῦμεν, αναγκαζοµένων ὁμολογεῖν ola λέγω. GAN 
ἐὰν * εὕρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώµεθα, TOT ἤδη περὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχὀόντων αὐτά, ἐκτὺς τοῦ 
γελοίου ἑστώτες' ἐὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω- 
κ a“ 4 ο) 
θέντές, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξοµεν ὡς ναντιώντες πατεῖν 
\ a 4 A / ϕΦ ελ 4 / \ 
τε καὶ χρῆσθαι 6 τι ἂν βούληται. ᾗ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ 
εὑρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἆκουε ΘΒΑΙ. Aéye 
A A A ο , 
µόνον. XO. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθώς ὁμολογῆσαι, ἠνίκα 
A 
ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἅ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ 
οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ | ψευσθῆναι ἀλλά wy δυνατόν. 
@EAI. "Apa λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἠἡγίκ' 
Δ ο 
αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι evioT ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων 
/ /ὸ}ε ν΄ Coa ov: A 9 , 
Σωκράτη, πόῤῥωθεν δὲ ὁρών ἄλλον, ὃν ov γυγνώσχω, 
./ ολ \ \ 
φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη, ὃν οἶδα; yiyverat γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ 
, , ? n 9 / 9 aA 
τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγει. LO. ΌὈυκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, 
ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΙΑΙΊ. 
A ° 9 
Πανυ μὲν οὖν. 20. Μὴ yap οὕτω τιθώµεν, αλλ woe. 
καὶ ἴσως πῃ ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. 
ee \ \ ? a / > 2 > e > 2 / 
αλλα γαρ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἄναγκη πάντα 
/ / / / 4 3 
µεταστρέφοντα λογον βασανιζειν. σκόπει οὖν, εἴ τι 
> νά al 
λέγω. dpa ἔστι μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν ; 
OEAI. Ἔϊτι μέντοι. LO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον 


καὶ ἕτερν; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Τί δ οὔ; SO. Θὲς δή poe λόγου 


ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμών ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ 
μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ ὃ ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου 
κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις 
δὲ ὑγροτέρου, | ἔστι & ols µετρίως ἔχοντος. ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
Τέθημι. ΣΩ. Δώρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φώμεν εἶναι τῆς τών 
Μουσῶν μητρὺς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο, & τι ἂν 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 69 


66 “ 2 “a ἴδ a 3 / 
βουληθώμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν 
, ε n 
ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντες αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι 

/ 9 a v4 a 
καὶ évyolats, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα 
A 
ἐνσημαινομένους. Kat ὃ μὲν ἂν éxpayh, μνημονεύειν 
\ 0 / @ ιό a να \ ¥ >) A ϱ 
τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἑνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ. ὅταν 
δὲ } Qn a \ to / .. A 
é efarerpOn ἢ µὴ οἷόν τε γένηται | ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπι- 
λελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. OEAT. "Ἔστω οὕτως. 
6 / A 
ΣΏ. ‘O τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτώ, σκοπών δέ τι 
Φ e a “a 3 ’ wv 9 ww a) ή δη 
ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ apa τοιῷῶδε τρὀπῳ ψευδῆ 
A 
ἂν δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳω δή τιι; YO. “A older, 
9 9 ¢ “A a 
οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἃ olde, Tore δὲ ἃ py. ταῦτα 
\ A a 
yap ἐν τοῖς πρὀσθεν ov καλώς Wpmoroyncapev ὁμολο- 
γοῦντες ἀδύνατα. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Nov δὲ ads λέγεις; Σο. 
9 : / a a 
Aci ὧδε * λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζοµέ- 
4 “A / 9 > A a a 
νους, ὅτι ὃ µέν τις οἶδεν ἔχων αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ 
Ν / a a 
ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ py, τοῦτο oinOnvat ἕτερόν 
4 ; / 
τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον 
δὲ / δύ \ of ἷδ 4. 3 θη 9 “A 
é µή, aduvatov. καὶ 6 ye οἶδεν av, οἴηθῆναι εἶναι ὃ 
4 9 > + A A - ¢ 
μὴ olde pnd ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγῖδα καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ 
9 4, ὶ ὃ . οἶδεν. ὃ olde +3 . ; ’ 
μὴ οἶδεν av’ καὶ Ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, 0 οἶδε Kal 0 αἰσθάνεταί 
ο / 9 > θά ? An 9 5 \ oa ? / 
rye, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι καὶ ὃ αἰσθαᾶ- 
9 \ ‘ ἑ 
νεται, ὧν TL μὴ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν 
\ . rf) / . ν΄ ἃ \ η / ο ’ ’ 
μὴ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, | ὧν αἰσθάνεται. 
Kal ἔτι ye av ὧν olde καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ 
σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἴηθῆναι av ἕτερόν τι ὧν 
olde καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει av καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον 
\ a 9 , ” 3 / > , 
κατὰ τὶν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατωτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν 
τε. καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον 
a ¢ a < € 9 \ 9 
ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον καὶ ὃ oide καὶ αἰσθά- 
191 p. ὑπέχοντε. Multi codd. et edd. habent ὑπέχοντας. CE. 
Vers. Angl. 


E 


T9 


B 


ty 


70 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


3 4 9 , oA 9 θ , 3 ) OS} 9 \ to 
νεται ἔχων κατὰ TavTa, ὃ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ ad μὴ olde 
Ο μηδὲ ' αἰσθάνεῖαι, ὃ μὴ olde μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ 
μὲ) olde μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε καὶ ὃ μὴ olde μηδὲ 
αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει 
3 / ~ ? 9 a) . A , / 
advvapia τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται 
δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γε- 
νέσθαι.  ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν dpa ἐξ αὐτῶν τι 
μᾶλλον µάθω' νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕπομαι. ΣΏ. Ἐν ols 
οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ) atta εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθά- 
D vera’ ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ ἢ ὧν | οἶδε καὶ 
αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν av καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Nov 
πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε XXXIV. ΣΏ. Ὢδε 
δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὺ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ 
/ ’ 9 A \ 9 / 3). 
µεμνηµένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο 
τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ ov, καὶ ἅπτομαί 
ποτ αὐτῶν, τοτὲ ὃ ov, καὶ ἀκούω. ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθη- 
9 / λ 1 3 3 / » \ 
ow αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ ὃ αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ 
6 a / δὲ ς A δὲ e \ 9 / 
ὑμῶν, µέμνηµαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι 
E αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτώ; ΘΕΛΑΙ. Πάνυ ! μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Τοῦτο 
τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὧν βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν 
ἃ olde μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
᾽Αληθή. Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ olde, πολλάκις μὲν 
ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι µόνον; 
@EAI. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο ΣΏ. Ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον 
193 νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει * Θεόδωρον. καὶ 
Θεαίτητον, opd δὲ µηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ 
9 n 3 
πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν 
ς e / b] N / / “A σο/ 
ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν; 
@EAI. Nal, ἀληθῆ γε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων 
πρῶτον ἦν ὧν ἔλεγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γάρ. ΣΏ. Δεύτερον 
τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώ- 


ΘΕΒΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 71 


σκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ µηδέτερον, οὐκ adv ποτε ad 
οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾿Ορθῶς. 
ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, µηδέτερον «γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανό- 
µενος ' οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν εἶναι B 
ὧν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρὀτερα πάἀνθ᾽ ἑξῆς νόμιζε 
πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν ols οὐδέποτ) ἐγὼ περὶ cod καὶ 
Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε «γιυγνώσκων οὔτε 
ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν ὃ ov γυγνώσκων. 
καὶ περ) αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταὐτά, ei dpa ἔπει. ΘΒΕΑΙ. 
ὝἜπομαι. ΣΩ. Λείπεται τοίνυν ta ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν 
τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν 
ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ | ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ C 
σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυ- 
μηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οὐκεία 
ier, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρµόσαι eis τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, 
ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ 
ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω 
τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ Kat 
οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατὀπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ 
εἰς ἀριστερὰ µεταῤῥεούσης, tavTov | παθὼν διαµάρτω' D 
τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε yap, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυµασίως ᾧ λέγεις 
τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἆμφο- 
τέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ ηιυγνώσκειν αἰσθά- 
νωµαι, τὸν δὲ pn, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόὀσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον 
καὶ µου tote οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.  ' ΘΒΑΙ. Ov γὰρ οὖν. 
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ 
| αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν av- E 
τοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἴήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα 
ὧν φυγνώσκει τε Kal αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνώσιν ad 


72 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


| ν΄ 9 / ” A 4 3/ > a) A a 
καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. Nv yap τοῦτο; 
@EAI. Ναί ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ yé που τὸ νῦν λεγό- | 
µενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμὲν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ 
ov / A bd 6 a wv a 
ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρώντα n τινα ἄλλην 
104 * αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τὸ σηµείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν av- 
τοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, GAN οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον 
e/ / le) ο \ e A “A \ Δ 
ἱέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ 
φεῦδος dpa ὠνόμασται. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Εὐκότως γε. ΣΏ. Kad 
/ / a a a a 
ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σηµείων, τῷ δὲ 
/ A , 
µή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσ- 
/ 
αρµόσῃ, παντῃ ταύτῃ Ψψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἑνὶ 
4 
λόγφῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδὲ ἤσθετο πώποτε, 
οὐκ ἔστιν, | ὡς ἔοίκεν, οὔτε Ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδὴς 
Β δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν' περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν 
τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ 
ἑλίττεται 4 δόξα Ψψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνοµένη, κα- 
ταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα 
3 , / 3 ¢ 3 / \ 
ἁποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, ἀληθης, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ 
σκολιὰ ψευδή. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλώς, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
λέγεται; ΣΏ. "Ere τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας | μᾶλλον 
6 αὐτὸ ἐρεῖ.. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλὀν, τὸ δὲ 
ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δ of; YO. Taira 
/ ) > θέ ὃ / 6 c/ Δ ¢€ / 
τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρὀς του 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ µετρίως 
ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τών αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαι- 
’ 9 a A a a / A + ο 
νόµενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη "Όμηρος 
αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ 
τούτοις καθαρὰ τὸ | σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς 
D τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρὀνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν 
a 54 
of τοιοῦτου πρὠτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα µνήµονες, εἶτα 
9 ’ a » / 4 A 3 \ 
οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, ἀλλὰ 


@EAITHTOS. 73 


/ 3 A A 4 2 , / v 
Sofalovow αληθή. σαφῆ yap καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίαᾳ οντα 
ταχὺ διανέµουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ 
δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ 
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυώς μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Ὅταν 
| / / / νο 4 a 5 \ > 7 ¢ , 

τοίνυν λάσιόν του TO κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν 6 πάντα 
copes ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρώδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ 
κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόὀν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρόν, 
. a / > / \ / / 
εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, dv δὲ σκληρὀν, 
ταναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον Kal τραχὺ λιθώδές τε 7 
γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ 
9 a» 9 A ον Ν΄ εϱ 9 . , 
ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά βάθος 
yap οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ 
συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ * γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς Tact 
τούτοις em ἀλλήλων συµπεπτωκοτα ᾖ ὑπὸ στενοχω- 
plas, ay του σμικρὸν 7 τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα 
ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι «γίγνονται olor δοξάζειν 
ψευδῆ. ὅταν yap τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, 
ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις ov δυνἀάµενοι βραδεῖς 
τέ εἶσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρᾳ- 
κούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι 
ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖ.. ΘΕΙΑΙ. | Ὀρ- 
θύτατα ἀνθρώπων λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατε. YO. Φῶμεν 
dpa ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δύξας εἶναι; ΘΕΔΙ. Σφόδρα γε. 
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή; O@EAI. Kal ἀληθεῖν. ΣΏ. δη 
9 of e n ο a 4 \ a 
οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανώς ὡμολογῆσθαι, OTL παντὸς μᾶλλον 
ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω tw δόξα; ΘΕΑΙ. περφυώς 
μὲν οὖν. XXXV. 30. Δεινόν τε ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς 
ἀληθώῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης. 
@EAI. Té Sat; πρὸς τί τοῦτ΄ eles; ΣΏ. | Τὴν éuav- 
ο / / 6 3 A 3 , 
τοῦ δυσµαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. 
A bad 4/ a v 6 ” , \ 
τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς 


195 


B 


ο 


74 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας ov δυνάµενος πεισθῆναι, 
καὶ ᾗ δυσαπάἀλλακτος ad ἑκάστου λόγου; @EAI. Σὺ 
δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνες; ΣΏ. Ov δυσχεραίνω µόνον, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα 6 τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἄν τις ἔρηταί 
. U 
µε Ὦ Σώκρατες, εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῇ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε 
ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς 
D διανοίαις, ἆλλ ἐν τῇ ὶ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διά- 
νοιαν» Φήσω δὲ ἐγω, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι 
εὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ- 
κρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. >. 
Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις, ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν δια- 
νοούµεθα µόνον, ὁρῶμεν & ov, ἵππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
9 A = bd 6 α 9/ ς / 
οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν ad οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἁπτόμεθα, 
διανοούµεθα δὲ µόνον καὶ ἄλλ οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ 
αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγει. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Kal ὀρθώς 
Eve. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; ' φήσει τὰ ἔνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ 
διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν 
ποτε oinbein δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ µόνον av διανοεῖται; ἴθι 
οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου. @EAI. Αλλ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, 
ϱ e 4 \ Ww a 9 / > \ ο 
OTL ὁρών μὲν ἄν Tis ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ evdexa 
δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοία ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
περὺ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἴει 
τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ 
τού * μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέµενον σκοπεῖν 
pnd ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἅ papev 
ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς 
9 ’ A 3 v 2 4 my) 
οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη 
πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτών, πόσα 
9 9 \ e , 9 > \ a 2 
ποτ) ἐστί, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς Evdexa αὐτὰ 
΄ ε ϱἱ / . 2 , /) . oy 
εἶναι, 6 δὲ δώδεκα 4 πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται 
δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι; @EAI. Ov pa τὸν Ala, ἀλλὰ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. Τὸ 


πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕἔνδεκα. | ἐὰν δέ ye ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ B 
τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφἀάλλεται. οἶμαι yap σε περὶ 

9 fe) / > n 
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ΣΏ. ’OpOds yap oles. 

Ν΄ 2? A , ’ / ν A 9 4 ‘ 
καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ, µή Tb ποτε yiyveTat ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ 
δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ Evdexa οἰηθῆναι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
"Βοικέ ye. YO. Οὐκοῦν eis τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει 
λό . e A A @ / “A to ο 9 AY ο 

όγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ older, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἵεται 
9 9 Φ 9 A 100 ) , 9 Αα 
εἶναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ 
3 Aa ’ 
ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι | ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ ο 
αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἁλη- 
θέστατα. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ 
τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλ- 
λαγήν. εὖ γὰρ τοῦτ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς 
διανοήµασιν ἐψευδόμεθα νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς 
/ ν 
δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων 
πότερα αἱρεῖ; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Απορον αἴρεσι προτίθης, ὦ 
Σώκρατε. ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλὰ µέντοι ἀμφότερά | ye κινδυ- D 
νεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολµη- 
τέον, τί et ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς; 
ΣΏ. Εθελήσαντες εἶπεῖν, ποῖὀν τί ποτ ἐστὸὺ τὸ ἐπί- 
στασθαι. @EAI. Kat τύ τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον; ΣΩ. 
ν 9 ? a ό a e a bd > A ς / 
Ἐοικας ουκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι mas ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόηγος 
ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἶδόσι, τί ToT 
ἐστίν. ΘΕΒΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν. Σω. “Emer οὐκ 
9 \ a \ 297 b / 3 \ 
ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μη εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ 
ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ' πάλαι E 
9 Ν 9 / A 4 ~ , / 
ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρώς διαλέγεσθαι. μµυριαᾶκις 
γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώσκοµεν καὶ ov γυγνώσκοµεν, Kar 
ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἆλ- 
λήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, 
καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόὀντι κεχρήμεθ ad τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε 


76 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στε- 
ῥόµεθα ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ τίνα τρόπον δια- 
197 λέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος: ΣΩ.  Οὐδένα 
ὤν ye ὃς εἰμί ef µέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εὖ 
καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων T ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν 
σφόδρ ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν 
φαῦλοι, βούλει τολµήσω εἰπεῖν, οἷόν. ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστα- 
σθαι; Φαίνεται yap prot προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι. 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν vy Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἄπεχο- 
µένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη. XXXVI. ΣΩ. ᾽Ακή- 
κοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως" 
ov µέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρὀντι μνημονεύω. YO. Ἐπι- 
Ἡ στήµης που | ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αληθὴή. 
ΣΏ. 'Ημεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν µεταθώµεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν 
ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν. ΘΕΛΙ. Τέ οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο 
ἐκείνου διαφέρειν; ΣΏ. “lows μὲν οὐδέν' 3 δ οὖν 
δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκἰµαζε. ΘΕΑΙ. Εάν πἐρ γε olds 
τ᾿ ὦ. ΣΩ. Ou τοίνυν µοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τὸ κεκτῆσθαι 
τῷ ἔχειν. οἷον εἰ ἱμάτιον πριάµενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς 
év μὴ φοροῖ, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι 
6 δέ γε φαῖμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθώς γε. ΣΩ. “Opa ! δὴ 
καὶ ἐπιστήμην εὖ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτηµένον μὴ ἔχειν, 
ἀλλ ὥσπερ ef τις ὄρνιθας ἁγρίας, περιστερὸς ἤ τι 
ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἶκοι κατασκευασάµενος περιστερεὠνα 
τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν yap ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν 
αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἡ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 
ΣΏ. Τρόπον δέ vy ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν 
μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεηονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ 
περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, 
D ἐπειδὰν βούληται, ' θηρευσαµένῳ ἣν av ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃη, καὶ 
πάλιν ἀφιέναι καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὁποσάκις ἂν 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ, | 77 


A ” a 
δοκῇ αὐτῷ. QOEAI. “Eote ταῦτα. ΣΏ. Πάλιν δή, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὀσθεν Krpwov τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς 
’ 9 ee) ϱ , ο) 9 3 e , 
κατεσκευάᾶζοµεν οὐκ οἷὃ 6 τι πλάσμα, νῦν av ἐν ἑκα- 
στη ψυχῃ ποιήσωµεν περιστερεὠνά τινα παντοδαπών 
3 / \ \ > 9? / Ww \ “A of. 
ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν Kat ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, 
b) \ οὖν / > / \ , \ a 
tas δὲ nar ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ povas διὰ πασῶν, ὅπη 


ἂν τύχωσι, πετοµένας. ΘΒΕΑΙ. ' Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ Ε 


τί τοὐντεῦθεν», ΣΩ. Ἠαιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ 
εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων 
ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι ἣν ὃ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάµενος 
καθεἰρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν µεµαθηκέναι 
ἢ εὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ εἶναι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ἔστω. Σω. Τὸ 
/ / “A a * , na 9 a 6 , 
τοίνυν πάλιν ἣν av * βούληται τών ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν 
\ , ¥ 4 >, 7 , , 
καὶ AaBovta ἴσχειν καὶ ἀὖθις ἀφιέναι oKoTet τίνων 
δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε 
3 ο . e , , 3 bd] α a 
ἐκτᾶτο, elite ἑτέρων. µαθήσει ὃ ἐντεῦθεν σαφέστε- 
\ 
pov, τί λέγω. aplOuntixny μὲν ydp λέγεις τέχνην; 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ναί ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστη- 
μῶν ἁρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός. ΘΒΑΙ. Ὕπο- 
λαμβάνω. ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ δή, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε 
ὑποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμών | ἔχει καὶ 
ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν 6 παραδιδού ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. Σω. 
Kat καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παρα- 
λαμβάνοντα δὲ µανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι 
ἐν τῷ περιστερεώνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. avy 
μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν 
“ 9 \ ‘ a / Vv / 
νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὧν τέλέως ἄλλο τι πάντας 
ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων yap ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ 


ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι ΘΕΑΙ. Ti µήν; ΣΩ. Ἡ ! οὖν ς 


6 τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἢ 


78 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω, ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν; ΘΒΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ 
ov; ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν ye οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ 
σκοπεῖσθαι, πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ov. OEAT. 
Otto. ΣΏ. Ὁ dpa ἐπίσταται, σκοπούµενος φαίνεται 
e 3 9 / “A e / 6 bd \ 2N7 
ὡς OUK εἰδώς, ὃν ὡὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα αριθμὸν εἰδέ- 
ναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ἜὌγωγε ΧΧΧΥΠ. Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς πει- 


κάζοντες τῇ τών ἱ περιστερών κτήσει τε καὶ θήρα 
D ] | ζ 


199 


3 a er 5 \ 4 e @ / « Δ Ν 3 “ θ a“ 
ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ 
ο A a ” 
κεκτήσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτηµένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν 
ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὧν 
πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι σαν αὐτῷ µαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο 
αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταµανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ava- 
λαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν 
ἐκέκτητο μὲν πᾶλαι, πρὀχειρον δ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ δια- 
Poe 3 a A \ 9) 3 , 
voia; ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Αληθῆ. ΣΏ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, 

\ na / 4 + 
ὅπως | χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον Aéyew περὶ αὐτών, 
ὅταν ἀριθμήσων in ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢἤ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος 
ὁ γραμματικός. ὡς ἐπιστάμενος dpa ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ 
πάλιν ἔρχεται µαθησόµενος παρ ἑαυτοῦ a ἐπίσταται ; 
@EAI. ’AAN’ ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατε. YO. ’AAN ἃ ove 

/ a 
ἐπίσταται φώμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμή- 
σειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράµµατα, πάντα. δὲ 
ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ * ἆλο- 
yov. 2. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων 
ΦΩΛ 65 On lA το / ο \ 3 / 
οὐδὲν ἡμῖν µέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι 

’ 9 \ \ oe , ο \ \ 
καὶ µανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ 
κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ µέν 

” A 3 / / Φ ϱ 
τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν Φαµμεν εἶναι, ὥστε 
οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις olde μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι 

/ / % 9 ’ A a \ 4 3/ 
δόξαν οἷόν 7’ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 79 


τὴν ἐπιστήμην | τούτου οἷόν τε, GAN ἑτέραν avr’ ἐκεί- B 
νης, ὅταν θηρεύων rida ἀπ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην διαπε- 
τοµένων ἀνθ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτων λάβῃ, ὅτε dpa τὰ 
ἔνδεκα δώδεκα ὠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην 
ἀντὺ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν éavT@ οἷον φάτ- 
ταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. ΘΕΑΙ. “Eyes γὰρ οὖν λόγον. 
ΣΏ. Ὅταν δέ ye ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀψευδεῖν 
τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε,.καὶὺ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ 
τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς | πρόσθεν ἐδυσ- 6 
χεραίνοµεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν «ύγνεσθαι; tows οὖν pot 
συµφήσει.. ἢ Tas ποίήσες; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. Σω. 
Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίσταται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἄπηλ- 
λάγμεθα ἃ yap κεκτήµεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι 
συμβαίνει, οὔτε «ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε µή. δεινότερον 
µέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαἰνεσθαί µοι δοκεὶ ΘΕΑΙ. 
Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΏ. Ee ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ 
ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δή; ΣΏ. 
ΙἹρώτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ϱ 
ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀηνωμοσύνῃ αλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ, 
ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ ὃ ἕτερον τοῦτο, 
πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενοµένης γνώ- 
ναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ 
τούτου τοῦ λόγου Κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγε- 
νοµένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ 
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσε. ΘΕΑΙ. 
Ἴσως γάρ, © Σώκρατες, ov Karas | τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτί- E 
θεµεν ἐπιστήμας povoy τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστη- 
μοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετοµένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 
καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, 
τοτὲ © ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αυτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν 
δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ,. ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. 


δ0 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Σω. Ov ῥᾳδιόν ye, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε. ὃ 
µέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν yap ὡς 
200 λέγεις' ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην * λαβὼν ψευδῆ 
µέν, bys, δοξάσει ἡᾖ yap; ΘΒΑΙ. Να. Σω. Ov 
δήπου καὶ ἠγήσεταί ye Wevdn δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς 
yap; 20. Αλλ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται 
περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται. ΘΒΑΙ. Τί µήν; Σ9Ώ. Ἠπιστήμην 
dpa οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, ἀλλ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημο- 
σύνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελ- 
θόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώὠτην πάρεσµεν ἀπορίαν. 6 
Β γὰρ ἐλεηγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος «γελάσας φήσει | Πότερον, ὦ 
Βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἶδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ave- 
πιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναυ 
ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν εἶδως, ἣν μὴ olde, δοξάζει 
ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν ὃ ov, ἣν 
οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ oldev; ἢ ἣν μὴ older, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ 
πάλιν av pou ἐρεῖτε OTL τῶν ἐπιστημών καὶ ἀνεπιστη- 
μοσυνών εἰσὶν ad ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς 6 κεκτηµένος ἐν ἑτέ- 
ροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεώσιν 7 κηρἰνοις πλάσμασι 
6 καθείρξας, | ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν 
μὴ προχείρους ἔχη ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκα- 
σθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν µυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον 
ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινού- 
µεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰά pa Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ 
ἔχω, TE χρὴ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Αρ’ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλώς 
ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην 
D ἀφέντες; | τὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἄν τις 
ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ, τί aot ἐστίν ΘΕΑΙ. ’A- 
νάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι. 


XXXVIIT. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστή- 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. δΙ 


µην; ov γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν yé πω. BEAT. "Ἠκιστα, 
ἐάν περ μὴ σύ ye atrayopevons. 0. Aéye δή, τί ἂν 
αὐτὺ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιω- 
θεῖμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σωκρατες, | ἐν 
τῷ πρόσθεν' οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ΣΏ. Τὸ 
ποῖον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. 
9 / / , ’ 9 4 / 93 ο] 

ἀναμάρτητόὀν yé πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθὴ, καὶ τὰ 
ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόµενα πάντα καλὰ Kal ἀγαθὰ yiyverat. 

εν ΄ ν \ / 9 / » 

ΣΏ,. ‘O τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούµενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη 
apa δείξειν αὐτό' καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνώμεν, TAY’ 
ἂν ἐμπόδιον «γενόμενον αὐτὸ * φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον, 
µένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν. OBAI. ΟὈρθώῶς. λέγει; adr’ 
» / \ a s a as 

ἴωμέν ye καὶ σκοπώμεν. 20. Ουκοῦν τοῦτό ye βρα- 
χείας σκέψεως τέχνη yap σοι ὅλη σηµαίνει μὴ εἶναι 
ἐπιστήμην αὐτό. ΘΒΑΙ. Ids δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη; Σο. 
ε a / b / A ὃ \ a ep , 
H τῶν µεγίστων eis σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι ῥήτοράς 
τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ 

/ 9 , 3 4 , lo) A a 
πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν παιοῦντες ἃ ἂν 
/ aA \ v , ef , 

Εούλωνται. ἢ σὺ oles δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους 


201 


ς ef 
εἶναι, ώστε ols | μὴ παρεγένοντὀ τινες ἀποστερουμένοις B 


χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζοµένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς 
ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενοµένων τὴν ἁλή- 


θεια»; ΘΒΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι 


µέν. ΣΩ. Τὸ πεῖσαι ὃ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι; 
ΘΕΔΙ. Τί µήν; Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθώσι 
δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι µόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ 
µή, ταῦτα tote ἐξ axons κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν | λα- 
Bovres, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ 
εὖ ἐδίκασαν; @EAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ove 
ἄν, ὦ pire, eb γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς [καὶ δικα- 
᾿στήρια] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά mor ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος 
K. Ρ. 6 


4 


82 | ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


9 α΄ ¥ : : 
ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκά- 
τερον εἶναι. ΘΕΙΑΙ. “Ὁ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος 

9 , 9 ) A > 3 A ” \ \ 
του ἀκούσας ἐπιλελήσμην, viv & ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν 
D μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ' τὴν δὲ 
ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ὧν μὲν pH ἐστι λόγος, 
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάξων,. a ὃ ἔχει, 
ἐπιστητά. Σ). 7H καλώς λέγει. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ 
ταῦτα καὶ μὴ wh διῄρει, λέγε, Eb ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε 
mee . 
Kayo ἀκηκόαμεν. ΘΒΑΙ. ᾽Αλλ) οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ éEevpnow’ 
x / / > A e / e b ν b x 6 , 
έγοντος μέντ ἂν ἑτέρου, ws ἐγώμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμι. 
XXXIX. ΣΏ. "Ακουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὺ dvelpatos. ἐγὼ 
Ἑ γὰρ av ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν. ἰ πρώτα 
οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείµεθα καὶ 
a. , > »ν 9 4 \ 5) ey. ¥ 
τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον 
93 / , ” aA 24 4/ , 
ὀνομάσαι µόνον ein, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὀν, 
ες wa « wa? ες > » . Ν \ a > + 
οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ) ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν' ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν 
202 *7 μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ- 
φέρει», εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο µόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ 
3 ὸ ὸὲ A 3 Ua) Py: \ ο δὸ Q , 
αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ µόνον 
οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. 
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα Tact προσφέρεσθαι ἕτερα 
ὄντα ἐκείνων, οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν 
αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν 
A , e Ay J / 5 9 A 9 9 α > 9 A 
B τών πρωτων ῥηθήναι ' λογῳ᾽ ov γαρ εἶναι aVT@ αλλ, 7 
ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον ἔνομα yap µόνον ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ 
τούτων ἤδη συγκείµενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω 
καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτών συµπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι’ 
ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω 
δὶ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ 
δέ τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ 


2 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. | 88 


δόξη δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆὴ 
δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν | ψυχὴν ο 
περὶ αὐτό, γιυγνώσκειν ὃ οὔ' τὸν yap μὴ δυνάµενον 
δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ 
τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατον τε ταῦτα πάντα 
γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως σὺ 
τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν 
παντάπασιν. ΣΏ. Αρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, 
δόξαν ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ΘΕΛΑΙ. 
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Σ. Αρ’, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ' νῦν οὕτω D 
τῇῆδε τῇ ἡμέρα εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν 
σοφών ὑΚητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν; ΘΒΑΙ.. 
Ἐμοὶ, γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλάς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν 
ῥηθέν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός ye αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν 
τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς λόγου τε καὶ 
ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἓν µέντοι τί µε τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΏ. Ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι 
κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τών 
συλλαβών «γένος ' γνωστόὀν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ουὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; Ε 
ΣΩ. Ἱστέον δή ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου 
τὸ παραδείγµατα, ols ypwpevos εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Hota δή; ΣΏ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά 
τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ oles ἄλλοσέ trot βλέποντα ταῦτα 
εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα, ἃ λέγομεν;, ΘΒΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ) eis 
ταῦτα. XL. 20. Ἡασανίζωμεν * δὴ αὐτὸ ἀναλαμβά- 203 
νοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως 
γράµµατα ἐμάθοµεν. Φέρε πρῶτον ap αἱ μὲν συλ- 
λαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; MEAT. 
Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκρά- 
τους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί, 
Ὢ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι GO, τί ἀποκρινεῖ; ΘΒΑΙ. 
6—2 


84 MAATONOS 


“Ore σῖγμα καὶ ©. 20. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον 
τῆς συλλαβῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, οὕτως 
Ἡ εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ | σῖγμα λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ wads τοῦ 
| ο) nw , ’ 
ἱστοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; Kal γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις µόνον, οἷον 
συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης' τοῦ ὃ av βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ 
οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ 
Φ Υ Ν / 27 NN Oo” oO \ > / 
ev ἔχει τὸ λέγέσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλοηα, ὧν ye Ta ἐναργέστατα 
μμ. Ve / A. / ” / \ »ο) ¢ a 
αυτά, Ta ἑπτά, φωνὴν µόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ ὀντινοῦν. 
ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν dpa, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώὠκαμεν περὶ ἐπι- 
6 στήµης. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα. YO. Ti δὲ ! δή; τὸ μὴ 
\ ? \ a 9 \ A y φ ο 
Υνωστὸον είναι το στοιχείιον, αλλα την συλλαβην αρ 
ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ΘΕΒΕΙΑΙ. Ἑἰκός γε. ΣΏ. Φέρε 
δή, τὸν συλλαβὴν πὀτερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοι- 
ή, τὴ 7 pov λέγομ μφότερ 
3 λ / 4 A , , A / \ οσο 
χεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ παντα, ἢ µίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν 
yeyovuiay συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Ta ἅπαντα 
ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. LO. “Opa δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ 
-- / 4 3 « / \ a 9 a ο), 
@. αμφοτερᾶ ἐστιν n πρὠτη συλλαβή τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνό- 
patos. ἄλλο TL ὁ γιγγὠώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα 
Ὦ γιγνώσκει; ΘΕΑΙ. ' Τί µήν; ΣΏ. Τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ 
@ apa γιυγνώσκει. @EAI. Nai. 20. Ti δέ; ἑκάτερον 
ap ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; 
@EAI. ᾽Αλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατε. Σω. 
? \ ῤ 2-8 e , / a 
Αλλὰ μέντοι el ye ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γυγνώσκειν, εἴπερ 
ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προηγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα 
ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ µέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλα- 
’ \ ef Cm e A / ’ \ > +f 
βην, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχή- 
Ῥσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Kai para ye! ἐξαίφνης. ΣΩ. Ov γὰρ 
A >? A / n A v \ « 
καλῶς αὐτον φυλαττομεν. χρῆν yap tows την συλλα- 
Bnv τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι 
γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν play αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ, 






τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν κα 
ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. ΣΏ. Σκεπτέον, 
οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως µέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν 
λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ov yap οὖν. YO. Ἐχέτω δή, ὡς νῦν 
φαμέν, µία * ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρµοττόντων 204 
στοιχείων yuyvouevn ἡ συλλαβὴ ὁμοίως ey τε ypap- 
pact καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν µέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. ' ΘΕΔΙ. Te δή; 
ΣΩ. "Οτι οὗ ἂν ᾖᾗ µέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα 
µέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τών μερών λέγεις γεγονὸς 

ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερών; ΘΗΒΑΙ. Ἔγωπε. 
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ wav Kai τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς 

ἢ ἕτερον | ἑκάτερον; ΘΒΑΙ. Ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, B 
ὅτι δὲ Kerevers προθύµως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυ- ᾿ 
νεύων λέγω, ὅτι ἕτερον. ZO. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ 
Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή' ef δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις  σκεπτέον. 
ΘΒΑΙ. Ac? δέ γε δή. XLIL ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν 

τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς 6 νῦν λόγος, ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ 6 τι δια- 
φέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, 
πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν Sis τρία ἢ | τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά TEC 
καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις 

τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν; ΘΕΑ]. Ταὐτόν., ΣΏ. ᾿Αρ' 
ἄλλο τι ἢ EF; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέ. YO. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ ἑκά- 
στης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἓξ εἰρήκαμεν; @EAT. Nai. 
ΣΩ. Πάλιν & οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα Ἀλέγοντες ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. Σω. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ; OEAT. 
Οὐδέν Σω. Ταὐτὸν dpa ἔν ye τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ' ἀρι- Ὁ 
θμοῦ ἐστι TO τε πᾶν προσαγορεύοµεν Kal τὰ ἅπαντα; 


2040. πάντα τὰ ἕξ. Ἠεϊηᾶοτί, legit ray τι τὰ 2. 


\ 


86 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


@EAI. Φαίνεται. YO. ὪὋδε δ) περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. 
ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς Kal τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν. ἡ γάρ; 
@EAI. Ναι 20. Kal 6 τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως ; 
@EAI. Ναι Σω. Καὶ μὴν καὶ 6 τοῦ στρατοπέδου 
ye καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδο», καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως ; 
ὁ yap ἀριθμὸς was τὸ tv πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΏ. Ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὺς pov ἄλλο 
Ώ τι ἡ µέρη ! ἐστίν; @EAI. Οὐδέν ΣΩ. "Ὅσα dpa ἔχει 
µέρη, ἐκ μερών ἂν ein; @EAI. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ 
ye πάντα µέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, εἴπερ Kal ὁ 
πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ wav ἔσται. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὕτω. ΣΏ. Τὸ 
ὅλον ap οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν yap ἂν εἴη, τὰ 
πάντα ὃν µέρη. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικε YO. Μέρος & 
| ἔσθ᾽ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου; ΘΕΑΙ. 
205 Tod παντός ye. 20. * ᾿Ανδρικῶς ye, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
µάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἁπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
πᾶν ἐστίν; OEAI. ᾽Ανάγκη. ZO. Ὅλον δὲ ov ταύ- 
τὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὗ 
δ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα «γενόμενον 
ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ; ΘΕΒΑΙ. Δοκεῖ pou viv οὐδὲν 
διαφέρειν wav τε καὶ ὅλον. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι 
οὗ ὧν µέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον Te καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα µέρη 
ἔσται; ΘΒΑΙ. Πάνυ γε ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι 
ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ TA στοιχεῖά 
Β ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς | µέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ 
στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνω- 
στὴν εἶναι; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα 
μὴ φένηται, ἕτερον αὐτών αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;  ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. 
ΣΩ. Τί &; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς µέρη ἐστίν, 
ἔχεις GAN atta εἰπεῖν, ἃ µέρη µέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ 
µέντοι στοιχεῖά Υ ἐκείνης; ΘΒΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς' εἰ γάρ, 


@EAITHTOS. 87 


/ , / a 
© Σώκρατες, µόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, yedoicy που 
Ta στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ἰέναι. YO. Παντάπασι 


δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, | κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον µία τις ἰδέα ἁμέ- 


ριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν ein. ΘΒΑΙ. Ἔοικε. YO. Μέμνησαι 
οὖν, ὦ Φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρὀσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα 
ἠηγούμενοι ev λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος, 
3 9 \ ιά / » 3 e A 

ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκευται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον 
ein ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ elvat περὶ αυτοῦ ὀρθῶς & ἔχοι 
προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερά καὶ ἀλλότρια 
λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνω- 
στον αὐτὸ ποιο; ΘΒΑΙ. Μέμνημαι Σω. ' Ἡ οὖν 
7. a 6 6 3 ο , Δ . , 
ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ µονοειδές τι καὶ αμέρι- 
στον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὁρῶ ἄλλην. OEAT, 
Ov γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν eis ταὐτὸν 
> 4 ς \ 9 9 / ” / 
ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ µέρη τε 
μὴ ἔχει καὶ µία ἐστὶν ἰδέα; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν 
οὖν. 20. Ei μὲν dpa πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή 
ἐστι καὶ ὅλον τι, µέρη δ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως at τε 

\ e ae \ a ? / 
συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ 
τὰ πάντα µέρη τῷ ὕλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη. ΘΕΑΙ. | Καὶ 
para. ΣΩ. Ei δέ ye ἕν τε καὶ dpepés, ὁμοίως μὲν 
συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ὤγνω- 
ο. 7 \ 3 , > \ a 

στον ἡ yap αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αυτὰ τοιαῦτα. OEAI. 
Οὖκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. ΣΏ. Τοῦτο μὲν dpa μὴ ἆπο- 
δεχώµεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν ανωστὸν καὶ 
ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον. @EAI. Μὴ yap, εἴ- 
περ τῷ λόγῳ πειθὀµεθα. Σ. Τί 8 ad; τοὐναντίον 


D 


20 


be @ 
λέγοντος dp ov μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς 


σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων µαθήσει ; 
ΘΕΙΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;, ΣΏ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἆλλο µανθάνων 
διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγυγνώσκειν 


88 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


, 9 ww 9 A 3 A 9 6ς \ ο ϱ 
πειρώμενος Kal ἐν TH akon αὐτὸ καθ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα 
μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. 
@EAI. ᾽Αληθέστατα λέγει. ΣΏ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ 
τελέως µεµαθηκέναι pov ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγ- 

By@ | ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς ein’ 
ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; 
@EAI. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. 20. Ὃν μὲν dp’ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί 
9 / A ? α 9 \ ’ 
ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων 
τεκµαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων 
γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν yvaow ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ 
κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκα- 
στον µάθηµα, καὶ ἐάν τις dy συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, 
ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα 
παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν. ΘΒΑΙ. ἸἹομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 

οΧΙΠ. Σω. ἰ ᾽Αλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι Kav ἄλλαι 

a ’ / ς 9 4 a, \ / 

φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ws ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ προκείµενον 

μὴ ἐπιλαθωμεθα δι αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, 6 τι δήποτε καὶ λέγεται 
\ ‘ , 9 Dia / ῃ 

τὸ peta δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόηον προσγενόµενον τὴν τελεω- 
/ 3 / / > A \ 6 α 

τάτην ἐπιστήμην yeyovevat. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν. 

ΣΏ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σηµαί- 

[νειν; τριών γὰρ ἕν τί µοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. ΘΒΑΙ. Τί- 

Ὦ νων δή; 20. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη | ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε 
καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ els κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν 
ἐκτυπούμενον eis τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὗ δοκεῖ 
σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; @EAT. Ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν 
αὐτὸ δρώντα λέγειν φαµέν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ad τοῦτο ye 

-πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδεί- 
ξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, 6 μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς 
» 9 9 a. \ 6 ef > nV , ’ 
ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς' καὶ οὕτως Όσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες 
> vy A | / . a Ww ὶ ]ὸ σι 

Β αὐτὸ peta | λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 89 
« 
ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης «αενήσεται. ΘΒΑΙ. 
’ a \ / ος / / ‘ 
Αληθή. 20. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγυγνώσκωµεν τὸ 
9 / 3 . ¢ “A 
μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστημην, Oo νῦν 
Le 3 ς ῥ . A »” 3 

σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ 6 λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ 
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι THY ἀπόκρισιν 
Sid τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι * τῷ ἐρομένφ. OEAT. 207. 
Οἷον τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες; YO. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος 
περ) ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ ἁμάξης. ἃ 
> ον > A / 2 oa > Y 984 —7, 49 
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίµην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ' ἀλλ 
ἀγαπώμεν ἂν ἑρωτηθέντες 0 τί ἐστιν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν 
9 A BA 6 / 3/ / 
εὐπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν. ΘΕΛΙ. 
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. ‘O δέηε ἴσως οἴοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ 
ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ 
συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι | ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ B 
λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι 
καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου 
ὀνόματος λόγον. TOS οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, 

\ a ‘ a / \ oa . a / 
πρὶν ἂν διὰ τών στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης 
ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὀσθεν που 
ἐῤῥήθη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐβῥήθη yap. ΣΏ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ᾿ 
περὶ ἁμαάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ 
τών ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάµενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν | οὐ- ο 
σίαν͵, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ 
ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπι- 
στήµονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, Sid στοιχείων 
τὸ ὅλον περαναντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ed δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ 
Σώκρατες; XO. Et col, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει 

‘ \ A / / 8 e / , 
τὴν διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον 
A ‘ 
εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς 7 καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι 
ἁλογίαν, τοῦτό µοι λέγε, ἵν αὐτὸ | ἐπισκοπώμεν. D 


90 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾽Αλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι. ΣΏ. Ἡότερον ἡγου- 
µενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὀντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ 
ὁτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ 
ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃη ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ma Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε ΣΏ. Hira ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν 
τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων µαθήσει Kat ἀρχὰς σαυτὀν τε καὶ 
τοὺς ἄλλους δρώντας αὐτά; @EAI. "Δρα λέγει τῆς 
Β αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, tore δὲ ἱ ἕτερον 
ἠηγουμένους γράµµα, Kal τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς THY προσ- 
ήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ eis ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν; ΣΏ. 
Tatra λέγω. ΘΒΑΙ. Ma A’ οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, 
οὐδέ γέ πω ἠγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας' 
ΣΩ. Té οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτω καιρῷ Θεαίτητον 
γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ € οἴηταί τε δεῖν ypadew καὶ 
208 γράψη, καὶ av * Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν tad καὶ 
E οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψη, dp ἐπίστασθαι 
Φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τών ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων 
συλλαβήν; @EAI. ᾽Αλλ) ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν oav- 
τως ἔχοντα µήπω εἰδέναι. ΣΏ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ 
τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως 
ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν; @EAT. Οὐδέν γε. ΣΏ. ᾿Αρ' οὖν τότε 
τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον 
μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἑξῆς ypadn; ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δή. 
BQ. | Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ay, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξαζων, 
ὡς φαµέν; ΘΕΑΙ. Nal. ΣΏ. Λόγον ye ἔχων μετὰ 
ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν yap διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων 
ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθή. 
ΣΏ. Ἔστιν dpa, ὦ ἑταῖρε, peta λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν 
οὕπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. @EAT. Ἐινδυνευε. XLITI. 
ΣΏ. Ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν 


®EAITHTOS. 91 


\ 4 , 3 ’ / a , 
τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ µήπω κατηγο- 
ρώμεν; lows γὰρ ov τοῦτό. τις αὐτὸν ὁριεῖται, | ἆλ- 
: Δ \ \ 9 a a ? ο A ” 
λὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριών, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν 
, , 4 9 / e , / 
λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν 
εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθώῶς ὑπέμνησας' 
4 Δ a / \ \ \ ? , bd a 
ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν yap ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ 
ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς 
ἐπὺ τὸ ὅλον τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις; ΣΏ. "Ὅπερ 
ἂν οἱ πολλοὺ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τῶν 
ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. @EAI. Οἷον τίνα τίνος 
ἔχεις µοι λόγον εὐπεῖν; XO. | Olov, ei βούλει, ἡλίου 
/ e \ 9 / 9 3 / ϱ/ \ / 
πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, οτι τὸ λαμπρό- 
τατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν όντων περὶ γῆν. 
@EAI. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. YO. Λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. 
” νο wv 4 e wv \ \ e / 
ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ apts ἐλέγομεν, ὡς apa τὴν διαφορᾶν ἑκάσ- 
του ἂν λαμβάνῃης, ᾗ τών ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόηον, ὥς 
/ / 3 of 27 ow A 9 ‘ 

φασί tives, Aner’ ἕως ὃ ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτηῃ, 
ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόηος, ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ. 


σ 


D 


ΘΕΙΑΙ. Μανθάνω' | xai pot δοκεῖ καλώς ἔχειν Adyor E 


τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. YO. “Os & ἂν per’ ὀρθῆς δόξης 
περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσ- 
AaBn, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται, οὗ πρότερον ἦν 
δοξαστής. . @EAI. Dapév ye μήν οὕτω. ΣΏ. Nov 
δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς 
ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήµατος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι 
οὐδὲ σµικρόν. ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόῤῥωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί 
µοι λέηεσθαι. ΘΒΑΙ. Ids τί τοῦτο; YO. * Φράσω, 
ἐὰν olds τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, 
ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὺν cov λόγον, γυγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ 
δὲ pn, δοξάζω µὀνον.. @EAI. Ναί. Σ9. Λόγος δέ γε 


Ν 


209 


92 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία. ΘΕΙΑΙ. Οὕτως. 
ΣΩ. ‘Hulk’ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων 
διαφέρει», τούτων οὐδενὸς ἧπτόμην τῇ Savoia: ΘΕΑΙ. 
Οὐὖκ ἔοικε ΣΏ. Tov κοινών τι apa λος ὧν 
Ῥ οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει. ΘΒΑΙ. !᾿ Ανάγκη. 
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός' πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ 
μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὀντινοῦν; θὲς γάρ µε διανοού- 
µενον, ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ᾖ τε ἄνθρω- 
πος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόµα καὶ οὕτω 
δὴ ἓν ἕκαστον τών μελών. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ᾽ ὃ 
τι μᾶλλον ποιήῄσει µε Θεαύτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, 
ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον ; ; @EAI. Τίηάρ; 
ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλ) ἐὼν 87 μὴ µόνον τὸν ἔχοντα pire καὶ ὀφθαλ- 
6 μοὺς διανοηθῶ, | ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιµόν τε Kal ἐξόφθαλμον, 
µή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέ. ΣΏ. ᾽Αλλ) οὐ πρότερὀν γε, οἶμαι, 
Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν n σιµότης αὕτη 
τών ἄλλων σιµοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόὀν τι 
μνημεῖον παρ) ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθήται, καὶ 
τἆλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, ἣ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἆπαν- 
τήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ 
Dood. ΘΒΕΒΑΙ. ᾽Αληθέστατα. ΣΏ. Περὶ τὴν | διαφο- 
ρότητα apa καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεταί ye. YO. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον 
τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εὖ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι 
λέγει ᾗ διαφέρει τι τών ἄλλων, Wavy «γελοία yiyverat 
n ἐπίταξις. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΣΏ. Ὃν ὀρθὴν δοξαν ἔχομεν, 


Φ 


ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει 


209 ο. # ue. Si 7 Platonis est, neglegentius scriptum videtur. 
Sed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfio 6 vel ἆ reponere, 


ΘΒΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 93 


ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως 
ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δ) λέγεται περιτροπὴ 
πρὸς | ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ E 
παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον᾽ τὸ γὰρ ἃ ἔχομεν 
les aA / A / “A / 
ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα µάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζοµεν, 
πάνυ yevvatws ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ. ΘΗΒΑΙ.' Εἰπὲ δή, © 
τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου; ΣΩ. Ei τὸ λόγον, ὦ rail, 
a a στ / 9 \ \ , \ 
προσλαβεῖν yvavas κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν 
διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ᾽ ἂν ein τοῦ καλλίστου τών 
περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ αγνώναι ἐπιστήμην 
που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. * 4 γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 210 
ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται, 
¢ / 9 \ b / / / λ 
ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ 
πρὀσληψις tour ἂν εἴη κατ ἐκεῖνον. ΘΗΒΑΙ. "Εοικε. 
ΣΏ. Καὶ παντάπασί ye εὔηθες, ξητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπι- 
στήµην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ ἐπιστήμης εἴτε 
διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε dpa αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαί- 
τητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε pet’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης λό- 
| / 1 a 2 ΘΠΒΑΙ O 3 
yos | προσηγιγνόµενος ἐπιστήμη av ein. . Ove Β 
ἔοικεν. 20. 7H οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ 
Φιλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; ΘΒΛΙ. 
Καὶ vai pa At’ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ 
did σὲ εἴρηκα. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα ἡ 
µαιευτικήὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ 
οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς; @EATI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. XLIV. 
ΣΩ. "Edy τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῆς 
rf 9 / Σ/ | / / wv 
γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν te! γίγνη, βελτιόνων ἔσει 6 
/ a > , 37 \ 9 
πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς 75, ἧττον 
ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ 
οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ µόνον ἡ 


94 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 


ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ 
ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ 
γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ µαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ µήτηρ 
ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν ηυναικών, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν 

Ὦ γέων τε | καὶ γενναίων Kab ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν 
ἁπαντητέον µοι eis τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν 
Μελήτου γραφήν, nv µε γέγραπται ἕωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεό- 
δωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἁπαντώμεν. 


TRANSLATION 


WITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE. 








Sie OF THE 


UNIVFRSITY 
4ΤΙΓΟΑ ΑΝ 






TRANSLATION. 


[Euclides, founder of the Megarie School, and his friend Terpsion, both 1 
of them pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Megara. .The 
former mentions that on his way to the harbour he had met Theae- 
letus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from 
the Athenian camp near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the 
noble character of Theactetus, and the estimation in which he was held 
by Socrates, Euclides says that he has at home in manuscript a 
dialogue, which Theaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion 
expresses a wish to hear this dialogue, the friends adjourn to the house 
of Euclides, where a slave reads tt aloud to them as they repose.] 


£u. Ha, Terpsion! long in’ from the country*? 

Ter. A good while. And you*—I was looking for 
you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you. 

Eu. I was not in the city. 

Ter, Where then? 


1} “Aptt...4 πάλαι; English idiom would say ‘just in?’ or ‘long in?’ . 
but not both. The translation therefore omits one alternative. 

3 Ἔξ ἀγροῦ. Terpsion has a country residence; whether a town 
house also, there is nothing to show. 

ὃ Καὶ oé ye. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of 
Euclid’s absence. The ἀγορὰ or market-square was a promenade, 
where a friend might be looked for at a certain time of day, as in the 
Cascine at Florence, 


_. KP. 7 


98 THEAETETUS. 


Eu. As Iwas going down‘ to the harbour I met with 
Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at 
Corinth. 

Ter. Alive or dead ? 

Eu. Alive, but only just’. Besides being very ill from. 
wounds, he is more seriously affected® by the malady which 
has broken out in the army. 

Ter. You mean the dysentery ὃ 

Eu. Yes. 

Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that! 

Eu. Ay,a gallant and good one’, Terpsion. It was but 
just now I heard some people praising him highly for his 
behaviour in the battle®. 

Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more sur- 
prising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to 
put up here at Megara’? 

Ζω. He was in haste to get home. For all my entrea- 
ties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying 
him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the mar- 
vellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, 
especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little 

4 Καταβαίνων. The preposition κατὰ compounded with verbs of 
motion often implies coastward movement, the converse being avd. 
The harbouwwas Nisaea. 

-5 Καὶ µάλα. The intensive καὶ is largely used by Plato. 

6 Αἱρε. A technical verb for morbid affection. 

7 Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. Καλοκαγαθία is the Athenian term for the 
heroic ideal of a gentleman. 

8 Μάχην. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutely de- 
termine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians 
defeated the Athenians, was in July, 394 B.c. Grote, H. Gr. Part m. 
ch. Ixxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato may point to some other 
affair before 387. 

9 Αὐτοῦ Meyapot, two local adverbs=éy αὐτοῖς τοῖς Meydpos, at 
Megara itself; at the very place he had reached, viz. Megara. 


TRANSLATION. 99 


while before his own death that he met him, a mere lad at 
the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired 
his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated 
ο to me the arguments he had held with him—well worth 
_ hearing they were—and said this youth must inevitably be- 
come distinguished, if he should reach man’s estate. 

Ter. He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were 
the arguments? Can you repeat them? 

Eu. No indeed: not from mere recollection. But, 
having returned home immediately, I jotted down” some 
notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, 
I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used 
to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to 
make corrections on my return here. So that I have got 
nearly the whole conversation in writing. 

Ter. True: I heard you say so once before; and I 
have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have 
loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing 
it now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after com- 
ing from the country. 

fu. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as 
Erineum" ; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; 
and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us. 

Ter. A good suggestion. 

[ Zhey go to Ες house.| 

£u. Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe 
that I wrote out the conversation In my own way:—not in 
the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a 
dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he 


109 ᾿ἨἩγραψάμην. The use of the middle voice here, as compared with 
ἔγραφον afterwards, is notable: perhaps it implies the act of writing at 
the moment from recollection and for ts own future revision. 

1 Erineum: a locality on the way from Megara to Athens. 

7—2 


100 IHEAETETUS:. 


stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. 
And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between 
the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was 
speaker, ‘I spoke,’ ‘I said,’ and, in case of an answerer, ‘he 
agreed’ or ‘he disagreed’) I wrote as if he were actually 
talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations. 

Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid. 

Zu. Now, boy, take the volume, and read. 

[Zhe slave reads aloud all that follows.| 


latter are also present, one of whom ts called Socrates; but neither of 
them ts made to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodorus in a gymnasium 
at Athens, asks him if he has encountered any youths of prontise. 
Theodorus names Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of 
his features he resembles Socrates. Theactetus, then approaching with 
his two friends, ts invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages him in a 
conversation about their personal resemblance. The purpose of it 
seems to be, partly to test the dialectic faculty of Theaetetus, partly to 
embolden him by relating the praise he has received Srom so compe- 
tent a judge as Theodorus.) 


So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its 
affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and 
about its people, whether any of the young men in those 
parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But 
I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, 
and would rather know which of our own young men are . 
expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe 
for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from 
every body else, with whom I see the young men desirous 
to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend 


TRANSLATION; 77058 11141 
your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many 
grounds, but especially for geometry, So I shall be glad to 
hear if you have met with any one worth naming. 

Theo. Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with 
α youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your 
attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid 
to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with 
him. But in fact (don’t be vexed with me) he is not hand- 
some; he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but 
less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then with- 
out scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons 
I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I 
never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Apti- 
tude for learning such as few attain, combined with a 
temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled 
courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I 
ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are 
quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are 
liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unbal- 
lasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them — 
than of valour: whilst others of more solid temperament 
usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and 
laden’ with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies 
and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of 
oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and _ success- 
fully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these 
things as he does. 

So. Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he? 

Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. 
However, he is the middle one of those who are now ap- 
proaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing 


2 1 Γέμοντε. A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here 
opposed to ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα. 


{091 τετ ZHEAETETUS. 

themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have 
finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you 
know him. 

Sv. Ido. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just 
such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of 
good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a 
considerable property. But I do not know the name of the 
youth. 

Theo, Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; the property I 
fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money mat- 
ters he is wonderfully liberal. 

So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come 
and sit down by me here. 

Theo. Iwill. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socra- 
tes. 

So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view my- 
self, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it’s 
like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and 
he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe 
him at once, or should we have taken note whether he 
spoke as a musician ? 

Theae. We should have taken note. 

So. And if we found him such, should we not believe 
him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve ὃ 

Theae. ‘True. | 

So. And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at 
all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he 
speaks with a painter’s skill or not. 

Theae. I think so. 

So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting? 

Theae. Not to my knowledge. 

So. And is he not skilled in geometry ? 

Theae. Without doubt, Socrates. 


TRANSLATION, 103 


So. And in astronomy and calculations and music? 
and every subject of education? 

Theae. I think so. 

So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, 
that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well 
worth while to attend to him? 

Theae. Perhaps not. 

So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or 
the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth 
while for the one who heard the praise to observe him 
who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with 
alacrity ? 

Theae. Quite so, Socrates. 


[Socrates, after telling Theactetus of the high praise given to him by 3 
Theodorus, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to 
admit that the end to be gained by them is ‘wisdom,’ and that this 
ts the same thing as ‘knowledge.’ He goes on to confess the difficulty 
he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to 
discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself, pleading age 
and wani of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be 
invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.] 


So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to 
exhibit and.for me to observe. For I must tell you that, 
although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of 
many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave 
such praise to anybody as he did to you just now. 

Theae. Iam glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it, 
that he did not speak in jest. 


2 Μουσικό. This word can either mean ‘musical,’ or ‘literary.’ 
The former is more probable here. 


104 ο ITHEAETETUS. 


So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not 
retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here: 
speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I 
am sure nobody will indict him for perjury’. So stand to 
your confession boldly. 

Theae. Yes, I must, if you think so. 

So. Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodo- 
rus some lessons of geometry ? 

Theae. I do, 

So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations? 

Theae. use my best endeavour. 

So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all 
others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the 
subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well 
versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must 
examine with your help and that of our friends here, Tell 
me, does not ‘to learn’ mean to become wiser in that which 
one learns? 

ο Τσε Certainly. 

So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are 
wise ὃ | 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Does this differ at all from knowledge? 

Theaée. Does what differ ? 

So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are 
we not also wise? 

- Theae. Can it be otherwise P 


So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing ? 


Theae. Yes. 


8 1 ᾿Ἠπισκήψε. Ἠεϊπάοιξ rightly says: ἐπισκήπτειν h. 1. est i. α. 
ἐγκαλεῖν ψευδομαρτυριῶν. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but 
Aeschines Tim. 142 has the active, jw οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἔστι 
ἐπισκῆψαι. See below 5; also Dict. Ant. (Martyria, Ἐπίσκηψι). 


TRANSLATION. 105 


So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot 
adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge 
really is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? 
Which of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on 
each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for 
donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without miss- 
ing, shall be our king*, and shall command us to answer 
anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love 
of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make 
us argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another. 

Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rude- 
ness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. 1 am 
unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire 
the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would 
get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth 
has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand 
at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him. 


[Theactetus, having modestly consented to take his share of the argument, 4 
endeavours to define ‘knowledge’ by enumerating various sciences and 
arts which are specific kinds of it. Hereupon Socrates, by a series of 
elenctic questions in the dialectic manner, exposes the futility of all at- 
tempts to define, which contain the term itself proposed for definition.) 


So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says ; 
and you will not, I. think, wish to disobey him. In such 
matters a wise man’s injunctions cannot be lawfully dis- 
obeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What 
do you think that knowledge is? 

ο Theae. 1 must, Socrates, since you both require. No 
doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me. 


2 Ῥασιλέύσει. See Hor. Epist. I. 1, §9: pueri ludentes, Rex eris, 
ajunt, si recte facies, | 


4 


106 THEAETETUS. 


So. Certainly, if we are able. : 

Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one can 
learn from Theodgrus are knowledge; geometry for instance 
and the others which you enumerated just now: and again 
leather-dressing’, and the trades of the other craftsmen, all 
and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge. 

So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, 
when asked for one thing you give many, and various one 
instead of a simple one. 

Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, σος 

So. Perhaps none αἲ all*: however, I will explain what 
I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend 
anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of 
shoes ? 

Theae. Nothing else. : 

So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend any- 
thing but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden im- 
plements ? 

Theae. No, nothing, 

So. In both cases then, you express that thing of which 
each is the knowledge? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concern- 
ing the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We 
did not as wish to count them, but to know what 
the nature of knowledge | itself is. Am I talking non: nonsense ὃ 

Theae. No, quite correctly. 

So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us any 
trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we 

1 Σκυτοτομικὴ and σκυτική, σκυτοτόµοι and oxvreis arg indifferently 
used for the shoe-trade. 

3 Qvdév (λέγω). Adyew οὐδὲν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly) ; : 
λέγει τι to speak reasonably (rightly). 


TRANSLATION. 107 


said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the 
stove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we 
not deserve to be laughed at? 

Theae. Probably.- 

So. Inthe first place because we thought the questioner 
would understand us from our answer, when we introduce 
the word ‘clay,’ whether we add that of the doll-makers, or 
of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think—you, -under- 1 
( stand any name-of anything, when he does not know its ΄ 
" correct_meaning ? 

Theae, Not at all. 

So. Then he who is ignorant of ‘knowledge,’ does not 
understand ‘knowledge of shoes.’ 

Theae. He does not. 

So. And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not 
understand leather-dressing or any other art ? 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. Then an answer made to the question—What is 
_ knowledge ? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply 
the name of some art, For he names ‘the knowledge of 
something,’ when that was not the thing asked from him. 

Theae. Apparently, 

So. In the next place, when he might have answered 
easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For in- 
Stance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to 
say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from add- 
ing whose it is. 


[7heactetus now accepts the principle of definition laid down by Socrates, § 
and illustgates tt by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by 
himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, to distinguish rational 
and irrational mumbers. These terms are (a) τετράγωνος apiOuos, 
square number (4, 9, 16, 25...27); (8) προµήκης ἀριθμός, oblong 


108 THEAETETUS. 


number (the vest exe. 1); (Ύ) µῆκος, length (all integral numbers after 1) 
which may be represented by straight lines, and used to form squares ; 


(5) δυνάµεις (trrational roots, v3, v5, 5, 6 Gc.) which -are incom- 
mensurable with the unit of length (ποδιαία), but can become sides 
of figures commensurable in area with squares. Socrates applauds 
this invention, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his mind in the same 
way to discover a definition of knowleage.| 


Theae. Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appears 
easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question 
that occurred some time since to us in our discussions ;— 
to nyse I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here, 

So. What was that, Theaetetus ? 

Theae. Theodorus was writing out for us something 
about ‘ powers,’ proving, as to the ‘tripod'’ and the ‘ pente- 
pod,’ that in length they are not commensurable with the 
foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: 
but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought 
us of such a notion as this: since the ‘powers’ were evidently 
infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, 
by which we should entitle all these ‘ powers.’ 

So. Did you find any such term? 

Theae. I think we did. Consider it yourself. 

So. Speak on. 

Theae. We divided number generally into two classes, 
one, that which is capable of being formed by the ‘multipli- 
cation of equal factors into one another, we likened in 
form to the square, and called it square and equilateral. 

So. Very good. | 


ὅ 1 Πρίπους, as Heindorf says, is εὐθεῖα δυνάµει τρίπους, i.e. J3, 
which is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), 
but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: V3 x,/3=3). 
So πεντέπους and the rest. The use of δύναμις is therefore differ- 
ent from the modern mathematical term ‘‘power” (x?, x3...2%). 


TRANSLATION. 109. 


Theae. All intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and. 
5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the 
multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a 
larger number having a smaller—or by a smaller number 
having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other 
hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has 
greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number’, 
So. Excellent. What next? | 

Theae. All lines which being squared form an equi- 
lateral plane figure we defined to be ‘length’; all which 
form an oblong, we comprised under the name ‘powers’ 
(i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with 
the others except through the surfaces which they have 


power to form®*. And similarly with respect to the solids 
(cubes). | 


So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So 
I do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury. 

Theae. But as to your question about knowledge, 
Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that 
about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be look- 
ing for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again 
appears to be a false speaker. | 
"So, Well, but if he had praised your running, and said 
he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in 


3 This appears as a general expression in the form 
I I 
14Χι-[τι- Χη]Ξξή ΕΠ. 
n n 


Example: 2x 14 (=14x2)=3. As # is any integer, this includes all 
oumbers greater than unity, τετράγωνος as well as προµήκης ἀριθμός. 

5 Tots 5° ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. Thus 4/12 being 3°464 (nearly), 
/12Xa/12=12=2 X 6=3 X 4=(geometrically represented) a rectangle 
with sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary 
square with side 3°464 (nearly). 


110 THEAETETUS. 


a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the- prime 
of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have 
been any the less true? 

Theae. I do not. 

So. And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while 
since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, 
and not one of the highest achievements ? 

Theae. Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the 
very highest of all. 

So. Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that 
Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way to 
obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things. 

Theae. As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found 
wanting. 


6 [7heactetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition of 
knowledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always on the verge of 
success, Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending child- 
birth in women: and reminding Theaetetus that he himself (Socrates) 
ts the son of an excellent midwife, he claims the analogous function of 
assisting the labour of intellectual parturition in the minds of young 
men; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with a 
view to illustrate and justify his own method as an educator.| 


So. Come then: you wet a good όρος ορ just now. 


Imitate your answer about the ‘powers’. As you comprised 
their vast number under one term, so also try to describe 
the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition. 

-Theae. I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavoured | 
to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the ques- 
tions you put. But, though I cannot persuade myself that 
I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have 
heard from some one else any such statement as you require, 


\ 


TRANSLATION. ο 111 


nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on 
the point of doing so’. 

So. Oh! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theae- 
tetus, through being not empty, but pregnant. 

Theae. 1 do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, 
at all events. 

So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am 
the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete ? 

Theae. I have heard it before now. 

So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art? > 

Theae. Never. 

So. Idoreally. But don’t tell of me to other people. 
I am not known, my friend, to have this skill, And others, 
being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that Iam a 
very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you 
heard this too? 

Theae. I have. 

So. Shall I tell you the reason? 

Theae. Pray do. . 

So. Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, 
and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I 

- suppose, that none of them practise while they are still con- 
ceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past 
child-bearing. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for 
that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Ac- 
cordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become 
midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an 


σα...» 


6 1 Μέλλεν is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the 
parable of the midwives. Mé\ew would fail to do this. 


112 THEAETETUS. 


those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour of 
their resemblance to herself. 

Theae. Naturally. 

So. Is not this also natural, that those who conceive 
and those who do not are better known by midwives than 
by others? 

Theae. Quite so. 

So. Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and 
chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to 
quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a 
hard time bring forth: and they ee abortion’, if the, 
case require it. 

Theae. ‘True. ' 

So. Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they 
are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to 
know what woman uniting with what man must bear the 
finest children ? 3 

Theae. I was not quite aware of that. ; 

So. I assure you they pride themselves on this much 
more than on their special practice*. Just consider. Do 
you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth 
belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must 
plant or sow to another? 

Theae. No, to the same. 

So. And do you consider it different in the case of a 
woman P 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and 

1 Νέον cy. Prof. Campbell writes, ‘Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of 
the embryo “‘at an early stage,” i.e. before it is dangerous to do so.’ 
But most commentators do not believe that νέο» would be used of τὸ 
κύημα. Heindorf conjectures δέον for νέον dv. The words may be a 
gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above. 

3 Gr. ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. 


TRANSLATION. 113 


unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 
‘procuration,’ midwives, being a respectable body, shun 
match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the 
other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, 
that the art of correct match-making belongs. 

Theae. Apparently so. 

So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives ; 
but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to 
women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, 
so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they 
been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for mid- 
wives would have been to decide between the true child 
and the untrue. Do you not think so? 

Theae. 1 do.. 


[Zhe parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the 7 


intellect ts carried on and concluded.| 


So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other 
respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, 
that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labour 
of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important 
skill in our art is, the being able to test in every way 
whether the young man’s mind is bringing forth an idol and 
an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to meas 
well as to the midwives belongs the following condition, I 
am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which 
many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, 
I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no 
wisdom in me, is a just reproach. ‘The reason of it is this: 
the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me 
from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise 
myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that 


K. P, : 8 


ς 


114 THEAETETUS. 


mA 


kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who MG 
resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly igno- 
rant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives 
opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion 
and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so 
not by any learning they have gained from me, but because 
they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, 
which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the 
god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, 
not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while 
they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either 
of their own will or by the persuasion of others’. After this, 
they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, 
and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped 
them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and 
ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere 
Liockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is 
Aristeides? son of Lysimachus. When these truants come 
back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven 
and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius 
forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these 


7 1.14 αὐτοὸ 7 ὑπ ἄλλων πεισθέντε. The translation follows this 
conjecture; MSS. omit the second ή, by the absence of which αὐτοὶ be- 
comes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrote 
καὶ ἢ αὐτοὶ éavrovs (μὲν) αἰτιασάμενοι ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες ἢ UW 
ἄλλων πεισθέντες κ.τ.λ. ‘Many ere now, being ignorant of this, and 
either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or per- 
suaded by others &c. &c.’? This would give a still better sense than the 
adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates: a// did 
so in ignorance of his divinely given power (τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες); but 
some through self-conceit (7 αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι), some through 
yielding to persuasion (7 ὑπ ἄλλων πεισθέντες). Also the passage 
would be more perspicuous if ἑαυτοὺς μὲν were written. 

2 ᾿Αριστείδης, a descendant of the great Aristeides. 


TRANSLATION. 115 


latter improve again. And this affection also they that as- 
sociate with me have in common with women in labour: 
they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much 
more than the women. And my art has the power to excite 
and allay that throe. So much then for them. And some- 
times, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be preg-- 
nant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly 
make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, 
I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. 
Many I have made over to Prodicus*, many to other wise 
and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you be- 
cause I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that 
you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal 
with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner 
myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are 
able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it 


_an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly 


_ and put it away, don’t be angry as women at their first lying 


“in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, 
have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite 
πε when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they 


imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware 
that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this 
sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise 
allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth. 


[ Zheaetetus, again exhorted by Socrates, takes courage, and suggests asa 8 
defining term for knowledge αἴσθησις, perception (sensation, sensuous 
perception). Socrates at once identifies this definition with the famous 
doctrine of Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων µέτρον ἄνθρωπος, ‘man ts 


3 Ἐξέδωκα Προδίκφ. ᾿'Ἑκδιδόναι (θυγατέρα) means ‘to give a daughter 
in marriage.’ Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in his- 
tory, mythology, and legend. 


8—2 


116 THEAETETUS. 


the measure of all things.’ He goes on to argue that this implies 
‘what appears to each ts true to each;’ and after illustrating by an 
example he farther proceeds to connect this view with that of Hera- 
cleitus and his school (to whom he adds Homer) respecting a per- 
petual motion or flux of all things—wayta pet. This doctrine does 
sot suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as ‘one,’ 
‘some,’ ‘of some quality,’ ‘great,’ ‘small,’ ‘heavy,’ ‘light,’ &c. 
Nothing § is’ any of these, but by motion and commixture all things 
‘become’ ths or that. Therets no ‘being,’ only ‘coming to δε.] 


So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endea- 
vour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you 
are unable: for if the god pleasé and you play | the man, you 
will be able. 

Theae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must. 
own it were disgraceful not to use one’s utmost endeavour 
to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me 


and, in my present view, knowledge Is nothing else than 
PERCEPTION‘. 

So. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to - 
speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine 
the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine 

| product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is_per- 
ception ? | 

Theae. Yes. 

So. I really think you have given an account of know- 
ledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras 
also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different 
way. He says, I fancy, that ‘man? is the measure of all 


8 1 Αἴσθησι. Sensation; perception ; or rather, ‘sensuous percep- 
tion,’ which must be understood when either of the two former terms 
is used in this translation. 

3 "Ανθρωπο», i.e. the human mind; the mind of each percipient. 


TRANSLATION. 117 


things ;’ of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing 
things, that they do not exist. Have you perhaps read. 
this ? 

Theae. Yes, I have read it often. 

So. He speaks then to this effect, that-such as things 
appear to me, they severally are to me; and such as they 
appear to you, they severally are to you. The term ‘man’ 

- includes you and me. 

Theae. He does speak so. 

_ So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not 
talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not 
sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, 
one of us_is cold, the other not; and one 15 slightly cold, 
the other exceedingly ? 

Theae. No doubt. | 

So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself® is 
cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to 
ane who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, 

Theae. ‘The latter, I should say. 

So. And this is apparent to each? 

Theae. Yes. . 

So. And the term ‘is apparent’ implies ‘perceiving’? 

Theae. It does. 

So. Appearance then and perception concur in things 
warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives 
them, they probably are to each. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Perception then is always of that which ‘is’; and it 
is unerring, since it is knowledge. 

¢ 3 In itself. Codd. have ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτό, which Prof. Campbell supports 


by examples. Bekker reads ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ. But ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ is most usual 
in this sense. | 


118 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. Manifestly. 

So.: In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a 
-man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly 
‘to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke 
“the truth’ in secret confidence*? ~ 

Theae. What do you mean by this, Socrates ? 

So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight import- 

ance: namely, that_nothing in itself ‘is one,’ nor can you 
rightly call a thing ‘ some’ or ‘of some kind,’ but, if you 


style it great, it will turn out_also small, and if heavy, light 
\ y gr : es. Vy, δα 
_ , and so in every case; since nothing ‘is’ ‘one’ or ‘some,’ or 


‘of some kind’: but from vection and motion and mixture 
with each other all things ‘come to be,’ of which we say 


. that they ‘are,’ using a wrong term: for nothing at any time 


“Cis? but always ‘comes {ο be.’ And on this point let all 
philosophers except Parmenides® be compared in their 
| order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles*: and 
‘of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind, 


4 The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called 
Αλήθεια, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, 
as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras ‘‘ told the real truth, 
not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples.” 

5 Πλὴν Παρμενίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic 
School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before 
him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine 
directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, 
continuous, stable: that only ‘being’ is; ‘non-being’ is not; there is 
no ‘ becoming,’ 

6 Ἠμπεδοκλῆς. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced 
the words κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα in order .to include Empedocles of 
Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that 
οὐδὲν fort, πάντα γίγνεται, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and 
stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by 
the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are 
themselves alone unchangeable. 


TRANSLATION. 119 


in the comic, Epicharmus’, in the tragic, Homer®; for in 
saying . 
Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother 
he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. 
Does he not seem to say so? 
Theae. I think he does. 


ra 


[ Zhe Heracleitean doctrine (πάντα pet) is further expounded and seemingly 9 
defended. But, as it ts confuted afterwards (28), we must explain 
this defence as an instance of the Socratic εἰρωνεία.] 


So. After this then, who that disputes with so great a 
host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself 
ridiculous ? 

( Theae. It were not easy, Socrates. 

So. No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement— 
that motion produces the semblant’ ‘ being,’ and the ‘coming 
to be,’ while ‘non-being’ and ‘perishing’ are produced by 
rest—has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat 
of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is 
itself engendered by vection and attrition. And these are 
motions*. Are not these the parents of fire? 


7 "Ἐπίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, 111. ro, quotes verses from Epi- 
charmus, the comic poet of Syracuse (490 B.c.), which eontain the 
doctrine of perpetual mutation. 

8 Ἡραγφδίας δὲ Όμηρος. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, 
viz. Comedy and Tragedy, including in the latter Epic poetry, and its 
great master Homer. See Rep. X. 495 D, ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγφδίαν 
καὶ τὸν ἡγέμονα αὐτῆς “Ounpor. 

9 Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν. As he is professing to expound the Hera- 
cleitean theory, which does not admit τὸ εἶναι, he evasively says τὸ 
εἶναι δοκοῦ», ‘the semblant being.’ 

3 Tovrw δὲ Κωήσει. This is the reading in most codd., for which 


- 


120 THEAETETUS. 


Fheae. They are. 

So. Moreover the race of animals is produced from 
them 2 | 

Theae. To be sure. 

So. Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest 
and laziness, and’ preserved in géneral’ by exercise and 
motion ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And does not the habit of the soul by learning and 
study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve‘ 
them and become better, while through rest, which is the 
absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and 
forgets what it has learnt ? 

Theae. Decidedly. 

So. The one then, namely motion, is a good both in 
soul and body, the other is the reverse. 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities 
and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, | 
while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I 
clinch the matter’, and evince that by the golden cord® 
Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as 
long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving, 


κυήσει (dual) is suggested. But some have τοῦτο δὲ xlynows, which 
Bekker edits, and Campbell approves. 

5 In general, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, read in many codd. and by Stobaeus. 
Professors Jowett and Campbell prefer ἐπὶ πολὺ ‘ for a long time,’ as in 
cod. Bodl. 

4 Σώζεται. The middle voice of σώζω is specially used of ‘memory.’ 

5 Τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβίβαξζων; ‘must I bring up my crowning 
reason and prove conclusively (dvayxdf{w)’? See Strabo’s explanation 
of κολοφὼν in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. Others have been given, 
for which see Heindorf’s note. . 

6 For Homer’s χρυσῆ σειρά see Il, ΥΙΠΙ. 47. 


TRANSLATION. 121 


all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but 
should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be 
spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned ppside down ? 

_ IDheae. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate 
what you say. 


[ The relativity of the facts of sensation ts illustrated by the phenomena of 10 
colour, number and size. What you call colour has no definite place 
or existence within or without you. § the result of a passing col- 
lision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. a 
Lt ts neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage 
between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same 
subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be 
in itself great, white, hot or anything else; if it were, it would not 
appear different to another subject. The subject touching or measuring 
cannot be any of these, for, tf so, it would be so always, and would not 
be modified by application to another object. Socrates illustrates by six 
dice, which, as compared with four, are more, and half as many 
again (t.e. 3:2), but fewer and half compared with twelve (4.6. 

4). Can then anything become more without being increased ; 
or fewer without being diminished? Theaetetus is puzzled; and 
Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere 
quibbles, like Megarian disputants.} 


So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. 
As to vision first: that what you call white colour is not 
in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And 
do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere 
in position, it would ‘be’ and remain, and would not by 
generation ‘come to be.’ 

Theae. Howsoe 
_ So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, 

at_ nothing exists as an independent unit;f/and in that 
way we shall see that black and white and every other 
colour have ‘come to be’ from the coincidence of the eyes 
with the suitable motion ; and that what in each case we call 





122 THEAETETUS, 


colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives 
the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to 
each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears 
to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other 
animal ? a 

Theae. No indeed, I would not. 

So. Again: does anything appear to another man like 
what it appears to you? Are-you strongly convinced it 
does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is 
not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the 
same P 

Theae. ‘The latter seems to me truer than the former. 

So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure 
ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, 
it would never have become different by contact with some 
other, unless it underwent a change in itself, And if again 
the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, 
it would not have become different when another approached 
or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. 
For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of 
way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras 
would affirm, and every one who ventures to propound the 
same that he does. 

Theae. ow do you mean? and what kind of things ? 

So. Take a small sample, and you will know what I 
mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are 
more in number and half as many again. If you bring 
twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the 
second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you 
tolerate it? 

Theae. No, I will not. 

So. Well: suppose Protagoras or some one else were 
to ask you:—Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to 


TRANSLATION. 123 


become greater or more, except by being increased? What 
answer would you give? . 

Theae. If I were to answer what I think in reply to 
your present question, Socrates, I should say ‘no’: but if with 
reference to the former one, to avoid Sself-contradiction, I 
should say ‘ yes.’ 

So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But 
if you answer ‘yes,’ something will occur like the case in 
Euripides’: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind 
not unconvicted. 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk 
who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and 
from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one 
another’s powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical 
conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each 
other*. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to 
look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is 
we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or 
inconsistent. | 

Theae. Certainly that is what I should wish. 


Ν 
[The contradictions and difficulties implied in these statements are now 11 
set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or 
less while it ts equal to itself, or ts increased without addition or 
diminished without subtraction, or that tt 1s what it was not before 
without having ‘come to be. And yet the case of the stx dice, and the 
case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the 
course of one year is shorter without having ‘come to be’ different, 
seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to 


10 1 Βύριπίδεόν τι. See Hippol. 612, 4 γλῶσσ) dudpox’ ἡ δὲ φρὴν 
ἀνώμοτος. 
2 In this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) prac- 
tice of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time. 


124 THEAETETUS. 


say? Theaetetus wonders till he feels dizzy. Wonder, says Socrates, 
tsa philosophic affection, and I will try to enlighten you by a fuller 
exposition of the Heraclectean doctrine.] 


So. So should I... But, since this is the case, shall we 
“not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not 
losing our temper, but rgally probing ourselves) what these 
fancies in us are? Looking at the first of them, we shall 
say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either 
in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. “Is it not 
thus ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor 
subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is 
always equal to itself. 

Theae Unquestionably. 

So. (Is not this ‘also a third proposition, that what was 
not before, cannot erwards be without ‘having come to 
be’ and ‘coming to be 

Theae. So it seems. 

So. These three admissions, I think, severally clash 
with each other in our soul, when we say what was said 
about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the age I 
am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the 
space of a year begin~by being bigger than you, who are 
young, and afterwards became less,—when nothing has been 
withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 
‘I am’ afterwards what before I was not, without having 
‘come to be’ so. Now without ‘coming to be’ it Is impos- 
sible ‘to have come to be,’ and without losing any size I 
could never ‘come to be’ ¢maller. And other like instances 
there are, myriads upon myriads, if we thoose to admit 
these. 1 suppose you follow me, Theaetetus: at all events 
you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters. 







σα “OF Tag aN 


TRANSLATION. 


Theae. 1 do, Socrates; and by all the gods : 
immensely what these things are, and really sometimes 
fee] dizzy when I look at them. 

So. Ay, my friend; evidently Theodorus forms no bad 
estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wonder- 
ing, is quite that of a philosopher; for philosophy has no 
other origin but this; and he who said that Iris is the child 
of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do 
you by this time understand why these things result from 
the statements we ascribe to Protagoras? 

Theae. Not yet, I think. 

So. You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable 
man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away 
in the mind, I help you to search it out from them. 

Theae. ‘Thankful indeed I must be in the highest 
degree. 3 


[The doctrine of Heracleitus is now set forth in its complication with the 12 
doctrine imputed to Protagoras. Agent and Patient engender all 
things by motion: and there is no absolute Ens. Socrates asks if 
Lheactetus 1s so far content with the product of his intellectual labour. 
His answer ts indecisive: and Socrates prepares him for a new dialectic 
discussion. ] . 


So. Look about then, and see that none of the un- 
Initiated are listening. These are men who think that 
nothing ‘is’ but what they are able to grasp with their 
hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is 
invisible as in the category of being. 

Theae. Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refrac- 
tory people are-these you tell of. 

So. They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors’. 


12 1A fine set of boors, wad’ εὖ ἄμουσοι. In these days they would be 
called ‘ Philistines,’ a term derived from German Universities. 


eel 


126 THEAETETUS. 


Others there’ are much more refined, whose mysteries I am 
going to describe to you. Their principle 1s, and upon it all 
we were just now saying depends—€that the whole universe 
is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two 
kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the 
one involving action, the other suffering. From the asso- 
ciation and attrition of these with each other are formed 
products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one percepti- 
ble, the other perception, which continually breaks forth and 
is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, 
have the following names; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of 
cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and 
others: infinite are those without names; and those with 
names very numerous. And the objects of perception 
again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with 
all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with 
the other perceptions gther objects of perception are con- 
nate and ‘come to be.’ / What meaning has this tale for us, 
Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you 
perceive ? 

Theae. No, Socrates. 

So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. 
It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and 
in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That 
which is slow has its motion in the same place and in refer- 
ence to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus 
engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its 
motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engen- 
ders, and the things thus engendered]? are swifter, for they 


2 The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by 
Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so convinced 
of their being Plato’s, that he prints them without bracketing. And 
Heindorf maintains them, But Professors Jowett and Campbell reject 


TRANSLATION. 127 


are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. 
When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects 
approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, 
which could never have ‘come to be’ if either of them had 
gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of 
the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co- 
engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye 
becomes full of sight, and at length sees and ‘comes to be,’ 
nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engen- 
dered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and ‘comes. to 
be’ not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or 
stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured 
with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm 
and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 
‘to be’ nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but 
in their mutual intercourse ‘to become’ all and of all kinds 
from motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, 
taken apart (ἐπὶ évos) it is impossible to form any definite 


them, holding that τὰ βραδύτερα mean. τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχο», and 
τὰ θάσσω the αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθητὰ engendered by them. I have been 
unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words 
πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν Klynow ἴσχει seem intended to describe the 
organs of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and 
hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied 
that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is 
spoken of as πλησιάσαν to the eye: which may seem to prove that 
anything on which τὸ ποιοῦν can act may be said πλησιάζειν αὐτῷ, 
whether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not 
remove my difficulty; for I am unable to discern the use of discrimi- 
nating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and 
swiftness. The act of generation between the eye and a very distant 
object must surely have been regarded by Plato (whatever later mathe- 
maticians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the 
question at issue is difficult and doubtful: but it does not embarrass 
Plato’s general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation. 


128 ' THEAETETUS. 


notion Kfor nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, 
nor a patient till it concurs with an agent» and that which 
concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon 
other, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, 
(nothing is ‘one by itself,’ but always ‘comes to bé’}to some 
ér; and the term ‘being’ must be removed on all sides, 
although we are often, even in our present discussion, com- 
pelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not 
proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word 
‘some,’ or ‘of some’ or ‘me’ or ‘this’ or ‘that’ or any 
other term which ‘fixes,’ but in accordance with nature to 
speak of things as ‘coming to be’ and ‘being created’ and 
‘perishing’ and ‘taking new forms.’ Since if any one fixes 
anything in speech, he who does 5ο 15 easily confuted. And 
we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of 
many in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine 
‘man’ and ‘stone’ and each class of animals. Do these 
views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a 
taste of them agreeable ? 

Theae. 1 don’t know, Socrates; for about you too I 
cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own 
Opinions, or trying me. 

So. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed 
neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine? but I 
am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account 
I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various 
sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and 
when it is brought forth, then and not before I will exa- 
mine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So 
then with courage and patience answer well and manfully 
whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several 
questions, | 

Theae. Ask then, 


TRANSLATION. 129 


[Argumepts against the Protagorean doctrine from dreams, fevers and 13 
madness are suggested and answered. Persons so affected perceive 
different things from those perceived when they are awake and in 
health. Are these contradictory perceplions in each case equally true 
to the percipient ?] 


So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that 
nothing should ‘be,’ but ever ‘come to be,’ good and noble 
and all things which we were lately recounting. 

Theae. Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it 
appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and 
that we must accept the principles as you have stated them. 

So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our 
question. ‘There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, 
madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or 
mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, ' 
I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately 
explained seems by admission to be confuted, since un- 
doubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things 
that appear to each are far from ‘being,’ but, quite con- 
trariwise, none of the things that appear ‘are.’ 

ο Theae. You speak most truly, Socrates. 

So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays 
down that ‘perception is knowledgd, and that things which 
appear to each ‘are’ in every such case ? 

Theae. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from 
answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now 
~ you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot 

‘contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, 
when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose 
they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep. 

So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty 
raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking 
vision ? 

Ko: 9 


130 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. What difficulty ? — 

So. A question which I think you have often heard 
people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody 
were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and 
dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to 
one another in that state. -. 

Theae. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say 
by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed 
one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we 
have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to 
have held ina dream. And when in a dream we seem to 
be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is 
marvellous. | 

So. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a ques- 
tion, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or 
dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is 
equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state 
contends that the fancies which from time to time occur 
are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are 
existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident 
in regard to each. 

Theae. Yes, unquestionably. 

So. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, 
except that the times are not equal? 

‘Theae. Yes. | | 

So. Well, shall truth be determined by length or short- 
ness of time? 

Theae. That were ridiculous on many grounds. 

So. Have you then any other clear sign to show which 
of these fancies are true ? 

Theae. I think not. 


TRANSLATION. 131 


me 


[The answer is, a α percipient is not the same subject in each of two 14 
different states: 'and tf either of the two factors (τὰ yevvavra) ts 
changed, the επί (τὸ γεννώμενον) is changed. Grote says that the 
cardinal principie set forth exhibits itself ina perpetual series of 
definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive ts to say that 
7 perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, ts a contra- 
diction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some per- 
cipient subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, ts antmpossibility. Necessity’ 
binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Every term applied to one 
implies some reference to the other: no name can be truly predicated 
of the one which implies ‘being’ or ‘coming to be’ apart from the 
other.) — 


So. Hear then from me what they will say on this 
point, who lay it down that what from time to time ‘ seems, 
‘is’ true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, 
is expressed by this question: ‘O Theaetetus, of two things. 
which are totally different, can the one and the other have 
any identical powers?’ We must not assume that the things 
in question are in one respect the same, in another different, 
but that they are wholly different. 

Theae. Itis impossible that they should have anything 
the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are 
wholly different. , 

So, Must we not also perforce confess. the two things 
to be unlike? 

Theae. I think so. 

So. If, then, anything happens ‘to become’ like, either 
to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it 
‘becomes’ the same; when it gets unlike, different P 

Theae. Necessarily. 

So. Were we not previously saying that agents are 
many and infinite, and patients likewise ? 

Theae. Yes. 


9—2 


132 THEAETETUS. 


So. And also that a thing combining first with one, 
then with another, will not produce the same things, but 
. different ? 

- Theae. Certainly. 

So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, 
in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates 
out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, 
or unlike ? 

Theae. Socrates out of health, you say; do you com- 
pare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with 
Socrates in health? 

So. Very well put: that is my meaning. 

Theae. Unlike, of course. 

So. And different, as being unlike? 

Theae. Necessarily. 

So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and 
in all the states we cited? _ 

Theae. 1 would. 

So. And will not each of the things which have an 
active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal 
with me as one thing; when out of health, as a different 
one? ' 

Theae. ‘They must. 

So. And IJ, the patient, and that agent, will in each 
case produce different things ? 

Theae. ‘To be sure. 

So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me 
agreeable and sweet ? 

Theae, Yes. 

οσο, Ime; for, by our admissions, the agent and the 
patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them 
in motion eines and perception on the side of the 
patient made the fongue percipient, and sweetness on the 


TRANSLATION. 133 


part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and 
to appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions. 

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in 
the first place find one who is not the same? It comes 
to an unlike object. 

Thede. Yes. 

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, 
produce different things; in regard to the tongue a per- 
ception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness 
beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not 
bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that 
perceives. 

Theae. Assuredly. 

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything 
else in the same way ; for perception of another is another 
thing, and makes the percipient different and another ; nor 
will that which aets on me, if it concur with another, ever 
engender the same and become similar: for from another 
it will engender another and become different. 

Theae. Thatistrue. + 

So. I then shall never become similar to my former 
‘self; nor will the object become similar to its former self. 

Theae. No, surely not. 

So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient 
of something : for to become percipient, yet percipient of 
nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes 
sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to 


impossible. 
~Theae. Assuredly. 
So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each 
other we ‘are,’ if we are, or we ‘come to be,’ if we come 


134 THEAETETUS. 


to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, but 
binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; 
it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that 
if a person 54Υδ that anything ‘is’ or ‘ becomes,’ he must 
say that it ‘is’ or ‘becomes’ ‘to something,’ or ‘of some- 
thing,’ or ‘in relation to something’; but, if we have come 
to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of any- 
one else sayjng, that anything ‘is’ or ‘comes to be’ 
absolutely. 

Theaé« Undoubtedly, Socrates. 

So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself 
and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs 
always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am 
judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things 
which are not, that they are not. 

Theae. So it seems. 


15 [Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the 
suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrates 
1 asks of he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth 
rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant 
temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to 

draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.] 


So. How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as 
regards things which ‘are’ and ‘come to be,’ can I be un- 
knowing of things whereof I am percipient'? 

Theae. Inno sort of way. | 

So. Therefore you have said very well that knowledge 


15 1 Αἰσθητής, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one. 


TRANSLATION. 135 


is nothing else than perception ; and it turns out to be one 
and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and 
their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and 
that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) 
πιαΏ 15 the-measure -of -alt things, and-that (as Theaetetus 
infers from these premises) perception is proved to be know- 
ledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say, that this, as 
it were, is your newborn child, and the product ‘of. my 
midwifery ? What say you? 

Theae. Τί must be so, Socrates. 

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty 
brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after 
its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with 
it in our discourse’, not failing to observe whether the child 
be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or 
do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, 
and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, 
and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch 
from you your firstborn ? 

Theo. ‘Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not 
the least ill-tempered. But in heaven’s name tell me, is not 
this then true? 

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, 
‘and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of 
arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that 
what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is 
taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from 
myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; 
and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to 
obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat 


2 The fifth day after a child’s birth the festival was called ᾽Αμϕι- 
δρόµια, when the babe was carried round the ἑστία and received its 
name, 


136 THEAETETUS. 


it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, 
and not to say something of my own. 
Theo. You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it. | 


15 [Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, 


why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is true to every man, 
what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what ts the good of 
arguing on any subject? Theodorus, who was challenged as a friend 
of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back 
to Theaetetus.) 


So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me 
in your friend Protagoras ? 

Theo. What is that? 

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has 
said, how what ‘seems’ to each ‘is’ to each. But the com- 
mencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder 
that in the outset of his ‘Truth’ he did not say that a pig, 
or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous spe- 
cimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all 
things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a 
magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing 
that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were 
a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment 
to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or 
how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opi- 
nion shall be true to each man which he gets by. percep- 
tion, and nobody’s affection shall be better determined by 
another person, nor one be more entitled than another to 
review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, 
as has been often said, each person singly shall form his 
own opinions, and all these shall be right and true—why 
in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly 
deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in 


TRANSLATION. 137 


comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of 
us is the measure of his own wisdom ? Must we not say 
“that Protagoras spéaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as 
to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to 
say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole 
practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising 
each other’s fancies and opinions, when each man’s are 
right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the ‘Truth’ 
of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest 
from the shrine of his book ? 

Theo. We was my friend, Socrates, as you said just 
now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted 
by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. 
So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he ap- 
peared some time back to follow your lead very prettily. — 

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, 
Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your in- 
feriors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and 
exhibit your own form competitively ? 

Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, 
with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to 
persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to 
the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle 
it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple. 


[Socrates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken 17 
by what has been said. When he admits that tt 1s, he is rallied by 
Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, ‘Knowledge is 
sensation,’ (Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we 

hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies 
that we know them in some respects, not in others. ] 


‘\Y So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don’t say ‘nill,’ 
‘ as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise 


138 -THEAETETUS. 


Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our 
late discussions; do you not share my surprise if thus 
all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior 
in wisdom to any man or even any god? Or do you 
suppose that the ‘measure’ of Protagoras 15 less applicable 
to gods than to men? 

Theae. Upon my word I do not. And as to your 
question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged 
in showing how that which ‘seemed’ to each ‘was’ also 
to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very 
good; but now another view has taken its place all of a 
sudden. 

So. You are young, my dear boy: you quickly succumb 
to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Pro- 
tagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply: My fine 
gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim, 
bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and 
writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, 
set aside: and you say just what the populace would 
hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to 
differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you offer 
no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probability, 
which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought to 
use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just 
consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such important 
subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere per- 
suasion and probability. 

Theae. No, Socrates, we should not any more than 
yourself affirm that to be just. 

So. We must view it then in some other way, as you 
and Theodorus suggest. ) | 

Theae. In some other way certainly. 

So. In this way then let us consider it: whether know- 

saa 


‘ 
\ 


TRANSLATION. 139 


ledge and perception are the same or different. For to this 
point, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this 
purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did 
we not? 

Theae. Assuredly. 

So. Shall we then admit that all the things which we 
perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? 

- For instance, before we have learnt the language of the 

barbarians’, shall we say that we do not hear them when 
they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they 
say? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when 
we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist 
that we know, since we see them ? | 

Theae. So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, 
we shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know 
the figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know 
the sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and inter- 
preters teach concerning them we shall say we neither per- 
ceive by sight and hearing, nor know. 

So. Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while 
to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow. 


[Socrates now brings an argument against the Protagorean doctrine which 18 
he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic. He says that 
Theodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend’s children, as their 
guardian. Theodorus naively says that Callias holds that office, not 
himself. | 


But look at this other question also which approaches, 
and consider how we shall repel it. 


17. # All who spoke another language than Greek were by the Hellenes 
called βάρβαροι. Hence Prof. Jowett renders this word in English, 
‘ foreigners.’ 


[ο 


‘and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he 


Lp Wem Ne ae 
ῳ ( 


140 _THEAETETUS, [ει ‘1 oY 


’ Theat, What is that? - 
So. (This. If any one shall ask—‘ Suppose a man has 
become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, having 


remembers he should not know the very thing which he 
remembers?’ _)But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish 
to ask 1 a man remembering anything he has learnt does 
not know it. | 

Theae. How could that be, Socrates? The thing you 
suggest would be a miracle. 

So. Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do you 
not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception ? 

Theae. Ido. 

So. Has not then one who has seen something become 
cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last state- 
ment P 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well: do you not grant there is such a thing as 
memory P 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Memory of something or of nothing ? 

Theae. Of something, certainly. 

So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has 
perceived ; of such things, is it not? 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I © 
suppose ὁ 

Theae. He does. 

So. Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing so 
has he forgotten ? 

Theae. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates. 

So. We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our 
former argument. If not, there is an end of it. 


TRANSLATION. 141 | 


Theae. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite 
make up my mind. Tell me how. 

So. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, 
cognisant of what = _sees, “For ae and percepaon and 


~"“Theae. Quite so. 

So. And he who saw and became cognisant of what 
he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see 
the thing. Isitso? _ | 


Theae. Yes. 

So. And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means 
knowing. .. 

Theae. ‘True. 


So. The inference then is, that, while a man remembers 
something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he 
does’ not see, he does not know it: ο this we said would 
be a miracle. ~ 

Theae. ΑΙ quite true. 

So. If then anybody says that knowledge and percep- 
tion are the same, there results an evident impossibility. 

Theae. So it seems. 

So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other. 

Theae. I suppose so. 

So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin 
our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going 
to do, Theaetetus ϱ 

Theae. About what? 

So. We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away 
from the argument and crow, before we have gained the 
victory. 

Theae. Wow so? 

So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content 
that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted 


142 THEAETETUS. 


uses of words, and by some such method mastered the ques- 
tion. And though we say we are not Eristics but philoso- 
phers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever 
- fellows. 

Theae. Ido not yet understand your meaning. 

So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of the 
matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and 
remembers something does not know it; and taking the case 
of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered 
though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know at 
the same time that he remembered ; and this, we said, was 
impossible. And 5ο the Protagorean { me to ruin, 
and yours with it, as to knowledge-and-perception-being the 
same. 

Theat. Apparently. 

So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of the 
former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong 
defence for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult it. 
For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of 
whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue. 
Well, in the interest of justice I will run the risk of helping 
him myself. 

Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children’s trustee, 
but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged some- 
what earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we 
shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him. 

So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my 
succour. For a man would have to make stranger admis- 
sions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms 
in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I 
explain how to you or to Theaetetus P 

Theo. Το the company generally, but let the younger 
one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat. 


TRANSLATION. 143 


_ [Socrates produces some more eristic puzzles.) 


So. I put now the most startling question. To this 
effect, I think{ Is it possible for the same man knowing a 
thing not to know what he knows? 

Theo. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus ? 

Theae. Impossible, in my opinion. 

So. Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. 
For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, 

as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed 
~ man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether 
with the closed eye you see your cloak. 

Theae. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but 
with the other. 

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at 
the same time? 

Theae. Ina sort of way. 

So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I 
ask how, but only whether you know that which you do 
not know And now you are shown to see what you do 
not see; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing 
and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from 
these premises. 


19 


Theae. I consider that it directly contradicts my former 


"assertion. 

So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had 
more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you 
whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, 
and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the 
same thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, 
countless in number, which .a light-armed mercenary am- 
bushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid 


144 THEAETETUS. 


it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and 
attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the like 
he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, 
admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him 
so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might 
then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agreed 
on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Pro- 
tagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we aot try 
to state it? 
Theae. Certainly we must. 


» 


20 [Socrates, having obtained from Theaetetus an admission that Protagoras 
ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his cause, 
and does so tn the assumed person of Protagoras himself.] 


So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he will 
also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and 
saying: Here’s this good creature Socrates, who—when a 
lad got frightened on being asked whether it is. possible for 
the same person at once to remember some particular thing 
and not know it, and in his fnght said ‘no,’ because he 
could not see before him,—made a laughing-stock of me in 
the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going 
Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doc- 
‘trines by the method of interrogation, if the person ques- 
tioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, 
I am corfuted; but if they differ from mine, then the 
person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual 
word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think 
anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past 
feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the 
time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, 
that he will shrink from admitting that it 1s possible for 


TRANSLATION. 145 


the same person to know and not to know the same thing ? 
Or, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person 
to be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather— 
that anybody can be called ‘one’ and not ‘many’—infi- 
nitely multiplied, if alteration goes on. But, O my good sir, 
he will. say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, 
if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions 
do not ‘come-to-be’ to each of us, or that, supposing they 
do, it does not follow that the appearance will ‘come-to-be’ 
(or ‘be,’ if that is the proper term) to that person alone, 
unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog- 
headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but 


. ° . ς 
you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my 


treatises without any decency. For I say that the. Truth 
is as I have written: that each_of us is a measure of 


[66.0 


things that are and are not: but that, nevertheless, one 


man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that 
to one man some things are and appear, to another other. 
things. And-I am far from denying that wisdom and a 
wisé man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by 
working changes, makes things to appear and to be good’ 
to any one of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And 
‘again, do not press my argument literally ; but understand 
from the following explanation more clearly what I. mean. 
Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man 
his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health 
the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these 
persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is 
impossible: nor may we declare that the sick man is igno- 
rant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health 
is wise for holding another. We must effect a change to 
the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the 
other. So also in education we must cause a change from 


K. P. 10 


V7 
. 


poe 


oe 


/ 6+ 146 THEAETETUS. 


ο. 


the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by 
medicines ; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeed 
did anybody make gxe who had false opinions afterwards 
to hold true ones. (Fo it is not possible either to think 
what is not, or anything but what one eats) and this is 
always true. But, I suppose, when througtf a bad habit 
of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit 
makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms which 


some persons from inexperience call true: but I call some 


better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, 
I am far from calling frogs: but in relation to bodies I 
call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. 
For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead 
of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and 
healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rheto- 
riclans make/good things instead of evil seem just to states. 
Since whatever things seem just and good to each state; 
are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but the 
wise man, in the place of those things which are παν 
evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. 
And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to 
instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees 
at their hands. Ανά thus some are wiser than others, and 
nobody thinks falsities:/and you, whether you will or not, 
must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this 
doctrine is maintained. ‘And, if you wish to revive your 
dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if you 
prefer the method of questioning, adopt it ; for no person of 
sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most wil- 
lingly. Mind this however; you must not question unfairly. 
{For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for 
virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argu- 
ment.) Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to con- 


TRANSLATION. 147 


duct his arguments-diversely ; in one way as a combatant. 
in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying 
and tripping up as much as. he can, in the latter being 
serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only 
those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in 
consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your 
fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their 
own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will 
follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, 
that they may become different, and get rid of their former 
selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, 
you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of 
philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they 
grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was " 
before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, 
but with a really mild and condescending temper, consider 
what we mean, when we declare that all things are in 
motion, and that what seems ‘is’ also to each, individual 
as well as state. From these considerations you will discern 
whether knowledge and perception are the same: but not, 
as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, 
which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing 
each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is 
the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have 
supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he 
been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander 
language. 


[Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that 21 
admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wrung from the mouth of a 
terrified lad.-\ Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very re- 
luctantly, to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue] 


AQ—2 


148 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped 
" him most valiantly. 

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one 
word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he 
said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, 
and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention 
against his propositions: and while he represented this 
as mere ‘amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things’ 
a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his 
argument. 

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates. 

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice? 

Theo. Very earnestly. 

So, Do you see that all here are boys except you? 
If then we are to take his advice, you and I must ‘deal 
seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, 
that he may not have to reproach us with considering this 
subject in a jocular manner with lads. 

Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the inves- 
tigation of a doctrine better than many who have great 
beards P 

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose 
that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every 
manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But 
come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such 
time as we know whether you are to be the measure of 
diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with 
you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein 
you are reported to excel. 

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy 
to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now 
when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you 
would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem 


TRANSLATION. 149 


rather to tend in Sciron’s' direction. The Lacedaemonians 
indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
your part like Antaeus”: you will not let one who comes to 
you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
with you in argument. 

So. You have found very good precedents for my 
malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. 
Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch 
for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must 
inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
you have proposed. 

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any 
childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 
doing 5ο. 

Theo. Wery well, ΤΗ try my best. 


[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that ‘man 22 
is a measure to himself, may be briefly summaxised thus. That doc- 
trine means, (chat seems to each ts to each.’ | Now to the mass of 
mankind this doctrine. seems. tobe untrue, because it-is_certain that 

κ 21671 in general do consider some to he wiser than_others, and look up 
ὧν to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it. ts untrue. 
I 


οἱ ?} Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who fine travellers 
from rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 
2 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents : but was 
himself defeated and slain by Hercules. 


me 
>. 


. 
9 


Ν 
ma 


150 THEAETETUS. 


And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are 
right ; from which it necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his 
own opinion. In short ‘the Truth’ of Protagoras is not true to him- 
seuf or to any body else.] 


So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, 
and see whether we were right or ‘wrong in being out 


‘ of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every 
* one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly 


conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some 
do surpass, and they are wise. 15 it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject : 
but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 


competent to make the confession on his part. It is 


: better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 


special point. For whether it is so or not makes ‘a great 


- difference. 


Theo. Very true. 
So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
but from his statement, as briefly as we can. | 

Theo. Wow? | 

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 
seems to every one ‘is’ also to him unto whom it seems? ~ 

Theo. Yes, he does. 

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man’s opinion, 
or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
there 15 nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, 
when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men 
regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting 


TRANSLATION. 151 


them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with 
people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
and of other living creatures and of the various trades ; 
and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all 
these cases what else can we say than that men themselves 
think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance ? 

Theo. Nothing else. 

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and 
ignorance false opinion ? 

‘Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 
Protagoras ? Must we > Say. that men always have true 
opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both 
views it results that they do not always think true things, 
but at times true things, at times false. For consider, 
Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 

Theo. ‘That is incredible, Socrates. 

So. And yet the doctrine which says that man is the 
measure of all things is ον to this unavoidable con; 
clusion. 

“Theo. How so? 

So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it 
granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: 
but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
lieving that you judge and think falsities ? 


152 LTHEAETETUS. 


Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
myriads ὃ | | 

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
the statement. 

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing 
he did not think man a measure, and the public did not 
think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily 
follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth 
to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who 
deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much 
more decidedly it is or is not so? 

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual 
Opinion it will be or will not be so. 

So. .In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
that he on his side, by confessing that all men_hold true 
Opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party 
about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. 

Theo. Certainly. . 

So. Will he not admit that his own. is false, if he 
confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
think falsely is true ? , 

Theo. Of course. 

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 
think falsely. 

Theo. No, they do not. 

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true 
according to his written doctrines. | 

Theo. Evidently. 

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including 


TRANSLATION. 153 


Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
‘meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
not learnt. Is it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody 
will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
to anyone else” 

Theo. We run down my friend very hard, Socrates. 

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: 
and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, 
he would not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
bably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
real opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, 
one more ignorant; than. another? ι a 

Theo. Yes, I think so. 


[Jf we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 23 
truth as to some sensible things, as ‘hot’ and ‘cold; this is not uni- 
versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
what is ‘wholesome’ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
persons may judge with equal truth of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘holy’ 
and ‘unholy,’ they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and 
will be ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’ for them. But, he adds, this opens 
new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, 
replies Socrates, we have; and this ts the reason why philosophers 
make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 

ο freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows 
the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character. 


154 THEAETETUS. 


He asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and 
character of the true philosopher. Theodorus is very desirous to 
hear this.] 


So. Must we not also say that our argument is most 
stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to 
each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like’? but that, if he will grant 
that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say 
5ο in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman 
or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
in its own case, and is competent {ο cure itself: here, if 
anywhere, one excels another. 

Theo. 1 think so. 

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things 
honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un- 
holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful 
for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these 
no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting 
things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will 
confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 
opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 
a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will 
most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I 
named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they 
(the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any 
essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by 
public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long 
as it seems good*, And those who do not altogether echo 

25 1 Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. 
(as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’ 

2 In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects 

who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason 


TRANSLATION. 155 


the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
of question, greater out of less. 

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my. good 
sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
orators. 

Theo. How do you mean P 

So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with 
those who have been reared in philosophic and literary 
society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
compared with freemen. | 

Theo. In what respects? 

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
phers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 


of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in 
his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (8 20). The 
oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
translation indicates) on the dAdo re φῶμεν (must we not say?) at the 
close of the previous speech in §22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν 
Φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τιὰ understood are 
severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας 
and Πρωταγόρα», as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I sup- 
pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν 
κ.Τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to Τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ., 
Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἱσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master’s 
doctrine on the question specified. : 


156 THEAETETUS. 


pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, 
if one which follows pleases them better than the preced- 
ing; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at 
length, if only they can attain truth. The other class 
always speak in haste ; for the flow of water® quickens them, 
and they are not allowed to make their speeches on any- 
thing they desire; and the opponent stands over them 
holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document © 
read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not 
speak, yclept an affidavit*: and the arguments are always 
about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, 
who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and 
the contests are never away from the point’, but to the 
point of self-interest ; and often too the race is for life. So 
that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, 
knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him 
by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their 
slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and 
uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, 
setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. 
And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of 
justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood 
and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and 
become warped ; and so they pass from youth to manhood 
without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine, 


8 Flow of water. The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure 

the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view. 

4 Affidavit, ἀντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of 
each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these 
affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not 
stray from them. 

5 Away from the point, τὴν ἄλλως (6867), a proverbial phrase. Such 
also is περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Spopos. 


TRANSLATION. | 157 


clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. — 
Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or 
to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may 
not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the 
change of topics P 

Theo. Not so,.Socrates; finish the description. For 
you have said with great truth that we who form a circle 
like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions 
are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be 
completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no 
presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as 
in the case of poets, to censure. 


[Zhe habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and 94 
the succeeding chapter.] 


So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think 
proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle ; for why need 
one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This 
class from their youth, in the first place, do not know 
the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council- 
hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees 
spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies 
agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts 
with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams 
do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well 
or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace 
from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no 
more than he does of the proverbial ‘gallons in the sea.’ 
He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these 
things; for it is not for credit’s sake that he stands aloof 
from them, but in point of fact it is only his_body.that 
reposes and.resides in the city, while his mind, deeming 


148 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped 
" him most valiantly. 

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one 
word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he 
said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, 
and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention 
against his propositions: and while he represented this 
as mere ‘amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things’ 
a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his 
argument. 

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates. 

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice? 

Theo. Very earnestly. 

So. Do you see that all here are boys except you? 
If then we are to take his advice, you and I must ‘deal 
seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and ‘answers, 
that he may not have to reproach us with considering this 
subject in a jocular manner with lads. 

Theo. Nay, but would not Théaetetus follow the inves- 
tigation of a doctrine better than many who have great 
beards P 

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose 
that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every 
manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But 
come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such 
time as we know whether you are to be the measure of 
diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with 
you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein 
you are reported to excel. 

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy 
to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now 
when 1 said you would allow me not to strip, and that you 
would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem 


TRANSLATION. 149 


rather to tend in Sciron’s' direction. The Lacedaemonians 
indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
your part like Antaeus’: you will not let one who comes to 
you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
with you in argument. 

So. You have found very good precedents for my 
malady, Theodorus : but I am more robust than they were. 
Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch 
for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must 
inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
you have proposed. | 

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any 
childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 
doing so. 

Theo. Very well, 111 try my best. 


[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that ‘man 22 
zs a measure to himself,’ may be briefly summaxised thus. That doc- 
trine means, what seems to each_1s to each.’ } Now to the mass of 
mankind this doctrine. seems. tobe untrue, because it-ts_certain that 
men in en in general « do consider some to he wiser than_others, and look up 


ψ to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it-is untrue. 


οι } Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who fine travellers 
from rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 
2 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents : but - was 
himself defeated and slain by Hercules. 


150 THEAETETUS. 


And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are 
right ; from which tt necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his 
own opinion. In short ‘the Truth’ of Protagoras ts not true to him- 
self or to any body else.] 


So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, 

+ and see whether we were right or wrong in being out 

> Χο humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every 

.*" one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly 

” “conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some 
do surpass, and they are wise. 18 if not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: 
but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 
competent to make the confession on his part. It is 

- better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 
special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great 
- difference. | 

Theo. Very true. 

a So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
but from his statement, as briefly as we can. | 

Theo. Howe 

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 
seems to every one ‘is’ also to him unto whom it seems? ~ 

Theo. Yes, he does. 

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man’s opinion, 
or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, 
when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men 
regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting 


TRANSLATION. 151 


them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with 
people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
and of other living creatures and of the various trades ; 
and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all 
these cases what else can we say than that men themselves 
think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance P 

Theo. Nothing else. 

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and 
ignorance false opinion? 

‘Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 
Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true 
Opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both 
views it results that they do not always think true things, 
but at times true things, at times false. For consider, 
Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 

Theo. That is incredible, Socrates. 

So. And yet the doctrine which says that man is the 
measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable con; 
clusion. } 

Theo. Wow so? 

So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it 
granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: 
but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
lieving that you judge and think falsities 2 


152 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
myriads P 

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
the statement. 

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing 
he did not think man a measure, and the public did not 
think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily 
follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth 
to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who 
deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much 
more decidedly it is or is not so? 

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual 
opinion it will be or will not be so. 

So. .In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true 
opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite. party 
about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. 

Theo. Certainly. 

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he 
confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
think falsely is true? - oF 

Theo. Of course. | 
So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 

think falsely. 

Theo. No, they do not. 

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true 
according to his written doctrines. 

Theo. Evidently. 

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including 


TRANSLATION. 153 


Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
‘meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
not learnt. Is it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody 
will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
to anyone else” 

Theo. Werun down my friend very hard, Socrates. 

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: 
and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, 
he would not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
bably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
real opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
say that everybody will confess this—that one m man is wiser, 
one more ignorant; than another ? ι 

Theo. Yes, I think so. 


[2/ we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 23 
truth as to some sensible things, as ‘hot’ and ‘cold; this is not uni- 
versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
what is ‘wholesome’ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
persons may judge with equal truth of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘holy’ 
and ‘unholy,’ they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and 
will be ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’ for them. But, he adds, this opens 
new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure Jor them? Yes, 

replies Socrates, we have; and this zs the reason why philosophers 
make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 

ο freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows 
the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyers habits and character. 


154 THEAETETUS. 


Le asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and 
character of the true philosopher. Theodorus ts very desirous to 
hear this.] 


So. Must we not also say that our argument is most 
stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to 
each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like’? but that, if he will grant 
that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say 
so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman 
or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if 
anywhere, one excels another. 

Theo. 1 think so. 

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things 
honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un- 
holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful 
for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these 
no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting 
things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will 
confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 
opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 
a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will 
most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I 
named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they 
(the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any 
essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by 
public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long 
as it seems good*, And those who do not altogether echo 

26 1 Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. 
(as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’ 

2 In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects 

who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason 


TRANSLATION. 155 


the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
of question, greater out of less. 

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my. good 
sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
orators. 

Theo. How do you mean? | 

So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with 
those who have been reared in philosophic and literary 
society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
compared with freemen. | 

Theo. In what respects? 

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
phers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 


of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in 
his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The 
oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
translation indicates) on the dAdo re φῶμεν (must we not say ?) at the 
close of the previous speech in §22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν 
φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τι τινὰ understood are 
severally the subjects. Iam rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας 
and Πρωτάγόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons 1 sup- 
pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν 
κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to Τὰ Κκαλὰ κ.τελ., 
Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἱσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master’s 
doctrine on the question specified. 


156 THEAETETUS. 


pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, 
if one which follows pleases them better than the preced- 
ing; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at 
length, if only they can attain truth. The other class 
always speak in haste ; for the flow of water® quickens them, 
and they are not allowed to make their speeches on any- 
thing they desire; and the opponent stands over them 
holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document © 
read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not 
speak, yclept an affidavit*: and the arguments are always 
about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, 
who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and 
the contests are never away from the point’, but to the 
point of self-interest ; and often too the race is for life. So 
that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, 
knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him 
by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their 
slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and 
uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, 
setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. 
And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of 
justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood 
and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and 
become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood 
without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine, 


3 Flow of water. The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure 

the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view. 

4 Affidavit, ἀντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of 
each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these 
affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not 
stray from them. 

5 Away from the point, τὴν ἄλλως (ὁδόν), a proverbial phrase. Such 
also is περὶ ψυχῆς 6 δροµο». 


TRANSLATION. | 157 


clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. 
Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or. 
to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may 
not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the 
change of topics ? | 

Theo. Not so,.Socrates; finish the description. For 
you have said with great truth that we who form a circle 
like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions 
are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be 
completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no 
presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as 
in the case of poets, to censure. 


[Zhe habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and 94 
the succeeding chapter.] 


So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think 
proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle ; for why need 
one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This 
class from their youth, in the first place, do not know 
the way to the agora, nor where a law-court 15 or a council- 
hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees 
spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies 
agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts 
with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams 
do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well 
or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace 
from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no 
more than he does of the proverbial ‘gallons in the sea.’ 
He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these 
things; for it is not for credit’s sake that he stands aloof 
from them, but in point of fact it is only his _body.that 
reposes and.resides in the city, while his mind, deeming 


158 THEAETETUS. 


all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every 
direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the 
earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, 
and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of 
existing things, condescending to none of those which are 
near it. 

Theo. How do you mean, Socrates ? 

So. Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While 
he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well; 
and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to 
have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven, 

‘, but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The 
same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. 
For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his 
next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether 
he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and 
what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently 
from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search 
out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not? 

Theo. Ido, and your words are true. 

So. Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his 
associaticns private and public, as I said at first, when in 
a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of 
things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing- 
stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public, 
falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inex- 
perience ; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a sus- 
picion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order 
of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing 
no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble. 
So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when 
eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is 
seen to laugh in nght earnest without any affectation; and 


" 
y 


TRANSLATION. 149 


rather to tend in Sciron’s' direction. The Lacedaemonians 
indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
your part like Antaeus*: you will not let one who comes to 
you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
with you in argument. 

So. You have found very good precedents for my 
malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. 
Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch 
for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must 
inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
you have proposed. | 

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any 
childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 


doing so. 


21 


Theo. Very well, I'll try my best. 


[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that ‘man 22 
zs a measure to himself,’ may be briefly summaxised thus. That doc- 
trine means, (λαέ seems to each 1s to each.’ ) Now to the mass of 
mankind this doctrine. seems lobe untrue, because tt-ts_certain that 
men in en in general do consider some to be wiser than others, aud look up 
to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it. 4s. untrue. 


1 Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who fans travellers 
from rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 

2 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents : but was 
himself defeated and slain by Hercules. 


150 THEAETETUS. 


And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are 
right ; from which tt necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his 
own opinion. In short ‘the Truth’ of Protagoras ts not true to him- 
self or to any body else.] 


So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, 
and see whether we were right or wrong in being out 
of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every 


‘ one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly 


conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some 
do surpass, and they are wise. 15 it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: 
but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 
competent to make the confession on his part. It is 


' better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 
special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great 
difference. 


Theo. Very true. 
So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
but from his statement, as briefly as we can. 

Theo. How? 

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 
seems to every one ‘is’ also to him unto whom it seems? ~” 

Theo. Yes, he does. 

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man’s opinion, 
or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, 
when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men 
regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting 


TRANSLATION. 151 


them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with 
people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
and of other living creatures and of the various trades; 
and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all 
these cases what else can we say than that men themselves 
think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance ? 

Theo. Nothing else. 

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and 
ignorance false opinion? 

‘Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 
Protagoras P Must we > Say that men always have true 
opinions, or sometimes ‘true, sometimes false? From both 
views it results that they do not always think true things, 
but at times true things, at times false. For consider, 
Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 

Theo. ‘That is incredible, Socrates. 

So. And yet the doctrine which says that_man is the 
measure Of all things is να, to this unavoidable con; 
clusion. 

Theo. How so? 

So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it 
granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: 
but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
lieving that you judge and think falsities ? 


152 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
myriads ? | | | 

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
the statement. 

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing 
he did not think man a measure, and the public did not 
think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily 
follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth 
to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who 
deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much 
more decidedly it is or is not so? 

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual 
opinion it will be or will not be so. 

So. .In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true 
Opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party 
about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. 

Theo. Certainly. 

So. Will he not admit that his own. is false, if he 
confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
think falsely is true? .. 

Theo. Of course. 

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 
think falsely. 

Theo. No, they do not. 

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true 
according to his written doctrines. 

Theo. Evidently. 

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including 


TRANSLATION. 153 


Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
not learnt. Is it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody 
will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
to anyone else” 

Theo. Werun dowh my friend very hard, Socrates. 

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: 
and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, 
he would not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
bably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
real opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, 
one more ignorant; than another? = 

Theo. Yes, I think so. 


[7/ we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 23 
truth as to some sensible things, as ‘hot? and ‘cold; this is not uni- 
versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
what is ‘wholesome’ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
persons may judge with equal truth of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘holy’ 
and ‘unholy,’ they certainly cannot equally well decide what ts and 
will be ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’ for them. But, he adds, this opens 
new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, 
replies Socrates, we have; and this is the reason why philosophers 
make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 

ο freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows 
the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character. 


154 THEAETETUS. 


He asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and 
character of the true philosopher. Theodorus ts very desirous to 
hear this.) 


So. Must we not also say that our argument is most 
stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to 
each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like’? but that, if he will grant 
that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say 
so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman 
or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
in its own case, and is competent_to cure itself: here, if 
anywhere, one excels another. 

Theo. 1 think so. 

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things 
honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un- 
holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful 
for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these 
no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting 
things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will 
confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 
opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 
a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will 
most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I 
named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they 
(the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any 
essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by 
public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long 
as it seems good*, And those who do not altogether echo 

23-1 Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. 
(as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’ 

2 In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects 

who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason 


TRANSLATION. 155 


the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
of question, greater out of less. 

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my. good 
sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
orators. 

Theo. How do you mean? | 

So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with 
those who have been reared in philosophic and literary 
society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
compared with freemen. | 

Theo. In what respects? 

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
phers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 


of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in 
his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Ῥτοίαροτας (§ 20). The 
oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
translation indicates) on the dAdo re φῶμεν (must we not say ?) at the 
close of the previous speech in §22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν 
g¢dvat, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τινὰ understood are 
severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας 
and IIpwrayépay, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I sup- 
pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν 
κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τὰ Κκαλὰ κ.Τ.λ., 
Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἱσχυρίξεσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master’s 
doctrine on the question specified. 


148 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped 
" him most valiantly. 

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one 
word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he 
said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, 
and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention 
against his propositions: and while he represented this 
as mere ‘amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things’ 
a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his 
argument. | 

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates. 

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice? 

Theo. Very earnestly. 

So, Do you see that all here are boys except you? 
If then we are to take his advice, you and I must ‘deal 
seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and ‘answers, 
that he may not have to reproach us with considering this 
subject in a jocular manner with lads. 

Theo. Nay, but would not Théaetetus follow the inves- 
tigation of a doctrine better than many who have great 
beards ? 

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose 
that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every 
manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But 
come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such 
time as we know whether you are to be the measure of 
diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with 
you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein 
you are reported to excel. 

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy 
to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now 
when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you 
would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem 


TRANSLATION. 149 


rather to tend in Sciron’s’ direction. The Lacedaemonians 
indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
your part like Antaeus’: you will not let one who comes to 
you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
with you in argument. 

So. You have found very good precedents for my 
malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. 
Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch 
for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must 
inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
you have proposed. 

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any 
childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 
doing so. 

Theo. Very well, I'll try my best. 


[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that ‘man 22 
zs a measure to himself,’ may be briefly summaxised thus. That doc- 
trine means, Chat seems to each 1s to each.’ } Now to the mass of 
mankind this doctrine seems lo he untrue, because itis certain that 

κ men in en in general do consider some to be wiser than_others, and look up 
¥ to the wise as as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it.is.untrue. 


21 ?} Sciron, or Scirthon; the legendary robber, who Aine travellers 

from rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 

3 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents : but was 
himself defeated and slain by Hercules. 


ας 


, 
9 


‘ 
΄ 


1650 THEAETETUS: 


And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are 
right ; from which it necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his 
own opinion. In short ‘the Truth’ of Protagoras ts not true to him- 
self or to any body else.] 


So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, 
and see whether we were right or ‘wrong in being out 


‘of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every 
‘ one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly 


conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some 
do surpass, and they are wise. 16 it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: 
but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 


competent to make the confession on his part. It is 


better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 


‘special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great 


difference. 

Theo. Very true. 

So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
but from his statement, as briefly as we can. | 

Theo. ἩΠον ὃ 

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 
seems to every one ‘is’ also to him unto whom it seems? ~ 

Theo. Yes, he does. 

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man’s opinion, 
or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, 
when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men 
regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting 


TRANSLATION. BI 


them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with 
people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
and of other living creatures and of the various trades ; 
and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all 
these cases what else can we say than that men themselves 
think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance ? 

Theo. Nothing else. 

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and 
ignorance false opinion ? 

‘Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 
Protagoras P Must we Say that men always have true 
opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both 
views it results that they do not always think true things, 
but at times true things, at times false. For consider, 
Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 

Theo. That is incredible, Socrates. 

So. And yet the doctrine which says that_man is the 
measure of all things is ολ ας to this unavoidable con; 
clusion. 

Theo. ow so? 

So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it 
granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: 
but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
lieving that you judge and think falsities ? 


152 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
myriads ? | | 

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
the statement. 

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing» 
he did not think man a measure, and the public did not 
think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily 
follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth 
to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who 
deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much 
more decidedly it is or is not so? 

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual 
opinion it will be or will not be so. 

So. .In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true 
Opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party 
about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. 

Theo. Certainly. . 

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he 
confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
think falsely is true? +f 

Theo. Of course. | 
So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 

think falsely. 

Theo. No, they do not. 

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true 
according to his written doctrines. 

Theo. Evidently. 

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including 


TRANSLATION. 153 


Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
‘meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
not learnt. Is it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody 
will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
to anyone else” 

Theo. Werun down my friend very hard, Socrates. 

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: 
and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, 
he would not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
bably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
real opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
one more ignorant; than. another? ι 

Theo. Yes, I think so. 


[Z/ we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 28 
truth as to some sensible things, as ‘hot’ and ‘cold; this is not uni- 
versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
what is ‘wholesome’ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
persons may judge with equal truth of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘holy’ 
and ‘unholy,’ they certainly cannot equally well decide what ts and 
will be ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’ for them. But, he adds, this opens 
new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, 
replies Socrates, we have; and this is the reason why philosophers 
make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 

_ freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows 
the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character. 


154 THEAETETUS. 


Le asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and 
character of the true philosopher. Theodorus is very desirous to 
hear this.) 


So. Must we not also say that our argument is most 
stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to 
each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like’? but that, if he will grant 
that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say 
so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman 
or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if 
anywhere, one excels another. 

Theo. I think so. 

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things 
honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un- 
holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful 
for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these 
no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting 
things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will 
confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 
opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 
a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will 
most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I 
named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they 
(the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any 
essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by 
public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long 
as it seems good*, And those who do not altogether echo 

1 Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. 
(as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’ 

2 In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects 
who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason 


23 


TRANSLATION. 155 


the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
of question, greater out of less. 

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my. good 
sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
orators. 

Theo. Wow do you mean? | 

So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with 
those who have been reared in philosophic and _ literary 
society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
compared with freemen. | 

Theo. In what respects? 

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
phers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 


of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in 
his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Ῥτοίαροτας (8 20). The 
oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
translation indicates) on the dAdo τι φῶμεν (must we not say ?) at the 
close of the previous speech in 822. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν 
Φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τιὰ understood are 
severally the subjects. Iam rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας 
and Πρωταγόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I sup- 
pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν 
κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to ra καλὰ κ.Τ.λ., 
Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἱσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master’s 
doctrine on the question specified. 


174 THEAETETUS. 


So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, 
and do not yet concede to him that every man is the 
measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man; nor yet 
will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on 
the supposition of all things moving, -* 

Theo. A good hearing, Socrates { for, as this topic is 
concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as 
by our compact I was to be, when the question about the 
doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end. Pe 


29 [Theodorus rejoices that, according to the bargain, he was to be let off 
Srom the argument at this point. Theaetetus thinks he should go on 
{ο discuss the opposite theory of Rest. Theodorus {ocularly scolds him, 
and insists on his taking his turn, He consents. But Socrates, pro-. 
Sessing the highest respect for Parmenides, and alluding to the difficulties 
which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at issue, 
the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, he 
leads Theaetetus to admit that it is more proper to say we perceive 
through the senses than with the senses, thus pointing to a centrai 
percipient (the soul). Next he makes him admit that the senses belong 
to the body, and that things perceived by one organ are not perceived 
by another. Hence any common notion acquired about things which are 
perceived by two different organs ts not acquired through either organ, 
as existence, sameness, difference, likeness,and so on. What are the 
organs through which all these and other abstract notions are ac- 
quired? Theaetetus thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned to 
them ; but that the soul by its own powers observes these common pro- 
perties. Socrates commends his conclusion as agreeing with his own.) 


Theae. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates 
have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of 
those who on the other hand. affirm that the universe is at 
rest. 

Theo. What? you, Theaetetus, a mere youth, teaching 
your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, 
gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains. 


29 


Ν 
XN 
x 


“ 
N 


TRANSLATION. “vy 


' Theae. Qh, certainly, if he wishes. But I-should hav. 
been delighted to hear the other topic discussed. = 

Theo. You challenge cavalry to the plain when you 
challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will 
hear his answer. 

So. Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey 
the call which Theaetetus makes. 

Theo. Why not obey it? ; 

So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the 
universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much 
to treat their views cursorily ; but in still greater respect do 
1 hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to 
meet Homer’s definition, ‘venerable and likewise awful’.’ I 
was brought into contact with him when I was very young 
and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth 
of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not 
understand his language, still more that we may fail to 
achieve his meaning: aboveall, I am afraid that our original 
question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be con- 
sidered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains 
our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument 
which we are awakening, if considered as a digression, 
would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at 
full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We 
should do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our 
art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions 
about knowledge. 

Theo. Very well; we must, if you please. 

So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of 
our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that 
knowledge is perception. Did you not? 

Theae. Yes. 


1 J], 1Π. 171. 


a 
΄ 
΄ 
΄ 


ιά 
ἴτα ο THEAETETUS. 


{. So. If anybody were to ask you the question, with 
‘what a man sees white things and black, and with what 
he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, 
with the eyes and with the ears. 

Theae. 1 should. 

So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the 
non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out 
of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the reverse 
is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in the 
present instance I must perforce take exception to the 
answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider 
which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with 
which, or that through which we see, and the ears that 
with which, or that through which we hear. 

Theae. ‘Through’ which in each case, I think, Socrates, 
rather than ‘ with’ which. 

So. Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as 
though we were ‘wooden horses’,’ many independent senses 
are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some 
centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, 
through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things 
perceptible. 

Theae. I think this latter view the truer one. 

So. Why am I putting these minute questions to you? 
If with some one and the same part of ourselves we through 
the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the 
other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, 

ντο refer all such perceptions at once to the body...perhaps 
however it is better you should specify them'in answer to 
me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. 

The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard 


2 Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Trojan 
legend. . 


TRANSLATION. 177 


and sweet—do you not state them to belong 
} the body, or do they belong to anything else? 
To nothing else. 
Will you also be ready to admit, that what you per- ) 
ὁ through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive ; 
arough another ; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, 
_ you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse ? 

Theae. 1 most readily admit it. 

So. If you have any common notion about both, you 
would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other 
concerning both ? 

Theae. 1 should not. | 

So. As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you 
this same notion respecting both, that both ‘are’? 

Theae. I have. | 

So. You suppose also, that each is different from each, 
and the same with itself? 

Theae. Το be sure. 

So. And that both are twain, but each is one? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Are you not also able to observe whether they are 
like one another or unlike? | 

Theae. Probably. 

So. Through what do you form all these notions con- 
cerning bothe For neither through hearing nor through 
sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. 
Here again is another instance in point. If it were pos- 
sible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you 
know that you will be able to say with what you will 
examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but 
something else. 

Theae. No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised 
through the tongue. 


K. P. 12 


1δ THEAETETUS. 


So. Well said. Now, through what does the power act 
which makes manifest to you what all things generally have 
in common with these particularly—what you mean, to wit, 
in saying ‘is,’ ‘is not,’ and all else comprised in our late 
questions? What organs will you assign as those through 
which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally ? 

Theae. You mean being and non-being, and likeness 
and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and more- 
over unity and any other number applicable to things 
perceived? Evidently too your question includes the even 
and the odd, and all other such notions; asking through 
what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul. 

So. You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these 
are the very questions I ask. 

_ Theae. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer 
than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ — 
. peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the 
soul through its own individual power appears to me to 
observe the common properties of all. 

So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as 
-Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully is 
beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much 
obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the 
soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, 
and other things through the bodily organs. ‘This was my 
own opinion, and 1 was wishing it to be yours. 

Theae. Yes: to me it 15 apparent. 


30 [Socrates now draws from Theaetetus the admission that while certain 
properties, as hardness and softness, are perceived through the senses 
common to men and beasts, essence, difference, use, and the like are 
matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Without 
attaining essence, truth ts not attained, nor without truth knowledge. 


TRANSLATION. 179 


{3 is not in the affections themselves, but in the reasonable conclusions 
concerning them, that knowledge lies. And what ts the common name 
jor all these affections? Perception, which cannot therefore attain 
essence or truth or knowledge. Hence tt follows that perception and 
knowledge cannot be the same thing. Theaetetus admits the failure of 
this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search 1s not to find what 
knowledge is not, but to find what it ts, and then begs him to consider 
what tt ts that the soul ts said to do, when it forms a judgment on 
existing things. Theaetetus replies: It is said to opine—to form an 


opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new answer to the . 


question, What is knowledge ?] 


So. To which of the two classes do you assign 
‘being’? -For this is the notion most universally present. 

Theae, assign it to that class which the soul attains to 
by itself. 

So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of 
sameness and difference ? 

Theae. Yes. 

‘So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and 
evil ? | 

Theae. Yes: these are things the essence of which, 
above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their 
mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the 
present with the future. 

So. Waitamoment. Will it not perceive the hardness 
of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness 
of a soft one? 

Theae. Yess - “* 

So. But their being, and what they are, and their 
mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, 
the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with 
each other, endeavours to determine for us? 

Theae. Quite so. © 

So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are 


12—2 


180 THEAETETUS. 


able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I 
mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the 
reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are 
acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and 
gradually through the troublesome process of education. 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So. Can any one attain truth, who does not attain 
being ? 

Theae. He cannot. 

So. And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he 
ever have knowledge of it? 

Theae. Impossible, Socrates. i 

0. Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of 
_ sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for i in this it 
seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the 
affections ? 

Theae. Evidently. : 

So. Do you call two things the same which are in so 
many respects different ? : 

Theae. There were no justice in doing so. 

So. What name do you give to the one class—seeing, 
hearing, smelling, being cold and hot? 

Theae. ‘Perceiving’ I would certainly call them. 

So. Their common notion then you would call percep- 
tion ? 

Theae. Of course. 

So. And this, we say, has no share in the attainment 
of truth, having none in the attainment of being. 

Theae. It has none. 

So. Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge? 

Theae. No. 

So. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will 
not be the same? | 


Ἆ 


TRANSLATION. | 181 


Theae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has 
knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing 
from perception. 

So. But it was not by any means with this view that 
we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but 
to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced 
as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name 
which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul’s action 
when by itself it deals with existing things. 

Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called ‘ opining’ 
(forming opinion). | 
So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back 
again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any 
clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me 
once more what knowledge is. 


[Zhe first definition proposed by Theaetetus—that sensuous perception ts 31 
knowledge—being thus overthrown by the elenchus concluded in § 30, 
he ἐς invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that 
realm of pure thought which consists in believing, judging, or opining 
(forming opinion). But as it occurs to him that opinions formed 
are not always true, he sees that he must limit his definition ; and, 
accordingly, he ventures to suggest that TRUE OPINION ts knowledge. 
Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of argument without 
delay. It implies that such a thing as ‘false opinion’ ts possible: 
and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things 
subject to opinion are, he says, such as a man either knows or does 
not know. If he opines, he either knows or does not know that about 
which he opines: he cannot know, and not know, one and the same 
thing. Can he then (when he opines falsely) mistake one known 
thing for another known thing ?—No.—Or a known thing for an 
unknown ?—No.—Or an unknown for a known ?—No.—Or one 
unknown for another unknown ?—Impossible.—But tf he forms a 
Jalse opinion, he must err in one of these four ways :—all which are 
impossible, Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But 
perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ 


- 


! 


199 THEAETETUS. 


rather than knowing and not-knowing. May not aman opine what 
as false, if he opines ‘what is-not’? But he goes on to argue that 
nobody can opine ‘what is not’ any more than he can see or hear 
what is not: to opine ‘what is not’ is to opine ‘ nothing : that is, not 
to opine at all. Therefore false opinion 1s no more possible from this 
point of view than it was from the former.] 


Theae. ‘To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, 1s 
impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion 
probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it 
shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we 
will try some other statement. | 

Se. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is 
more to the purpose than your original reluctance to an- 
swer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two ad- 
vantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or 
our conceit of knowing what we do not know will be di- 
minished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now 
let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of 
opinion, the true and the false, do you make TRUE OPINION 
the definition of knowledge? . 

Theae. Ido, according to my present view. 

So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opi- 
nion ? 

Theae. Which do you mean? 

So. 1 am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, 
and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind 
and in conversation, from my inability to say what this con- 
dition is in us, and in what way engendered. 

Theae. What condition? 

So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I am 
still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, 
or review it in a way different from that we took some 
little time ago. 


TRANSLATION. 183 


Theae. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any 
clear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theo- 
dorus said very justly, that there is nothing to meee us in 
such cases. 

So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreason- 
able to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, “ 
to achieve a little well than much inadequately. 

Theae. Of course. 

So. Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we 
say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some 
one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such 
were the natural rule? 

Theae. Yes, we do. 

So. Does not this occur to us-in respect of all oe 
generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or 
not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between 
these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to 
our present argument. 

Theae. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each 
case but knowing and not-knowing. | 

So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who 
opines must opine αΏοιί one of the things which he 
knows, or one of those which he does not know? 

Zheae. Itis. 

So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to 
know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it? 

Theae. Quite impossible. 

So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think 
that things which he knows are not what.they are, but some 
other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he 
ignorant of both ? ' 

Theae. It cannot be so, Socrates. 

So. Or does he suppose things which he does not 


184 THEAETETUS. 


know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? 
Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor 
Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaete- 
tus Socrates ? | 

Theae. How can that be? 

So. But surely a man does not think that what he 
knows is what he does not know, or that what he does 
not know is what he knows. 

Theae. ‘That were a miracle. 

So. In what other way then can any one hold false 
opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impos- 
sible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either : 
know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly im- 
possible for us ever to have false opinions. 

Theae. Very true. 

So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question with 
reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being 
and not-being. 

Theae. How do you mean? 

So. Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who 
thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably 
think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in 
other respects. 

Theae. ‘This again is probable, Socrates. 

So. How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if 
any one examine us: ‘Is what you say possible for any 
one, and will any human being think what is not, either 
about some existing thing, or in the abstract?’ Seemingly 
we shall say in reply: ‘Yes, when he thinks, and does not 
think what is true.’ Or how are we to speak? 

Theae. As you Say. : 

So. Does the like happen in any other case? 

Theae. What do you mean? 


TRANSLATION. 188 


So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing. 

Theae. How can that be? 

So. If he sees some one thing, that ‘something’ is 
among things that are. Ordo you think ‘the one’ is ever 
among the things that are not? 

Theae. NotI. | 

So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some 
thing that is. 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, 
and a thing that is, 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one 
thing, and a thing that is, since it is one. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And does not he who opines form opinion of 
some one thing? 

Theae. We must. 

So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one 
thing form it of some thing that is? 

Theae. I grant this. 

So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing. 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine - 
at all. 

Theae. ‘That seems clear. 

So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, 
elther about things that are, or in the abstract. 

Theae. Manifestly not. 

So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from think- 
ing what is not. 

Theae. It seems different. 

So. And thus neither from our present consideration 


186 LHEAETETUS. 


(of. being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of 
knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to 
exist in us. 

Theae. No, we do not. 


ea 


32 [Socrates asks, whether false opinion may not possibly be found in what 
he calls ‘allodoxy,’ the mental exchange of one existing thing for 
another existing thing. Theaetetus would like to accept this expla- 
nation. But Socrates disappoints him. A short dialectic elenchus (in 
the course of which Socrates describes opinion as the result of a con- 
versation which the soul holds with itself) leads to the conclusion 
that, assuming two different things—the noble and the base—the 
Just and the unjust—a horse and an ox, &¢., nobody can mistake one 
jor the other, either tf he has formed an opinion of both, or if he 
has formed ain opinion of one, but not of the other: so that allodoxy 
(which he now terms heterodoxy) does not supply any rational defini- 
tion of false opinion.] 


So. But can we not speak of it as happening in this 
way P | 

Theae. Wow? 

So. We can say that an opinion which may be called 
an. ‘allodoxy’ is false when anybody says that some one 
existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in. 

Ὅ his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of 
one thing instead of another, and, as- missing that which he 
had in view, he may be said to have false opinion. 

Theae. Your present statement seems to me very cor- 
rect. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instead 
of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly 
has false opinion. 

So. Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of 
me, and without fear. 

Theae. Pray why? 


—., 


TRANSLATION. | 187 


So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold 
of your term ‘truly false’, and ask if it is possible for the 
swift to ‘come-to-be’ slowly, or the light heavily, or for any 
other opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own 
nature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a 
manner opposed to itself. This however—that your con- 


fidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you 


are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is ‘ allo- 
doxy.’ : 
Theae. Yam. 

So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine 
in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself. 

Theae. It is. 

So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not 
perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two? 

Theae. Yes, it must. 

So. At the same time, or else by turns. 

Theae. Very good. 

So. Do you employ the term ‘thinking’ in the same 
sense that I do? 

Theae. How do you define it? 

So. A discourse which the soul holds with itself 
about what it considers. 1 am representing this to you 
not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the 
soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, 
questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. 
And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly 
or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms 
undoubtingly, we state this to be its opinion. So that 
I call opining the soul’s speaking, and opinion its spoken 
word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but 
silently to itself. 

Theae. So dol. 


188 THEAETETUS. 


So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing is 
another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing 
is another. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Try to remember whether you ever said to your- 
self, ‘Assuredly the noble is base,’ or, ‘The unjust is 
just.’ Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to 
convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another: or 
if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to 
say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any 
such thing? 

Theae. You say the truth. 

So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses 
ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make 
himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two 
things one? 

Theae. No indeed, not I. 

So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who 
speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both 
with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. 
But you must avoid the terms ‘one and other.’ I'll state 
the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is 
base, or anything of the sort. 

Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree 
with you. 

So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly 
opine that one is the other? 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the 
other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other. 

Theae. ‘True: for so he would be forced to apprehend 
that of which he has no thought. 

So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one 


TRANSLATION. 189 


who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall 
define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: 
for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that 
false opinion cannot exist in us. 

Theae. Seemingly not. 


[Socrates seems, or feigns, to be driven to despair by the failure of his 99 
three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. Tt ts not in the 
region of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confusion of 
phenomena, which he terms allodoxy. Surely tt must be somewhere. 
Surely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, 
seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that 
thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato in- 
troduces two parables or myths. He supposes first, a memorial 
waxen block, and, later on, a bird-cage or aviary, to be situated in the 
human mind. (In figments of this kind Plato takes great delight: 
he has scattered them with profuston throughout his works. They do 
not supply to the pure intellect that verification which it demands in 
order to accept 4 philosophic theory. But the literary composer finds 
them avery convenient resource. They fill up gaps in serious argu- 
ment. They rouse the imagination, they charm the fancy: they 
attract and amuse the general reader, when fatigued with dry 
@ialexis. In short, they area valuable part of that ψυχαγωγία, which 
Plato, who has a rhetoric of his own, is far from disdaining for his 
own use. See Dr Thompson's Introduction to his edition of the 
Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi—u, also p. 141.) In this section a general 
description ts given of the waxen block or tablet, as Mr Grote calls tt 
(ἐκμαγεῖον). The wax varies in various cases, in some being larger, 
«ΙΕ, cleaner, and in every way better than in others. The recep- 
tacle also is more or less wideand convenient. The tablet ts a gift of 
Mnemosyne (memory) for impressing by seals every one’s sensations 
and thoughts, These are remembered and known while the impressions 
remain: when these fade, they are forgotten and no longer known. 
Socrates goes on to state when false notions cannot be formed, and 
when they can.] 


So. And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved im- 


190 THEAETETUS. 


possible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd 
consequences. 

‘Theae. What are they? 

So. I will not say till I have tried every point of view. 
For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we 
were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if 
we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak 
of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule our- 
selves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, 
in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall 
allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as it 
will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way 
of escape from our inquiry. 

Theae. Pray tell me. 

So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is 
impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does 
not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain way 
possible. 

Theae. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the 
time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes 
like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance 
another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates 
whom I know? For in such a case something like what 
you say comes to pass. 

So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made 
us, while knowing, not to know what we do know? 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the follow- 
ing manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. 
But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce 
turn about and examine every argument. See if Iaska 
rational question. Is it not possible to learn something 
which you formerly did not know? 


TRANSLATION. 191 


Theae. Yes, it is. 

So. And one thing after another? — 

Theae. Why note 

So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there 
is in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in 
another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less 
pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium 
quality. 

Theae. Well. . 

So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of 
the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were 
impressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among 
those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our 
senses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, 
“we remember and know as long as its image subsists; but 
that, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have 
forgotten and do not know. 

Theae. Be it so. 

So. See then if he who knows things, and considers 
anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some 
such way as the following: 

Theae. In what way? 

So. By thinking sometimes that what he knows is 
what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In 
our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to 
be possible. 

Theae. How do you state it now? 

So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We 
first determine, that what a person knows, having a record 
of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot pos- 
sibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having 
an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again 
it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he 


ς 


192 THEAETETUS. 


knows not and has no seal of: and that what he knows 
not is [something else] which he knows not: and that what 
he knows not is what he-knows: and to think what he 
perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what 
he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; and 
what he does not perceive to be another thing which he 
does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be 
a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a 
thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of 
it according to perception, is some other thing which he 
knows and perceives having its seal also according to per- 
ception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible than 
the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and 
perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to 
think [something else] which one knows: and what one 
knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [some- 
thing else] which one perceives: and what one neither 


knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one 


neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither knows 
nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not 
know ; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be 
[something else] which one does not perceive. All these 
things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any 
false opinion about them. There remain the following 
cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen. 

Theae. What are they? perhaps they may help me to 
understand. At present I do not follow you. 

So. In the case of things which a person knows, to think 
that they are some other things which he knows and per- 
ceives ; Or some other things which he does not know, but 
perceives: or that [some things] which he knows and per- 
ceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives. 

Theae. Jam more in the dark now than before. 


TRANSLATION. 193 


[ln this section it ts shewn how, by the misuse of the waxen tablet, false 34 
opinion may be supposed to occur ; namely, by an erroneous union of 
sensation and impression. Mr Grote states it as follows: ‘*A man, 
having sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects | 
A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects | 
again: but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with 
the wrong past impression, i.e. with that past impression to which it 
does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it 
with the past impression B, instead of A; or vice versa. And so 
Jalse opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensa- 
tions with sensations, nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with 
thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressions or 
thoughts.” Such an occurrence Socrates imputes to defects in the 
waxen block; which may be too shallow or too hard or too soft or too 
narrow, or impure, or inclosed in too small a space.) 


So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing 
Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man 
he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, some- 
times not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, 
and hear them or have some other perception of them, and 
again have no perception of you, but not the less remem- 
ber you and know you in my mind ? 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make 
known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may per- 
ceive, things which he knows. 

Theae. True. 

ο So. Things too which he does not know, a man may 
often not perceive, often perceive merely ? 

Theae. ‘This too is possible. 

So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates 
knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has 
no other present perception about them. He could never 


Κ. Ῥ. 19 


194 THEAETETUS. 


form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodo- 
rus? Do 1 speak sense or not? 

Theae. All quite true. 

So. This was the first of the cases spoken of. 

Theae. It was. 

So. The second was, that knowing one of you, and 
not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never 
suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know. 

Theae. Right. 

So. Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot 
suppose one whom I do not know to be some other 
whom I do not know. And as to all my former sup- 
positions, imagine that you have heard them stated again 
in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about 
you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know 
both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly 
with regard to perceptions, if you follow me. 

Theae. Ido. 

_ So. False opinion remains possible in a case like 
this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in 
_that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, 
then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly,-I strive to 
assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to 
introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that 
recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, 
and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, 
I apply the visage of each to the other’s seal; or again, if 
I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, 
when it flows from right to left :—then heterodoxy and false 
opinion occur. 

Theae. You descnbe with marvellous truth, Socrates, 
the conditions to which opinion is liable. 

So. Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knowing 


TRANSLATION. 195 


both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the 
other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is — 
not according to perception—a case put in my former 
statement, which you did not then understand. 

Theae. 1 did not. 

So. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and 
perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to 
perception, will never think that he is some other whom he 
knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also 
according to perception. Was it so? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. There remained, I think, the case we now deal 
with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a 
person knowing and seeing both, or having any other 
perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in 
accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer 
shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is 
called a falsity. 

Theae. And reasonably. 

So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is 
present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal 
which is without perception to the perception present, in 
every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things 
which a person knows not and never perceived, error and 
false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any 
soundness in our present argument: but in those things 
about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion 
turns and twists about, becoming true or falsé; true, when 
It brings the proper impressions and forms to meet ΟΡΡΟ- 
sitely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise 
and crookedly. | 

Theae. Is not this a noble statement, Socrates ? 

So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing 

VB—d 


196 - THEAETETUS. 


what I have further to state: for to think the truth is 
noble, to be deceived is base. 

Theae. No doubt. 

So. These things are said to happen as follows. When 
the wax in any person’s soul is deep and abundant and 
smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable 
which pass through the senses and are sealed on this 
(waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion 
to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, 
_ they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And 
such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the 
next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals 
of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their 
impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly 
distribute them to their several niches; and such impres- 
sions are called ‘real:’ and these persons are termed ‘wise.’ 
Do you not think so? 

Theae. With entire conviction. 

So. When any person’s heart is shaggy, as that all- 
wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or 
exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are 
quick to learn, but forgetful ; they whose heart is hard, the 
opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and 
gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or 
mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who 
have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is 
wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for 
through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides 
all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon 
another for want of room, when a man’s soul 15 small, they’ 
are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these 
people are capable’ of having false opinions. For when 
they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to 


TRANSLATION. 197 


assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they 
go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see 
and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these 
persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, 
and are ignorant. | 

Theae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates. 

So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us? 

Theae. Decidedly. 

So. And true? 

Theae. Yes. : , 

So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these 
kinds of opinion certainly exist ? 

Theae. Beyond all question. 


[Socrates has no sooner reached his conclusion as to the formation of false 35 
opinion, than he proceeds to confute it. There are phenomena for 
which it does not account. Errors occur in the identification of one 
past impression with another: and this leads to the dilemma that 
either false opinion is impossible, or it is possible for a person not to 
know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetus cannot solve. 
And Socrates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that 
they have constantly used the terms ‘knowing, ‘knowledge,’ and 
‘ionorance’ before they have reached a definttion of these terms. As, 
however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without 
using them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to 
make the attempt, and Theaetetus applauds his resolution. | 


So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, 
Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be. 
Theae. WHowso? What do you say this for? 
So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and 
manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct 
«Οἱ a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot 
be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced? - 
Theae. What vexes you? 
So. Iam not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, 
should any one question me and say. ‘Wane you nox, 


198 THEAETETUS. 


Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the 
mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but 
in the union of perception with thought?’ I shall say, 
‘Yes,’ I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made 
some beautiful discovery. 

Theae. 1 5εε nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has 
now been proved. 

So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never sup- 
pose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a 
horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think 
of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that 
I do mean it. 

Theae. Yes, and rightly. 

So. Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which 
is an object of thought only, must it not follow from 
this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be 
twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come 
now, reply yourself. 

Theae. I shall reply that any one who saw and touched 
them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he 
had them in thought, he could never conceive such an 
opinion regarding them. | 

So. Well, take the case of one who set before him- 
self and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I 
don’t mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, 
but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that 
they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to 
them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these 
things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were 
considering them, and conversing with themselves, and 
inquiring how many they come to—one person would think 
and say they were eleven, another twelve :—or would all 
say and think that they make twelve ? 

Theae. No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven. 


TRANSLATION. 199 


And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he 
is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking 
of number generally. 

So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether any- 
thing happens in such a case but imagining the number 
twelve, in the block, to be eleven. 

Theae. Nothing else, seemingly. 

So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. 
The person in such a case supposes a thing which he 
knows to be another thing which.he knows. This we 
said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced 
the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order 
that the same person might not be compelled to know and 
not know the same things at the same time. 

Theae. Very true. | | 

So. Therefore we must declare that holding false 
opinion is something else than a discrepancy between 
thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could 
never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But 
now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a 
person not to know what he knows. Which alternative 
do you choose? | 

Theae. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates. 

So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. 
Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we 
venture to be shameless? 

Theae. How? 

So. By making up our minds to say what ‘to know’ 
means. 

Theae. Why is this a shameless act? 

So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our dis- 
cussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, as- 
suming that we do not know what it 15. 


200 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. 1 do bear this in mind. 

So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know know- 
ledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in ‘fact, 
Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure 
method of discussion. Over and over again we have used 
the terms ‘we know,’ and ‘we do not know,’ ‘we have 
knowledge’ and ‘we have not knowledge,’ as if we could 
understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of know- 
ledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again 
used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it 
were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge. 

Theae. But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you 
abstain from these terms ? 

So. In no way, while I am the man I am: butI could 
if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that 
school now present, he would -profess to abstain from such 
terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since 
however we are such poor creatures, will you let me ven- 
ture to say what ‘knowing’ is? For I am clear that it will 
be of some help to us. 

Theae. Oh yes! pray venture. You will have great 
excuse for not abandoning these terms. 


[Having consented, for the sake of discussion, to use the term ‘knowing,’ 36 
though still undefined, Socrates now observes that most people suppose 
zt to mean ‘ the having of knowledge.’ For his own part, he would 
rather say ‘the possessing,’ than ‘the having :’ for a person cannot 
justly be said ‘to have’ what he never uses, though he may ‘ possess? 
it, like a coat kept in a wardrobe but never worn. This distinction 
he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. 
A person may be supposed to have caught a number of doves (i.e. to 
have acquired sciences or cognitions) which he has turned into his cage 
or aviary, and so ‘ possesses.’ But, if he wants to catch one of his’ 
doves (t.e. to recall and use one of his acquired cognitions), he has 


TRANSLATION. | 201 


to pursue another chase in his mental aviary; and this may not 
always be successful. He may fail to catch the dove he wants (i.e. he 
may find that he has forgotten the science he had once acquired) or he 
may get hold of a wrong dove (i.e. he may confuse things which he 
could accurately distinguish at a former time).) 


So. You have heard then what people now mean by 
“knowing ?’ 

Theae. Possibly: but I do not remember at the mo- 
ment. | 

So. They say it is a having of knowledge. 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of 
knowledge. 

Theae. What will you say is the difference between 
them ὃ 

So. Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and 
help me to test my opinion. 

Theae. I will if I can. 

So. ‘Having’ does not appear to me the same thing 
as ‘possessing.’ For instance, if any one bought a coat, 
and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say 
he had, but possessed it. 

Theae. Right. 

So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to 
possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person 
had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a 
dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way 
we should say he always has them, because he possesses 
them. Should we not? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. In another sense we should say he has none of 
them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made 
them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own. 


202 THEAETETUS. 


He can take and hold them when he likes, catching any 
one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is free to 
him to do this as often as he thinks proper ὃ 

Theae. It is. | 

So. So then, even as in the previous part of our dis- 
course we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen 
figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of 
various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest ; 
Others in small groups; others alone, flying among all 
wherever they may chance. 

Theae. Suppose it made. What next? 

So. While we are children (we must say) this struc- 
ture is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of 
birds: and whatever science any one has acquired and 
shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or 
discovered the thing of which It is the science: and this is 
‘knowing.’ 

ο Theae. Be it so. 

So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences a 
person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it 
go again,—consider by what terms these acts should be 
described, whether by the same as when he was first ac- 
quiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I 
mean more clearly from the following illustration. There 
is an art you call arithmetic? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of 
odd and even. 

Theae. Well, I do. 

So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the 
cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them 
to another. 

Theae. Yes. 






TRANSLATION. a 
κα. 


‘So. And we say that one who transmits teachesy.and ~~ «'» 
one who receives learns, and one who has them by pose .. @ 
ing in that cage ‘knows?’ 

Theae. Quite 5ο. 

So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a 
perfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his 
soul the science of all numbers. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, 
or any outward objects capable of numeration ὃ ee 

Theae. No doubt he could. 

So. And shall we say that counting means anything but 
considering how great any number is? 

Theae. Such is its meaning. 

So. Then what a person ‘knows,’ he is shown to con- 
sider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he 
knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these 
vexed questions? 

Theae. T have. 


[Socrates now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you 37 
acquired and possess, stems to mean learning from yourself what you 
know already. This Theaetetus sees tobe absurd. And the confusion 
of two known things appears to be not less absurd. For this knowledge 
zs shewn to’ produce the effect of tgnorance. Why may not ignorance 
as well be shewn to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that 
of sight? May we not imagine, says Theaetetus, that the cage contains 
nesciences (non-cognitions) as well as sciences (cognitions) and that false 
opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold 
of anescience in tts stead? By a short elenchus Socrates shews that 
this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknow- 
ledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got hold of ness 
cience mistakes wt for science, doeshe not? Yes, says Theactetus. But 
how can anybody, knowing two things, take one for the other, or, 
knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else that 


204 THEAETETUS. 


he does not know: or knowing one but not the other, take what he 
does know for what he does not know, or the converse. All these are 
imposstbilities: and so we, until we know what knowledge is, cannot 
know what false opinion is.] 


So. We then, following the similitude of the possession 
and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; one 
before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other 
after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the 
owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things 
of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, 
and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn 
-by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which 
he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his 
mental grasp. 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. Iwas just now asking what terms we must use to 
speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to. 
count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case, 
although he knows, come to learn from himself what he 
knows ? 

Theae. ‘That were absurd, Socrates. 

So. But must we say that he will read and count 
what he does not know, after allowing him to know all 
letters and all number? 

Theae. ‘This again is unreasonable. 

So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we 
do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the 
words ‘knowing’ and ‘learning;’ but that since we de- | 
fined ‘possessing’ knowledge to be one thing, ‘having’ it 
another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess 
what he has acquired ; so that it never happens that any one 
does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold 
of a false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to 


TRANSLATION. 205 


have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, 
when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he 
mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the 
case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of 
the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the 
ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon ? 

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable. 

So. But when he gets hold of that which he tries to 
take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and 
opines realities, and that in this way there is true and 
false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we 
found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Per- 
haps you will endorse my statement. Will you? 

Theae. I will. | 

So. Then so far we are τά of the notion that people 
do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in 
any case not to possess what we do possess, whether de- 
' ceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance 
sideways on me a trouble still more formidable. 

Theae. Of what nature ? 

So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever 
come to be false opinion. 

Theae. How do you mean? 

So. First, as to the notion of anybody’s having know- 
ledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, 
not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as 
to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be 
this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when know- 
ledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be 
ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is no- 
thing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to 
_ know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge 
shall ever cause any one to be ignorant. 


206 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds 
well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed 
also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and the 
chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of 
a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by 
nescience, true by science. 

- So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. 
But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. 
He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false 
opinions. Is it so? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opi- 
nions ? 

Theae. How can he? 

So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to 
things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same 
condition as if he knew them ? 

Theae. No doubt. 

So. He will think that he has chased and got science, 
not nescience ? 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached 
our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and 
say: ‘My right worthy friends, will one who knows them 
both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows 
to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of 
them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other 
which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the other, 
does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows 
not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? 
Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences 
of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses 
has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen 


TRANSLATION. 207 


figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if 
he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will 
you be compelled to run round and round to the same 
point without gaining anything by it?’ What answer shall 
we give to these questions, Theaetetus ? 

Theae. Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought 
to say. 

So. Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, 
and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of 
knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is 
impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately 
settled what knowledge is. . 

Theae. At this point, Socrates, I must accept your 
view. 


[Are we then to abandon the inquiry—‘ what is knowledge ?? Theaetetus 88 
will not do so, tf Socratesis ready to continue tt ; but he reverts to 
his second definition, that true opinion ts knowledge. Socrates says that 
the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine : for 
their whole business 1s to persuade dicasts that certain things which 
the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to 
decide accordingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have 

. formed a true opinion, which cannot be called knowledge, but the result 
of persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not iden- 
tical. Theaetetus now remembers that he once heard it said, that true 
opinion with rational explanation (λόγος) 7s knowledge, Things are 
unknowable, if they cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they 
are knowable. | 


So. Returning to the original question, what is one 
to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, 
I suppose. 7 . 

Theae. Certainly not, if you do not set the example. 

So. Say then how we must define it in order to escape 
best from self-contradiction. 


208 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, 
Socrates, I have no other suggestion to make. 

So. What was the definition? 

Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion 
is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble 
and good. 

So. The man who led the way into the river, Theae- 
tetus, said ‘the trial will prove;’ and if we search for this 
as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we 
are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing. 

Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out. 

So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for 
a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not know- 
ledge. 

Theae. Howso? What is that profession ? 

So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who 
are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art 
persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine 
whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any 
teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, 
to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, 
who were not present when they were robbed of money, OF 
when they received some other violence? 

Theat. I do not suppose they could; but they would 
persuade. | 

So. By persuading you mean, ‘causing to form an 
opinion ϱ) 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about 
things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, 
in that case, judging the things by what they hear, they 
judged without knowled ze, notes persuaded rightly, if their 
verdict was good P. 


TRANSLATION. 209 


Theae. Unquestionably. 

So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were 
the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion 
without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one . 
and the same. 

Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing 
which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. 
He said that true opinion accompanied with rational expla- 
nation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the 
sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explana- 
tion are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but 
those which have explanation are knowable. 

So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw be- 
tween these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, 
that I may see whether you and I have heard the same 
version or not. | 

Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if an- 
other told it, I think I could follow him. 


[Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, which he proceeds 99 
to explain by the analogy of words and letters. The primordial elements 
of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of 
rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element 
can only be perceived and called by its name. Youcan give it neither 
predicate nor epithet: you cannot speak of tt as ‘ being,’ as ‘this’ or 
‘that’ or ‘each,’ or ‘single:’ for so you add to tt something foreign 
to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these 
elements may be known and explained by enumerating the elements of 
which they are composed. And to do this ts to furnish a rational 
explanation (λόγος) of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and 
repeats the new definition of knowledge stated in the preceding section. 
Socrates intimates that he ts dissatisfied with the statement that 

ο elements are unknowable, while their compounds are knowable. He 
Jurther proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllables and 
the letters or elements of which they are composed.] 


K. P. ἂν 


210 THEAETETUS. 


So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard 
some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we 
and all other things are compounded, have no reason: for 
it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predi- 
cate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in 
such case ‘being’ or ‘not-being’ is attached: while it is 
wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing 
itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term ‘self’ 
or ‘that’ or ‘each’ or ‘single’ or ‘this,’ or many other like 
expressions: for these run about and are applied to all 
things, being different from the things to which they are 
attached. If the primal element were capable of being 
described, and had a proper description of its own, the 
fitting course would be, that it should be described apart 
from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one 
of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is 
nothing for it except to be named only: name is all it has. 
But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are 
themselves complex, so also their names being combined 
constitute definition : for a complex of names 15 the essence 
of definition. ‘Thus I dreamed that the elements are un- 
described and unknown, but perceptible ; while their com- 
binations are known and expressed and conceived by true 
opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of any- 
thing without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, 
but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive 
a spoken account of anything Is incognisant of it. But 
after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming 
all this, and 15 perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the 
dream thus or otherwise? 

Theae. Exactly thus. 

So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down 
that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge? 


TRANSLATION. 211 


Theae. Quite so. 

So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found 
at last what from ancient time so many wise men have 
grown old without finding ? , 

Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present 
statement a good one. 

So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called 
knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet 
I am displeased with one of the things we said. 

Theae. What was that? 

So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how 
that the elements are unknown, but the class of combina- 
tions known. | 

Theae. Is not that true? 

So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the 
examples which he used in saying what he did. 

- Theae. What are they? 

So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker 
had anything but these in view when he said what we cite ? 

Theae. No: he thought of these. 


[Assailing the new definition with reference to letters and syllables, and 40 
taking as an instance the first syllable of his own name, Σω, Socrates, 
by a short elenchus, proves that the syllable is not known, unless the 
letters sigma and Omega are known also. But, starting a fresh 
argument, he suggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion 
having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is willing to 
accept this view. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why? 
Because ‘a whole’ must mean ‘all its parts.’ Can a whole be a 
notion distinct from all its parts?  Theaetetus ventures to say it can, 
Socrates asks tf ‘the all and the whole’ are different. Theaetetus 
risks the answer: ‘they are different.’) 


So. Let us then take and test them; or, rather test 
ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any 


Va—D 


212  THEAETETUS. 


other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters 
not? . 

Theae. Probably. 

So. I take the same view. If some one asked about 
the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, ‘Tell me, 
Theaetetus, what SO is: how would you answer? 

Theae. Sigma and Omega. 

So. This then you hold to be the definition of the 


syllable ? 

Theae. I do. 

So. Well now, tell me similarly the definition of 
Sigma. | 


Theae. How can one tell the elements of an element ? 
For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a 
sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again 
has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. 
So they may very well be called undefined, as the cledrest 
of them have sound alone, but no definition at all. 

So. So much then, my friend, we have nghtly deter- 
mined concerning knowledge? 

Theac. Apparently. 

So. Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the 
letter is not known, but only the syllable? 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Do we now say that the syllable i: is both ‘letters, 
or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea 
arising from their combination ? 

Theae. 1 think we should say, all of them. 

So. Take the case of two, Sigma and Omega. ‘These 
two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who 
knows the syllable know both? 

Theae. Το be sure. 

So. He knows Sigma and Omega? 


TRANSLATION. 213 


Theae. Yes. 

So. How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing 
neither, does he know both ? 

Theae. ‘That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates. 

So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in 
order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is 
ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus 
our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us. 

Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way. 

So. Wedo not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we 
ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters 
themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one 
form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the sepa- 
rate letters. 

Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be ~ 
truer than the other. 

So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in 
this cowardly way a great and dignified theory. 

Theae. Surely not. 

So. Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one 
general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the 
several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else. 

Theae. Very well. 

So. Then there must be no parts of It. 

Theae. Why? 

So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must ne- 
cessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole 
formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts ? 

Theae. Yes, I do. 

So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or 
different ? 

Theae. 1 have no clear view: but as you bid me 

answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different. 


214 ILHEAETETUS. 


So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the 
answer is so too, we must consider. 
Theae. We must. 


41 [ The first eighteen questions of this section comprise an elenchus, by which 
Socrates compels Theaetetus to admit, that there is {70 difference be- 
tween ‘the all’ and ‘the whole, and that both terms, in a thing that 
has parts, mean ‘all the parts? He then puts this alternative, which 
Theaetetus grants: if the syllable is not the letters, they are not tts 
parts: if it ts the same with them, both must be known equally, 
And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be 
different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not ? 
Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the 
letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine as- 
sumed, a syllable must be a single form without parts. And in that 
case, he now proves, it must be elementary, and so undefinable and 
unknown. It is not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined 
and known, unless the letters can be so likewise. This proof Socrates 
strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did 
not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter? In 
learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particular note ; 
and are not the notes the elements of music? All this Theaetetus 
admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elements may be 
known even more clearly than compounds (syllables) .] 


So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to 
your present argument P | 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plu- 
ral) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, 
two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or 
thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, 
do we in all these cases speak of the same or something 
different ? 

Theae. Of the same. 


TRANSLATION. 215 


So. That is, six; is it not? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all 
the six? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of 
one thing’? 

Theae. We must. 

So. Is it not of the six? 

Theae. Yes, 

So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things 
consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or ta 
πάντα (in singular or plural form) ? | 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Let us now state the question as follows: The 
number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they 
not ? 


Theae. Yes. 
So. And so of the furlong ? 
Theae. Yes. 


So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and 
all such things similarly? For the whole number is the 
essential whole 1n each case? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And is not the number of each the parts of each? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And all things which have parts will consist of 
parts P 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. And ail the parts have been admitted to be the all, 
if the entire number is to be the all. 


1 Reading, with K. F. Hermann, 8’ οὐχ ἓν for Ms 3° οὐδέν. 


41 


216 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. ‘True. | 

So. Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it 
would be the all, being all the parts? 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of . 
any thing except of a whole? 

Theae. Yes, of the all. 

So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it 
not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all 
is all? | 

Theae. Necessarily. 

So. And will not the whole be the very same thing— 
that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that 
from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an 
all, each of these being equally constituted by the same 
combination of parts. 

Theae. I now think there is no difference between an 
all and a whole. 

So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, 
the whole and all will mean all the parts? 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is 
not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the 
letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must 
be known equally with them ? 

Theae. Yes. | 

So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it 
to be different from them ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have 
you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, - 
besides its letters ? 

Theae. By no means. For if I allowed it to have 


TRANSLATION. 217 


parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the “letters, and 
seek anything else. 

So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present 
view a syllable must be a single generality without parts. 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time . 
back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good 
one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are 
composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is 
uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the 
term ‘is,’ nor yet ‘this,’ which are alien and foreign to it; 
and this cause makes such element undefinable and un- 
known? 

Theae. 1 remember. 

So. Is there any other cause than this of its being 

simple and indivisible? I see no other. 
| Theae. Apparently none. 

So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the 
same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one 
general notion P 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a cer- 
tain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are 
alike knowable and utterable, since ‘all the parts’ were 
shown to be the same with the whole? 

Theae, Assuredly. 

So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and 
letter are equally undefinable and unknowable: for the 
same cause will make them both so? 

Theae. 1 cannot contradict you. 

So, Let us not accept this statement from anybody, 
that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a 
letter. 


218 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument. 

So. Yet further: would you not rather accept the 
opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself 
when you learnt to read? 

Theae. What is that? 

So. That all you went on doing in the course of 
learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as 

‘ you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse 
you when they were spoken and written. 

Theae. Very true. 

So. And did not a complete instruction at your music- 
master’s mean the being able to follow each note, and 
say what string answered to it? These everybody would 
own to be properly called the elements of music. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. So far then as we have experience of letters and 
syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to — 
others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a 
knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more 
important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if 
any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but 
the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or 
talking nonsense ? 

Lheae. Undoubtedly. 


49 [Recurring to the third definition of knowledge proposed by Theaetetus 
—true opinion with rational explanation (dbyos)—Socrates now 
criticises this adjunct. What does it mean? Three answers may 
be given. (1) lt may simply mean—speech. Well; but all who are 
not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later ; and all true opinion 
will carry speech with it; and so it can never be separate from know- 
ledge. (2) Adyos may mean the power of describing anything by the 
elements of which it consists. Hesiod says: ‘a wagon has a hundred 


TRANSLATION. 219 


planks. But you and I, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we 
describe a wagon by certain known parts: axle, wheels, body, yoke, 
Ge. Thus we havea right opinion about it: but, as we cannot 
enumerate the elements, we have not the full knowledge. Or again, 
tn the case of spelling: perhaps somebody can spell the name Theae- 
tetus quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able 
to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, when another name, Theo- 
dorus, ts in question, he ts found to spell it wrongly (writing Te 
707 Qc) This proves that his true opinion in the former instance 
did not amount to knowledge: and thus again we find ‘ true opinion 
with rational explanation’ to fall short of knowledge.] 


So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I 
think ; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view 
the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying 
that true opinion combined with rational explanation is 
the most perfect knowledge. 

Theae. We must keep it in view. | 

So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate 
tous? I think it means one of three things. 

Theae. What are they ὃ 

Se. The first will be — making one’s meaning clear 
through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion 
in the stream through the voice as in a murror or in 
water. Do you not consider explanation to be something 
of this sort ? 

Theae. Ido. We say therefore that one who does so 
explains. 

So. This however is not everybody able to do sooner _ 
or later,—to shew what he thinks about anything—if he is 
not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any 
right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of 
explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed 
without knowledge. 

Theae. True. 


220 | THEAETETUS. 


So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on 
him who defined knowledge in the way we are now con-, 
sidering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps 
he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, 
when asked what anything is, to make answer to the 
questioner in terms of its elements. 

Theae. Instance what you mean, Socrates. 

So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, ‘A wagon 
consists of a hundred planks.’ I cannot describe them, 
probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, 
we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, 
seat, yoke. 

Theae. Quite so. 

So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, 
as he would if being asked your name and making answer 
by syllables,—while all we thought and said was right— 
we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind 
and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theae- 
tetus; though the fact is that nobody can define any- 
thing with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its 
elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid 
down. | 

Theae. It was. 

So. So too he might consider, with respect to a 
wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but’ that one 
who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, 
had, through this addition, joined explanation to true 
Opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical know- 
ledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described 
the whole in its elements. 

Theae. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates ? 

So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, 
that the full description of everything by its elements is 


TRANSLATION. 221 


explanation, but the description by syllables or anything 
more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, 
that we may criticize it. 

Theae. I quite accept that view. VY 

So. Do you accept it under the belief that a person is 
cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing 
sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or 
when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one 
thing belongs, at another time another ? 

Theae. I believe nothing of the sort. 

So. Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters 
at first, you and the other scholars did such things P 

Theae. Do you mean that we thought first one letter, 
then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we 
assigned the same letter sometimes to ss) proper syllable, 
sometimes to another ? 

So. That is what I mean. 

Theae. No, I do not forget; nor do I consider 
that they who are in this condition have yet acquired 
knowledge. 

So. Well, when a child of that age writing ‘ Theaetetus,’ 
thinks he ought to write, and does write ‘theta’ and 
‘epsilon,’ and again attempting to write ‘Theodorus thinks 
he ought to write and does write ‘tau’ and ‘epsilon,’ 
shall we. say that he knows the first syllable of your 
names P 

Theae. It has been just allowed that such an one does 
not yet know. 

So. Is there anything to hinder the same child from 
making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and 
fourth syllables ? 

Theae, Nothing at all. 

So. Will one who has in mind the description by 


222 THEAETETUS. 


elements write ‘ Theaetetus’ with true opinion, whensoever 
he writes it in just order ? 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Being still without knowledge, thaugh having right 
Opinion, do we say? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And yet he unites explanation with right opinion : 
for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted 
to be rational explanation ? 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with 
explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge. | 

Theae, Apparently. 


43 [There remains (3) a third meaning of λόγος, viz. a mark of difference 
by which anything ts shewn to be distinct from everything else. It 
ts said that, while you perceive only those features which the thing 
has in common with others, you have true opinion of it only: but 
that, when you add those which are peculiar to it and characteristic, 
then you have the knowledge of 1. Socrates proves this to be falla- 
cious. You have not a true opinion about anybody or anything, 
until you are cognisant of the peculiarities in your object. Hence it 
follows that such a λόγος ts already included in true opinion, and 
that, if an adjunct to this, it ts merely superfluous and absurd. So 
then, says Socrates, all our three attempts to define knowledge have 
failed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus? No, says the 
youth: you have already helped me to say much more than was in my 
own mind.] 


So. So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in 
thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or 
must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will 
not define ‘explanation’ thus: but rather as the remaining 
form of those three, one or other of which we said would 


TRANSLATION. 223 


be taken as ‘explanation,’ by one who defined knowledge 
to be ‘true opinion with explanation.’ 

Theae. You justly remind me. There was one form 
left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in 
utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the 
whole through the elements. What do you call the 
third ? 

So. That which most people would define as being 
able to mention some sign by which the thing in question 
differs from all others. _ 

“~“Theae. Can you give me an instance of any such ex- 
planation of anything ὃ 

So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may com- 
petently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest . 
of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we 
were lately saying, that, if you take the difference between 
each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as 
some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common 
feature only, your account will be about those things which 
have that community. 

Theae. 1 understand. And I think it right to call such 
a process definition. 

So. But whosoever with right opinion about any thing 
learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained 
knowledge of that of which before he had opinion. 

Theae. Yes, we state it so. 

So. Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have 
come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, 
I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood 
at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense 
in it. 


224 IHEAETETUS. 


Theae. What do you mean by this? 

So. Iwill tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion 
of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, 
I have opinion of you only. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And the definition was the interpretation of your 
distinction. | . 

Theae. Even so. 

So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that 
I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which 
you differ from others ? 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Then I was taking note of some of the common 
features, which belong no more to you than to other 
people? 

Theae. Of course. 7 

So. Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will 
you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? 
Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever 
is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any 
other individual member. ‘Will this imagination cause me 
to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, pro- 
verbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever P 

Theae. How can it? 

So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and 
eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent 
eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or 
of any other with these features ὃ 

Theae. Νο. 

So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my 
mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and de- 
posited in my heart some memorial different from all other 
snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all 


TRANSLATION. 225 


your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I 
meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion 
about you. : 

Theae. Most true. z 

So. Right opinion then in each case will be concerned 
with differentiation. 

Theae. Evidently. | 

So. What then will be ‘the adding explanation to right 
opinion?’ For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner 
in which one thing differs from all others, this direction 
becomes utterly ridiculous, | 

Theae. How? 

So. Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the 
nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right 
opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And 
thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or any- 
thing else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: 
nay it might more fairly be called a blind man’s direction: 
for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may 
learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a 
man groping in the dark. 

Theae, Τε] me now what answer you meant to give to 
your last question. 

So. If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to 
know distinction,—not to have an opinion of distinction— 
the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be 
a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get 
knowledge. Is it not? | 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a 
person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge 
of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this 
in his view. 

K. P. Vo 


226  THEAETETUS. 


Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking know- 
ledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether 
of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither 
sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation ac- 
companying true opinion will be knowledge. 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my 
friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to every- 
thing ? 

Theae. By all that’s sacred, Socrates, with your help I 
have said more than I had in my own mind. 

So. And does not our art declare that all these products 
have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing ? 

Theae. Decidedly so. 


44 [Well, Theaetetus, says Socrates in conclusion, the discussion of to-day 
will have done you good service in every way. You will cease to 
think you know things which you do not know, and your future 
conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more 
amiable companion, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other 
disputants. I must now leave you, to keep an appointment with my 
accuser Melitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.]} 


So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do 
become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present 
enquiry will have improved your conceptions ; and, if you 
do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more 
mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what 
you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no 
more. Nor do I know any of the things which others 
do, who are—and have made themselves—great and 


TRANSLATION. — 907 


wondrous men. ‘This midwifery I and my mother received 
as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I 
on young, noble and beautiful men. 

Now, however, I, must encounter Melitus and his in- 
dictment against me at the Porch of the King’. In the 
morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here. 


44 1 The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his 
accusers Anytus and Melitus in the court of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, situated 
at the στόα thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King. 


APPENDED NOTES. 


[The references are (1) to chapters in translation; (2) to pages in text and - 
translation ; (3) to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as shewn in margin 
of text.] 


pp. το, 100. St. 147. D. περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεό- 
Swpos ode ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαί- 
νων ὅτι µήκει οὐ ἐύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, ‘Theodorus was descri- 
bing to us something about powers, proving as to. the root 
of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensur- 
able with the foot-unit:’ i.e. shewing that κ/ 3 is greater than 
τ and less than 2, and that κ/5 is greater than 2 and less 
than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many 
times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ποδιαίᾳ 
understand γραμμῇ. | 

H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew 
that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythago- 
rean Theorem (Euclid 1. 47); that δυνάµεις mean the powers 
αἲ, δ' &c. as in modern algebra, and that ποδιαία here is a 
unit square a*, by which the squares of a series of hypote- 
nuses of nght-angled triangles, having for their kathetes @ 


and the foregoing hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since 
W353 


230 + THEAETETUS. 


6° = 20°, c* = 3a, ὦ- -- 4a", &c. Theodorus may have taught 
this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the 
word µήκει proves, shewing ποδιαία to be the linear foot-unit. 
And that δυνάµεις mean roots, not the modern ‘powers,’ is 
clear from what follows 148 A, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, duvapets, 
ws µήκει μὲν ov ξυμµέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς O ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται, 
ie. α/4, V5 &c. are called ‘powers,’ because they have 
power, when squared, to form areas which are commensur- 
able with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. So Professors 
Jowett and Campbell. 

pp. 15, 116. St. 151 E. ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. 
The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of 
Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (µέτρον ἄνθρωπος, 
homo mensura) are probably cited from that philosopher’s 
treatise called ᾿᾽Αλήθεια, Truth. But the identification of it 
with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is 
sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, 11. p. 323 
note) to be Plato’s own view, which Grote considers 
unjust, contending at some length against it (322—336). 
His main argument is, that implication of object and sub- 
ject 1s universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 
‘cogitata’ suppose a ‘cogitans,’ as much as ‘sensibilia’ 
suppose a ‘sentiens.’ Therefore Protagor , would not have 
limited the application of his maxim to aiobyo.s'alone. We 
must concur withGrote in lamenting that we get the statements 
and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only; and that 
the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent 
Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, 
and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius. 

pp. 16, 117. St. 152 A. Ανθρωπος δὲ σύ τε Kayo; 
Socrates means: as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man 
generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are 
men. 


APPENDED NOTES. 231 


pp. 16,117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used 
Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that 
what appears to any one ‘is’ to him: and, as appearance 
implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge. 

pp. 16,118, St.152C. “Ap ovv«7.A. Why this out- 
burst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the ad- 
mission that αἴσθησις τοῦ ὄντος ἐστί, perception is of the 
existent, of that which ‘is.’ But the Heracleitean doctrine 
does not allow that anything ‘is’ (ἐστί but says that all 
things γίγνεται ‘come to be.’ And Protagoras in his ᾽Αλή- 
θεια adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? 
says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric 
doctrine (yvigaro) to the multitude, and tell the truth in 
esoteric confidence (ἐν ἀποῤῥήτῳ ἔλεγεν) to his disciples? 
Did he teach the one to believe in ovra, the others in 
nothing but γιγνόμεναδ Aivirreo Oat, ‘to speak in riddles,’ is 
used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato 
considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved 
in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he dis- 
tinctly says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation 
for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is 
evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: 
and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was com- 
mitted to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, 
which appear in the next passage and afterwards. 

pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three 
doctrines (1) the Heracleitean (οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ 
πάντα) (2) the Protagorean (πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον µέτρον 
εἶναι) and that put forth by Theaetetus (αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην 
γίγνεσθαι) is summarised below, 15, pp. 28, 135. The fol- 
lowing observations of Grote (Plato, 1. p. 324) deserve 
special attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties 
occurring in Plato’s treatment of this subject from 9 to 15 


232 THEAETETUS. 


and again from 15 to 30, where the definition αἴσθησις is 
finally abandoned. ‘Upon all the three opinions, thus 

* represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a 
lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue)... 
His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, 
because he often passes with little notice from one to the 
other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because 
he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to 
take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: 
and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his 
own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real 
purpose—whether to expound or to deride the opinions 
of others—whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his 
power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish 
between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still 
greater difficulty that we have not before us any one of the 
three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.’ 

193 pp. 21, 125. St. 155 Β. τῶν ἁμυήτων. Prof. Camp- 
bell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue ex- 
amines at large the question, who are the men whom 
Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. 
Had he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Demo- 
critus and the Atomists? If Plato had either of these two _ 
schools in view, it seems more probable that these were 
the followers cf Democritus. The γηγενεῖς mentioned in 
the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the 
σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι (ed pad ἄμουσοι) in this place. See 
Campbell, pp. xx, xxx. 

pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial 
favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to 
the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken 
by Prof. Campbell and Prof. Jowett supported also by 
H. Schmidt (though Miller in his German translation 


APPENDED NOTES. 233 


renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not 
contradict him): to which authorities I have to add an © 
opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former 
pupil Mr R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, 
Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker 
in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the 
text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my 
readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which 
conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. My 
own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or 
no value. 

20 pp. 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this 
point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended 
victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, some- 
times expounding and apparently ‘supporting it, but only 
to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes 
to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, 
for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take 
his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit 
to an elenchus, in defence of his old friend Protagoras. 

Tov ἐμὲ is an assumption of dignity: ‘a man like me.’ 

26 pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. if he had tried...a man’s 
own self” In this translation we follow the reading εἴ πῃ 
τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν instead of the vulgate εἰ μὴ. Prof. 
Campbell, though he keeps εἶ μὴ in the text, accepts 
emendation in his note, but prefers «ef δὴ. I can have 
no doubt that αὐτὸς must not be referred to Protagoras 
by reading αὐτῷ after it, but that the sense must be as I © 
have given it, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, ‘a man’s own self? So Prof. 
Jowett (who also reads δή) ‘every one for himself. 

28 pp. 56, 172. St. 182 B. ἀλλ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων κ.τ.λ. 
The meaning of this passage can be none other than what 
is given in my translation, which is the same as Prof. 





234 THEAETETUS. 


Jowett’s in effect. But how the Greek construction is to 
be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell’s note gives very 
faint assistance, and neither Heindorf’s ἑαυτῶν for ἀμφοτέ- 
pwv, nor ἀποτικτόµενα for ἀποτίκτοντα, fully satisfy. All we 
can say of the place is—medicam manum expectat. 

38 pp. 82,209. St. 201, C. It 1s commonly supposed that 
the words εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας refer to Antisthenes. 

44 As respects the definition -ef- knowledge, this dialogue 
only arrives at certain negative conclusions ; namely, that 
knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor 
true Opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in 
the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which 
he had in mind, and which he valued. For (1) he has paid 
a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, 
Eucleides and Terpsion; (2) he has shewn what he after- 
wards declared by his inscription on the Academy, μηδεὶς 
ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω, that mathematical studies (¢.¢ exact 
science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies (ze. to 
transcendental or abstract science); (3) he has shewn that 
minds capable of pursuing the former with success are 
not necessarily capable of mastering the latter: this he 
indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphilo- 
sophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt 
student of philosophy ; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Pro- 
tagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous 
and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great 
leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his 
master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he 
has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and 
political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth 
against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the Gorgias, 
and developed more fully in the Republic at a later 
time ; (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious 


APPENDED NOTES. 235 


assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all percep- 
tions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas: this 16 
ψυχή, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which 
confute the second and ‘third definitions attempted by 
Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word- 
fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dia- 
-lectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the 
same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers 
by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove- 
cage. But he may have had more serious aims in these 
lelenchi than are obvious to my mind. 


CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A., AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 





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